loader.rs

// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2024-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
use std::time::Duration;

use anyhow::Result;
use ipnet::IpNet;
use reqwest::dns::{Addrs, Name, Resolve, Resolving};
use reqwest::redirect::Policy;

use dynamo_memory::nixl::NixlAgent;
use dynamo_protocols::types::ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart;

use super::common::EncodedMediaData;
use super::decoders::{Decoder, MediaDecoder};
use super::rdma::{RdmaMediaDataDescriptor, get_nixl_agent};

const DEFAULT_HTTP_USER_AGENT: &str = "dynamo-ai/dynamo";
const DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 3;

// IP ranges that must never be reachable from a user-controlled URL.
// Source: RFC1918 (private), RFC6598 (CGNAT), RFC5735 (loopback, link-local,
// 0.0.0.0/8), RFC4193 (ULA), RFC4291 (IPv6 loopback / link-local), RFC6890
// (reserved). Link-local 169.254/16 covers the AWS / OpenStack metadata IP.
//
// Keep this list in sync with the Python counterpart
// (components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/url_validator.py::_BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS).
static BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS: LazyLock<Vec<IpNet>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    [
        "0.0.0.0/8",
        "10.0.0.0/8",
        "100.64.0.0/10",
        "127.0.0.0/8",
        "169.254.0.0/16",
        "172.16.0.0/12",
        "192.0.0.0/24",
        "192.0.2.0/24",
        "192.168.0.0/16",
        "198.18.0.0/15",
        "198.51.100.0/24",
        "203.0.113.0/24",
        "224.0.0.0/4",
        "240.0.0.0/4",
        "255.255.255.255/32",
        "::/128",
        "::1/128",
        "::ffff:0:0/96",
        "fc00::/7",
        "fe80::/10",
        "ff00::/8",
    ]
    .iter()
    .map(|s| s.parse().expect("invalid CIDR in BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS"))
    .collect()
});

// Hostnames we reject by literal match without any DNS lookup. Defends
// against /etc/hosts tricks or malicious resolvers that alias metadata /
// internal-service names to attacker IPs. Match is case-insensitive.
//
// Keep this list in sync with the Python counterpart
// (components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/url_validator.py::_BLOCKED_HOSTS).
static BLOCKED_HOSTS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    [
        "localhost",
        "localhost.localdomain",
        "ip6-localhost",
        "ip6-loopback",
        "metadata",
        "metadata.google.internal",
        "metadata.goog",
        "kubernetes.default",
        "kubernetes.default.svc",
    ]
    .iter()
    .copied()
    .collect()
});

/// Return `true` if `ip` falls inside any of the blocked ranges.
pub fn is_blocked_ip(ip: &IpAddr) -> bool {
    BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS.iter().any(|net| net.contains(ip))
}

#[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
pub struct MediaFetcher {
    pub user_agent: String,
    pub allow_direct_ip: bool,
    pub allow_direct_port: bool,
    /// When `false` (default), reject URLs that target blocked locations:
    /// an IP literal in the RFC-range blocklist (`BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS`),
    /// a hostname in the literal blocklist (`BLOCKED_HOSTS`, e.g.
    /// `localhost` / `metadata.google.internal`), or — in
    /// `check_if_url_allowed_with_dns` — a hostname that DNS-resolves
    /// to a blocked IP. The name reads "IP" but semantically this is a
    /// single "allow internal / on-prem targets" switch that covers
    /// both IP and hostname blocklists together: real on-prem
    /// deployments need both at once (private CIDRs *and* internal
    /// service names), and splitting them would give no useful config
    /// while doubling the footgun surface. **Never** set on anything
    /// public-facing.
    pub allow_private_ips: bool,
    pub allowed_media_domains: Option<HashSet<String>>,
    pub timeout: Option<Duration>,
}

impl Default for MediaFetcher {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            user_agent: DEFAULT_HTTP_USER_AGENT.to_string(),
            allow_direct_ip: false,
            allow_direct_port: false,
            allow_private_ips: false,
            allowed_media_domains: None,
            timeout: Some(DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT),
        }
    }
}

impl MediaFetcher {
    /// Build a `MediaFetcher` whose defaults respect the shared
    /// `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL` environment variable. Mirrors the Python
    /// `UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()` behavior so both fetch paths
    /// (frontend decode in Rust, backend decode in Python) honor the
    /// same on-prem opt-in flag.
    ///
    /// `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL=1` flips `allow_direct_ip`,
    /// `allow_direct_port`, and `allow_private_ips` all to `true` at
    /// once.
    pub fn from_env() -> Self {
        let allow_internal = std::env::var("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL").ok().as_deref() == Some("1");
        Self {
            allow_direct_ip: allow_internal,
            allow_direct_port: allow_internal,
            allow_private_ips: allow_internal,
            ..Self::default()
        }
    }
}

impl MediaFetcher {
    pub fn check_if_url_allowed(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<()> {
        if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https" | "data") {
            anyhow::bail!("Only HTTP(S) and data URLs are allowed");
        }

        if url.scheme() == "data" {
            return Ok(());
        }

        let host = url
            .host()
            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("URL has no host component"))?;

        if !self.allow_direct_ip && !matches!(host, url::Host::Domain(_)) {
            anyhow::bail!("Direct IP access is not allowed");
        }
        if !self.allow_direct_port && url.port().is_some() {
            anyhow::bail!("Direct port access is not allowed");
        }

        // Host-level checks: blocked hostnames and IP literals in blocked
        // ranges. DNS-resolved IPs are checked in `check_if_url_allowed_with_dns`.
        if !self.allow_private_ips {
            let ip_literal = match host {
                url::Host::Domain(domain) => {
                    let lowered = domain.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();
                    if BLOCKED_HOSTS.contains(lowered.as_str()) {
                        anyhow::bail!("Host '{domain}' is blocked (resolves to internal service)");
                    }
                    None
                }
                url::Host::Ipv4(ip) => Some(IpAddr::V4(ip)),
                url::Host::Ipv6(ip) => Some(IpAddr::V6(ip)),
            };
            if let Some(ip) = ip_literal
                && is_blocked_ip(&ip)
            {
                anyhow::bail!("IP literal '{ip}' is in a blocked range");
            }
        }

        if let Some(allowed_domains) = &self.allowed_media_domains
            && let Some(host_str) = url.host_str()
            && !allowed_domains.contains(host_str)
        {
            anyhow::bail!("Host '{host_str}' is not in the allowed_media_domains list");
        }

        Ok(())
    }

    /// Full policy check: runs `check_if_url_allowed` and, for hostname
    /// URLs, resolves DNS and checks each resulting IP against the blocked ranges.
    pub async fn check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<()> {
        self.check_if_url_allowed(url)?;

        // Only hostnames need DNS resolution; IP-literal hosts were already
        // checked against the blocklist above.
        if self.allow_private_ips || url.scheme() == "data" {
            return Ok(());
        }
        let Some(url::Host::Domain(host)) = url.host() else {
            return Ok(());
        };

        let port = url.port_or_known_default().unwrap_or(0);
        let iter = tokio::net::lookup_host((host, port))
            .await
            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not resolve host '{host}': {e}"))?;
        for sock_addr in iter {
            let ip = sock_addr.ip();
            if is_blocked_ip(&ip) {
                anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' resolves to blocked IP '{ip}'");
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

/// DNS resolver that filters out blocked IP ranges before reqwest sees them.
///
/// Attached to the shared `reqwest::Client` via `ClientBuilder::dns_resolver`.
/// reqwest calls this for every hostname it needs to resolve — including
/// redirect targets — so DNS rebinding can't slip a blocked IP past us:
/// reqwest literally never learns about the blocked addresses.
struct BlocklistResolver {
    allow_private_ips: bool,
}

impl Resolve for BlocklistResolver {
    fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
        let host = name.as_str().to_string();
        let allow_private = self.allow_private_ips;
        Box::pin(async move {
            let iter = tokio::net::lookup_host((host.as_str(), 0_u16)).await?;
            let addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = if allow_private {
                iter.collect()
            } else {
                iter.filter(|sa| !is_blocked_ip(&sa.ip())).collect()
            };
            if addrs.is_empty() {
                return Err(Box::new(std::io::Error::new(
                    std::io::ErrorKind::AddrNotAvailable,
                    format!("no non-blocked addresses for host '{host}'"),
                ))
                    as Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>);
            }
            Ok(Box::new(addrs.into_iter()) as Addrs)
        })
    }
}

pub struct MediaLoader {
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    media_decoder: MediaDecoder,
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    http_client: reqwest::Client,
    #[allow(dead_code)]
    media_fetcher: MediaFetcher,
    nixl_agent: NixlAgent,
}

impl MediaLoader {
    pub fn new(media_decoder: MediaDecoder, media_fetcher: Option<MediaFetcher>) -> Result<Self> {
        // Fall back to env-aware defaults so `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL=1` is
        // honored even when the caller doesn't pass an explicit fetcher.
        let media_fetcher = media_fetcher.unwrap_or_else(MediaFetcher::from_env);

        // Redirect policy: revalidate the policy-visible part of the URL
        // (scheme, IP literals, hostname blocklist, direct-IP / direct-port
        // rules) on every hop. DNS-based attacks on redirect targets are
        // handled by the custom resolver below.
        let fetcher_for_redirects = media_fetcher.clone();
        let redirect_policy = Policy::custom(move |attempt| {
            if attempt.previous().len() >= MAX_REDIRECTS {
                return attempt.error(anyhow::anyhow!("too many redirects (max={MAX_REDIRECTS})"));
            }
            match fetcher_for_redirects.check_if_url_allowed(attempt.url()) {
                Ok(()) => attempt.follow(),
                Err(e) => attempt.error(e),
            }
        });

        let mut http_client_builder = reqwest::Client::builder()
            .user_agent(&media_fetcher.user_agent)
            .redirect(redirect_policy)
            .dns_resolver(Arc::new(BlocklistResolver {
                allow_private_ips: media_fetcher.allow_private_ips,
            }));

        if let Some(timeout) = media_fetcher.timeout {
            http_client_builder = http_client_builder.timeout(timeout);
        }

        let http_client = http_client_builder.build()?;

        let nixl_agent = get_nixl_agent()?;

        Ok(Self {
            media_decoder,
            http_client,
            media_fetcher,
            nixl_agent,
        })
    }

    pub async fn fetch_and_decode_media_part(
        &self,
        oai_content_part: &ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart,
        media_io_kwargs: Option<&MediaDecoder>,
    ) -> Result<RdmaMediaDataDescriptor> {
        // fetch the media, decode and NIXL-register
        let decoded = match oai_content_part {
            ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart::ImageUrl(image_part) => {
                let mdc_decoder = self
                    .media_decoder
                    .image
                    .as_ref()
                    .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Model does not support image inputs"))?;

                let url = &image_part.image_url.url;
                self.media_fetcher
                    .check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(url)
                    .await?;
                let data = EncodedMediaData::from_url(url, &self.http_client).await?;

                // Use runtime decoder if provided, with MDC limits enforced
                let decoder =
                    mdc_decoder.with_runtime(media_io_kwargs.and_then(|k| k.image.as_ref()));
                decoder.decode_async(data).await?
            }
            #[allow(unused_variables)]
            ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart::VideoUrl(video_part) => {
                #[cfg(not(feature = "media-ffmpeg"))]
                anyhow::bail!("Video decoding requires the 'media-ffmpeg' feature to be enabled");

                #[cfg(feature = "media-ffmpeg")]
                {
                    let mdc_decoder =
                        self.media_decoder.video.as_ref().ok_or_else(|| {
                            anyhow::anyhow!("Model does not support video inputs")
                        })?;

                    let url = &video_part.video_url.url;
                    self.media_fetcher
                        .check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(url)
                        .await?;
                    let data = EncodedMediaData::from_url(url, &self.http_client).await?;

                    // Use runtime decoder if provided, with MDC limits enforced
                    let decoder =
                        mdc_decoder.with_runtime(media_io_kwargs.and_then(|k| k.video.as_ref()));
                    decoder.decode_async(data).await?
                }
            }
            ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart::AudioUrl(_) => {
                anyhow::bail!("Audio decoding is not supported yet");
            }
            _ => anyhow::bail!("Unsupported media type"),
        };

        let rdma_descriptor = decoded.into_rdma_descriptor(&self.nixl_agent)?;
        Ok(rdma_descriptor)
    }
}

#[cfg(all(test, feature = "testing-nixl"))]
mod tests {
    use super::super::decoders::ImageDecoder;
    use super::super::rdma::DataType;
    use super::*;
    use dynamo_protocols::types::{ChatCompletionRequestMessageContentPartImage, ImageUrl};

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_fetch_and_decode() {
        let test_image_bytes =
            include_bytes!("../../../tests/data/media/llm-optimize-deploy-graphic.png");

        let mut server = mockito::Server::new_async().await;
        let mock = server
            .mock("GET", "/llm-optimize-deploy-graphic.png")
            .with_status(200)
            .with_header("content-type", "image/png")
            .with_body(&test_image_bytes[..])
            .create_async()
            .await;

        let media_decoder = MediaDecoder {
            image: Some(ImageDecoder::default()),
            #[cfg(feature = "media-ffmpeg")]
            video: None,
        };
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allow_direct_ip: true,
            allow_direct_port: true,
            // mockito serves on 127.0.0.1 which is in the loopback blocklist.
            allow_private_ips: true,
            ..Default::default()
        };

        let loader: MediaLoader = match MediaLoader::new(media_decoder, Some(fetcher)) {
            Ok(l) => l,
            Err(e) => {
                println!(
                    "test test_fetch_and_decode ... ignored (NIXL/UCX not available: {})",
                    e
                );
                return;
            }
        };

        let image_url = ImageUrl::from(format!("{}/llm-optimize-deploy-graphic.png", server.url()));
        let content_part = ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart::ImageUrl(
            ChatCompletionRequestMessageContentPartImage { image_url },
        );

        let result = loader
            .fetch_and_decode_media_part(&content_part, None)
            .await;

        let descriptor = match result {
            Ok(descriptor) => descriptor,
            Err(e) if e.to_string().contains("NIXL agent is not available") => {
                println!("test test_fetch_and_decode ... ignored (NIXL agent not available)");
                return;
            }
            Err(e) => panic!("Failed to fetch and decode image: {}", e),
        };
        mock.assert_async().await;
        assert_eq!(descriptor.tensor_info.dtype, DataType::UINT8);

        // Verify image dimensions: 1,999px × 1,125px (width × height)
        // Shape format is [height, width, channels]
        assert_eq!(descriptor.tensor_info.shape.len(), 3);
        assert_eq!(
            descriptor.tensor_info.shape[0], 1125,
            "Height should be 1125"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            descriptor.tensor_info.shape[1], 1999,
            "Width should be 1999"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            descriptor.tensor_info.shape[2], 4,
            "RGBA channels should be 4"
        );

        assert!(
            descriptor.source_storage.is_some(),
            "Source storage should be present"
        );
        assert!(
            descriptor.source_storage.unwrap().is_registered(),
            "Source storage should be registered with NIXL"
        );
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests_non_nixl {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_direct_ip_blocked() {
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allow_direct_ip: false,
            ..Default::default()
        };

        let url = url::Url::parse("http://192.168.1.1/image.jpg").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);

        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(
            result
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string()
                .contains("Direct IP access is not allowed")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_direct_port_blocked() {
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allow_direct_port: false,
            ..Default::default()
        };

        let url = url::Url::parse("http://example.com:8080/image.jpg").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);

        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(
            result
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string()
                .contains("Direct port access is not allowed")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_domain_allowlist() {
        let mut allowed_domains = HashSet::new();
        allowed_domains.insert("trusted.com".to_string());
        allowed_domains.insert("example.com".to_string());

        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allowed_media_domains: Some(allowed_domains),
            ..Default::default()
        };

        // Allowed domain should pass
        let url = url::Url::parse("https://trusted.com/image.jpg").unwrap();
        assert!(fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url).is_ok());

        // Disallowed domain should fail
        let url = url::Url::parse("https://untrusted.com/image.jpg").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(
            result
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string()
                .contains("allowed_media_domains")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_is_blocked_ip_ranges() {
        for ip in [
            "127.0.0.1",
            "10.0.0.1",
            "172.16.5.5",
            "192.168.1.1",
            "169.254.169.254", // AWS metadata
            "100.64.0.1",      // CGNAT
            "::1",
            "fe80::1",
            "fc00::1",
        ] {
            let addr: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_blocked_ip(&addr), "{ip} should be blocked");
        }

        // Public IPs should pass.
        for ip in ["8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1", "2606:4700:4700::1111"] {
            let addr: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(!is_blocked_ip(&addr), "{ip} should not be blocked");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_blocked_ip_literal_rejected_even_when_direct_ip_allowed() {
        // allow_direct_ip=true lets IP-literal URLs through the early check,
        // but the RFC-range blocklist must still reject cloud-metadata IPs.
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allow_direct_ip: true,
            ..Default::default()
        };

        let url = url::Url::parse("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(
            result
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string()
                .contains("is in a blocked range")
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_blocked_hostname_rejected() {
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
        for host in [
            "localhost",
            "metadata.google.internal",
            "kubernetes.default.svc",
        ] {
            let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("https://{host}/x")).unwrap();
            let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
            assert!(result.is_err(), "{host} should be blocked");
            assert!(
                result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("blocked"),
                "{host} error should mention 'blocked'"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_allow_private_ips_bypasses_blocklist() {
        // allow_private_ips=true is the escape hatch for on-prem / dev envs.
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allow_direct_ip: true,
            allow_private_ips: true,
            ..Default::default()
        };

        // Both an IP literal in a blocked range and a blocked hostname
        // should pass when the opt-in flag is set.
        assert!(
            fetcher
                .check_if_url_allowed(&url::Url::parse("http://10.0.0.5/x").unwrap())
                .is_ok()
        );
        assert!(
            fetcher
                .check_if_url_allowed(&url::Url::parse("https://localhost/x").unwrap())
                .is_ok()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_hostname_blocklist_case_insensitive() {
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
        let url = url::Url::parse("https://Metadata.Google.Internal/x").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_from_env_default() {
        // Saving/restoring env vars in tests is racy with parallel tests,
        // so we only assert the "unset" case here (parallel-safe).
        // SAFETY: single-threaded mutation acceptable for this restore.
        unsafe {
            std::env::remove_var("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL");
        }
        let f = MediaFetcher::from_env();
        assert!(!f.allow_private_ips);
        assert!(!f.allow_direct_ip);
        assert!(!f.allow_direct_port);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_hostname_blocklist_strips_trailing_dot() {
        // FQDN form with a trailing dot must still match the blocklist;
        // `metadata.google.internal.` resolves to the same host as
        // `metadata.google.internal` at the DNS layer.
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
        let url = url::Url::parse("https://metadata.google.internal./x").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
        assert!(result.is_err(), "FQDN with trailing dot should be rejected");
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_check_with_dns_data_url_skips_resolution() {
        // data: URLs never touch the network, so the async path must early-return.
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
        let url = url::Url::parse("").unwrap();
        fetcher.check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&url).await.unwrap();
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_check_with_dns_public_ip_literal_passes() {
        // IP literals were already checked by the sync pass; async path is a no-op.
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
            allow_direct_ip: true,
            ..Default::default()
        };
        let url = url::Url::parse("https://8.8.8.8/x").unwrap();
        fetcher.check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&url).await.unwrap();
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_check_with_dns_blocked_hostname_fails_before_resolution() {
        // The sync hostname-blocklist check fires before we attempt any DNS.
        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
        let url = url::Url::parse("https://localhost/x").unwrap();
        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&url).await;
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }
}