pile_philpapers-v0-loglikelihood_rolling.json

[["Explaining the Illusion of Asymmetric Insight Asbj\u00f8rn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper Penultimate draft. Final version forthcoming in \u200bReview of Philosophy and Psychology\u200b. Abstract: People tend to think that they know others better than others know them (Pronin et al. 2001). This phenomenon is known as the \"illusion of asymmetric insight.\" While the illusion has been well documented by a series of recent experiments, less has been done to explain it. In this paper, we argue that extant explanations are inadequate because they either get the explanatory direction wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a sufficiently nuanced way. Instead, we propose a new explanation that does not face these problems. The explanation is based on two other well-documented psychological phenomena: the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased way, and the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others. Keywords \u200bIllusion of asymmetric insight \u2219 Interpersonal knowledge \u2219 Biased evidence assimilation \u2219 Cognitive bias 1. Introduction A series of recent psychological experiments suggest that people tend to think that they know others better than others know them (Pronin et al. 2001). If Alice and Ben are as people are most, Alice will tend to think that she knows Ben better than Ben knows her, and Ben will tend to think that he knows Alice better than Alice knows him. This phenomenon is known as the \"illusion of asymmetric insight.\" If people really do have a tendency to think that they know others better than others know them, it must indeed reflect an illusion, at least for many of us. Although it may be the case that some \u200bpeople have superior interpersonal insight, this clearly cannot be the case for the majority of us. Just like Alice and Ben cannot \u200bboth be right in the example above, many of us must be wrong in taking ourselves to have superior insight into others. The aim of this paper is to investigate what \u200bexplains the illusion of asymmetric insight. This means searching for a psychological mechanism or pattern that can be held responsible for the illusion. As it is, this explanatory challenge stands unmet. Extant 1 explanations, we argue, are inadequate because they either get the explanatory direction wrong or fail to accommodate the experimental results in a sufficiently nuanced way. Instead, we will propose a new explanation that does not face these problems. The explanation consists of two parts. The first part posits a tendency to \u200boverestimate our own insight into others. This tendency, we argue, is predicted by another well-documented psychological phenomenon, namely the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased manner. Since third-personal evidence about other people's inner feelings and motives is often highly ambiguous, we will tend to take such evidence to confirm our prior beliefs about the personal characteristics of other people, thereby making us prone to overestimate our own interpersonal insight. The second part of our explanation posits a tendency to \u200bunderestimate other people's insight into us. This tendency, we argue, is predicted by yet another well-documented psychological phenomenon, namely the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others. This might seem surprising: how could the relatively innocuous idea that we know ourselves better than we know others have the effect of making us prone to underestimate how well other people know us? We show that, when coupled with a few other well-supported auxiliary hypotheses, it can in fact have that effect. Together these two tendencies-the tendency to overestimate our own interpersonal insight, and the tendency to underestimate that of others-provide a simple and well-founded explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that can predict important details in the experimental findings. Why is it important to understand the psychological underpinnings of the illusion of asymmetric insight? One set of reasons has to do with social interaction. If we think that we know others better than others know us, it is natural to suspect that we will be inclined to invest more effort in correcting other people's perception of \u200bus than in correcting our own perception of \u200bothers\u200b. We will tend to talk when we should listen, and will become impatient or defensive when others suggest that we have misinterpreted their statements or motives. This might lead to socially undesirable outcomes, such as entrenched disagreement and conflict (Pronin et al. 2001, pp. 652-53; Kennedy and Pronin 2008). But 2 if we understand the cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for these impulses, we might be in a better position to correct or alleviate them. A second set of reasons concerns how the illusion of asymmetric insight relates to various other psychological phenomena. If our explanation is correct, understanding the illusion of asymmetric insight may be of even greater importance than previously thought. On the prevalent explanation, the illusion of asymmetric insight is seen as an effect of another illusory conviction about the relative importance of introspection for knowing ourselves versus other people: we tend to think that knowing \u200bus requires access to inner thoughts and feelings, whereas we can know \u200bothers quite well merely on the basis of observable behavior (Pronin et al. 2004 and 2008; Pronin 2009). This so-called \"introspection illusion\" is relevant for understanding a wide range of psychological phenomena, including people's tendency to make dispositional inferences about others, but not about themselves (Jones and Nisbett 1972), and their tendency to see others as being more susceptible to cognitive and motivational biases than they themselves are (Pronin et al. 2002 and 2004). But if we are right, the prevalent explanation gets the direction of explanation wrong: it is the illusion of asymmetric insight that gives rise to the introspection illusion, rather than \u200bvice versa\u200b. As such, our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight stands to explain a much wider set of psychological phenomena related to the introspection illusion as well. We do not present new empirical findings in this article. Rather, we base our explanation on its ability to account for the available data, and on the significant amount of independent support that has been given for the auxiliary hypotheses that we invoke. However, we also highlight some interesting novel predictions of our explanation to be tested in future experimental work. The agenda for the rest of paper is as follows. After reviewing the relevant experimental findings by Pronin et al. (\u00a72), we argue that existing explanations of the illusion of asymmetric insight are inadequate (\u00a73). We then present our new explanation of the illusion (\u00a74), argue that it does not suffer from the same shortcomings as the existing ones (\u00a75), and show that it can explain a two further psychological effect unearthed by 3 Pronin et al. (\u00a76). Finally, we describe a hitherto untested third-personal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, which may serve to test our explanation in further studies (\u00a77). 2. The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight Pronin et al. (2001) report a group of five studies designed to test the hypothesis that people tend to think that they know others better than others know them. Below we briefly review the setup and results of each study. First study: Participants were asked to think of a close friend and rate (on a scale from 1-11) how well they felt they knew or understood their friend, and how well they felt their friend knew or understood them. The study revealed a tendency among the participants to rate their knowledge of their friend higher than their friend's knowledge of them. Second study: Pairs of same-sex college roommates were asked a number of questions about how well they felt they knew their roommate, and how well they felt their roommate knew them. For example, the participants were asked to rate (on a scale from 1-11) how well they felt they knew how shy their roommate was, and how well they felt their roommate knew how shy they were. In line with the first study, the participants tended to rate their knowledge of their roommate higher than their roommate's knowledge of them. The study also sought to determine whether the effect would be more pronounced for judgments involving knowledge about private and unobservable psychological qualities rather than public and observable ones, and more pronounced for judgments involving relatively negative qualities rather than positive or neutral ones. For both contrasts, a significantly increased effect was found. The private and unobservable qualities included in this part were: \"real\" feelings, motives for action, doing things for the purpose of fitting in, and doing things just for the purpose of pleasing others. The study also gave support to an intrapersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, whereby people tend to think that they know themselves better than others know themselves. Again, this tendency was found to be more pronounced for judgments involving knowledge about private qualities, and negative qualities. 4 Third study: \u200bParticipants were given a questionnaire in which they were asked to describe when they were \"most like themselves\", and when their close friend was \"most like himself or herself.\" The participants tended to give more weight to privately accessible thoughts and feelings when describing themselves, while giving more weight to publicly available information about performance and behavior when describing their friends. Pronin et al. take this to reflect a tendency to think that it is harder to gain insight into oneself than it is to gain insight into others. Fourth study: \u200bPairs of previously unacquainted college students engaged in brief face-to-face interaction, and were subsequently asked how much they felt they had learned about their partner, and how much they felt their partner had learned about them. In line with the third study, the reports revealed a tendency among the students to think that they had learned more about their partner during the conversation than their partner had learned about them. Fifth study: \u200bParticipants took a projective test in which they were asked to complete a series of incomplete word fragments, such as \"g _ _ l\" and \"c _ r _ _ r.\" Afterwards, the participants were asked how revealing they felt the projective test had been of them, and how revealing they felt it had been of the other participants. In line with the third and fourth study, the participants generally found their own word fragment completions to be less revealing than those of other participants. 3. Existing Explanations Although the primary concern of Pronin et al. is to establish \u200bthat people suffer from an illusion of asymmetric insight, they also consider three possible explanations of \u200bwhy people might suffer from this illusion. Two of the explanations are based on the so-called \"self-enhancement bias\" and the phenomenon of \"na\u00efve realism.\" However, Pronin et al. reject these explanations because that they are unable to account for certain details in the experimental findings. Instead, they propose a third explanation, which is based on an illusory conviction about how \u200bknowable \u200bwe are compared to others. Below we review 5 Pronin et al.'s discussion of all three explanations, and explain why we find their favored explanation wanting. 3.1 Explanations from Self-Enhancement Bias and Na\u00efve Realism One line of explanation discussed and ultimately rejected by Pronin et al. (2001) sees the illusion of asymmetric insight as a special instance of the so-called \"self-enhancement bias.\" Numerous studies have shown that the majority of people take themselves to be above-average on a wide range of desirable qualities and abilities, such as intelligence, driving skills, and the like. Perhaps the claim to superior interpersonal insight should be 1 understood as just another instance of this more general tendency. However, Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) rightly observe that if we simply subsume the illusion of asymmetric insight under the self-enhancement bias, we risk overlooking important details in the experimental findings. For example, as noted above, the tendency to claim superiority in interpersonal knowledge was more pronounced for judgments involving knowledge about private and unobservable psychological qualities rather than public and observable ones, and for judgments involving negative qualities rather than positive or neutral ones (Pronin et al. 2001, p. 652). While this finding is \u200bconsistent with the view that the illusion of asymmetric insight is an instance of the self-enhancement bias, it is not \u200bpredicted by it. Thus, even if the illusion of asymmetric insight may be seen as an instance of the self-enhancement bias, this would still leave important nuances in the experimental findings unexplained. Another problem pointed out by Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) is that it is unclear from the experimental findings whether people primarily overestimate their own interpersonal insight, \u200bunderestimate other people's interpersonal insight, or \u200bboth\u200b. Thus, given that the self-enhancement bias only covers tendencies to overestimate oneself, the illusion of asymmetric insight might not be a clear-cut instance of the self-enhancement bias. Pronin et al. also consider the possibility of understanding the illusion of asymmetric insight as a manifestation of \u200bna\u00efve realism\u200b: the tendency to assume that one's perception of 1 See Schlenker and Miller (1977), Greenwald (1980), Riess et al. (1981), Greenberg et al. (1982), and Mezulis et al. (2004) for studies and reviews of the self-enhancement bias. 6 the world accurately reflects what the world is really like. A notable consequence of na\u00efve 2 realism is that when people make conflicting judgments on some matter, each party will tend to think that the other party's judgment is biased or otherwise flawed. One might naturally take this phenomenon to underlie the illusion of asymmetric insight: when people make conflicting assessments of the personal characteristics of themselves or others, each party will tend to think that the other party is wrong, and hence deem themselves more successful at judging the personal characteristics of the other party than \u200bvice versa\u200b. However, this explanation is limited in much the same way as the explanation from the self-enhancement bias. Even if the illusion of asymmetric insight may be appropriately categorized as a manifestation of na\u00efve realism, the explanatory value of such a categorization will be limited in the absence of more detailed predictions of the experimental results, such as the increased effect for judgments involving knowledge about private or negative qualities. 3.2 Explanations from Knowability and Introspection Illusions Consider next the explanation favoured by Proning et al. Several of the experiments reviewed in \u00a72 indicate that people tend to think that they are less knowable or \"harder to access\" than others. For example, the participants in the first study tended to deem their own \"true self\" less \"visible\" or more \"hidden beneath the surface\" than that of their close friend. Similarly, the participants in the third study provided self-descriptions that gave more weight to inner unobservable events and feelings than did their descriptions of their close friend. Pronin et al. (2001, p. 652) take these findings to suggest that the reason why 3 people take themselves to have superior interpersonal insight is that they take themselves to be less knowable than others. While we agree that the experimental findings indicate that people deem themselves less knowable than others, we have doubts about the significance of this \"knowability illusion\" in the context of explaining the illusion of asymmetric insight. The trouble is that 2 See Ichheiser (1949), Ross and Ward (1996), and Gilovich and Ross (2015) for studies and reviews of na\u00efve realism. 3 See also Goffman (1959), Markus (1983), and Andersen and Ross (1984) for studies and discussions of people's convictions about their own and other people's knowability. 7 we risk getting the \u200bexplanatory direction wrong. It would seem more natural to explain the knowability illusion in terms of the illusion of asymmetric insight than \u200bvice versa\u200b. Here is why: if people really do suffer from an illusory conviction to the effect that they themselves are less knowable than others, this illusion is itself in need of an explanation. One plausible explanation is that people deem themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into others than \u200bvice versa\u200b, and, on this basis, infer that they are generally less knowable than others. For example, people might feel misunderstood more often than they take themselves to misunderstand others, and hence eventually come to think of themselves as being harder to access than others. Thus, even if people's own explanation of their perceived superior interpersonal insight is based on a belief to the effect that they themselves are less knowable than others, the causal psychological explanation plausibly goes the other way around: the tendency to think of oneself as having superior interpersonal insight is what moves people to think that they are less knowable than other people. In subsequent work, Pronin and colleagues have refined the explanation from knowability by relating it to another well-documented illusion known as the \"introspection illusion:\" the tendency to think that observable behavior is more revealing of others than of oneself, and that access to private thoughts and feelings is more critical when it is oneself, rather than someone else, who is being interpreted (Pronin et al. 2004 and 2008; Pronin and Kugler 2007; Pronin 2009). It has been suggested that the introspection illusion may lead people to think that they are in a better position to gain insight into others than \u200bvice versa\u200b, thus giving rise to an illusion of asymmetric insight. For example, Pronin et al. (2004) submit that the illusion of asymmetric insight is rooted in the conviction that \"knowing \u200bus \u200bdemands that one enjoy access to our private thoughts, feelings, motives, intentions, and so forth,\" whereas \"we can know \u200bothers \u200bquite well solely from paying attention to their behaviors, gestures, verbal responses, and other observable manifestations\" (Pronin et al. 2004, p. 794). A similar point is made by Pronin et al. (2008) who note that the illusion of asymmetric insight \"has been traced to people's tendency to view their own spontaneous or off-the-cuff responses to others' questions as relatively 8 unrevealing even though they view others' similar responses as meaningful\" (Pronin et al. 2008, p. 797). 4 However, by using the introspection illusion to explain the illusion of asymmetric insight, we once again run a risk of getting the explanatory direction wrong. If people indeed suffer from an introspection illusion, this is itself in need of an explanation. A plausible explanation is that people deem themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into others than \u200bvice versa\u200b, and hence eventually come to conclude that the third-personal evidence that they have about others must be comparatively more revealing than the third-personal evidence that other people have about them. In other words, the reason why people are moved to think that third-personal evidence is less revealing of them than of others is that they take themselves to be more successful at gaining insight into others than \u200bvice versa\u200b. If this is the correct way of understanding the direction of explanation, any explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that does not rely on the knowability and introspection illusions will thereby help explain these latter two illusions as well. Thus, since the explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight that we propose in the following does not rely on the knowability and introspection illusions, it promises to provide a unified account of all three illusions. Another potential weakness of the explanations from the knowability and introspection illusions is that it is difficult to see how these explanations could be extended to the \u200bintrapersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight. Pronin et al. discuss the interpersonal and intrapersonal versions of the illusion of asymmetric insight under the same heading, and they seem to assume that they are equally well explained by the knowability and introspection illusions. However, it is anything but clear that they \u200bare\u200b. If we think of ourselves as being less knowable than others, why should this lead us to think that we have superior intrapersonal insight? It seems odd to reason that since I am harder 4 On another possible reading of Pronin et al.'s discussion of the introspection illusions, they do no seek to explain the illusion of asymmetric insight in terms of the introspection illusion, but rather seek to explain both of these illusions in terms of the knowability illusion. However, even if this is the correct interpretation, our new explanation still provides a unified account of all three illusions, by providing an independent explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight, which in turn explains the other two. 9 to know than others, I must know myself better than others know themselves. Likewise, it seems odd to reason that since introspection is more important for knowing me than for knowing others, I must know myself better than others know themselves. While our main focus will be on the interpersonal version of the illusion of asymmetric insight, we will also show, in \u00a75, how our explanation provides resources for understanding the intrapersonal version. 4. A New Explanation We now move on to present a new explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight. As previously noted, it is unclear from the experimental findings whether people primarily tend to \u200boverestimate their own interpersonal insight, \u200bunderestimate other people's interpersonal insight, or \u200bboth\u200b. But regardless of the relative significance of these tendencies, it is clear that neither tendency on its own is enough to generate an illusion of asymmetric insight. If I overestimate my own interpersonal insight, I won't suffer from an illusion of asymmetric insight if I overestimate other people's interpersonal insight to the same degree. And if I underestimate other people's interpersonal insight, I won't suffer from an illusion of asymmetric insight if I underestimate my own interpersonal insight to the same degree. Thus, at a minimum, an explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight must explain a differential assessment of how well people take themselves to know others as compared to how well others know them. We will meet this requirement by showing how a few well-founded psychological phenomena jointly predict a double tendency to \u200boverestimate our own interpersonal insight and \u200bunderestimate \u200bthe interpersonal insight of others. 4.1 Overestimating One's Own Interpersonal Insight What might explain a tendency to overestimate one's own ability to know others? We submit that this tendency is predicted by the familiar, well-supported tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence in a biased manner: Biased Assimilation of Evidence (BAE): People tend to interpret ambiguous evidence as supportive of their prior opinions. 10 This tendency has been documented by a number of experimental findings across a wide range of evidential domains. It is usually understood as an aspect of the more general confirmation bias, which is the tendency to search for, interpret, and remember evidence and information in ways that confirm one's prior beliefs, and impede the possibility of falsifying them. While early support for this general tendency came from Wason (1960), the classic study documenting the specific bias in assimilating ambiguous evidence is Lord et al. (1979). In their study, a group of participants, who were initially either for or against capital punishment, were presented with two sets of data on the effectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent; one set of data speaking in favor of such an effect, and another speaking against it. The studies revealed a tendency among the participants to have a more favorable opinion of the data that supported their initial opinion, while being skeptical of the data speaking against it. As Kunda (1990) notes, ambiguous evidence is particularly susceptible to biased assimilation, since reality itself to some extent constrains what one is able to conclude from a given body of evidence. One's evidence cannot speak too compellingly against one's prior opinion if it is to allow for a biased interpretation. Since mixed or ambiguous bodies of evidence do not do so, biased assimilation of such evidence becomes more likely. More generally, we might say that the degree of susceptibility for biased assimilation of evidence depends positively on the degree of ambiguity in the evidence, other things being equal. 5 We take it as relatively obvious that third-personal psychological evidence is often quite ambiguous and open to interpretation, since it often leaves us to draw relatively subtle abductive inferences about the inner feelings and motives of other people. Given this background assumption, it is not hard to see how BAE predicts a tendency to overestimate one's own reliability in judging the personal characteristics of others. The ambiguity of third-personal psychological evidence makes us prone to interpret the evidence in a way that supports our initial judgments of the personal characteristics of others. As a result, more false judgments are likely to be made and retained than we are 5 For useful overviews, see Gilovich (1991, ch. 3) and Oswald and Grosjean (2004). 11 aware of, thereby making us prone to overestimate our own ability to judge the personal characteristics of other people. To illustrate, suppose that Alice has come to regard Ben as being shy (say, based on some relatively limited experience with him in social situations). Even if he is not in fact shy, third-personal evidence of shyness is ambiguous, which means that Alice is likely to interpret evidence gained in subsequent interaction with Ben in a way that supports her initial judgment. As such, she stands to retain her initial judgment, even if a more balanced assessment of the evidence would speak against it. Being unaware of this mistake, she takes herself to know Ben better than she in fact does. Importantly, this explanation can account for the details in the experimental findings that the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and na\u00efve realism failed to predict, namely that our tendency to think that we have superior interpersonal knowledge is particularly pronounced in cases where the knowledge concerns private and unobservable qualities, rather than public and observable ones (Pronin et al. 2001, p. 643). Our explanation predicts this effect, since evidence about private and unobservable qualities is likely to be more ambiguous than evidence about public and observable qualities, thus leaving more room for biased assimilation, which in turn will strengthen the overestimation of one's own ability to know others. 4.2 Underestimating the Interpersonal Insight of Others Given that people overestimate their \u200bown interpersonal knowledge, one might naturally expect them to overestimate \u200bother \u200bpeople's interpersonal knowledge as well, since this would mean that they ascribed to others the same general capacities for interpersonal knowledge that they find in themselves. However, if this were the case, we would not see an illusion of asymmetric insight. What is needed is thus an explanation of why people do not\u200b overestimate other people's interpersonal insight, despite overestimating their own. At the root of our proposal lies a claim about people's comparative assessments of people's capacity for \u200bself-knowledge\u200b versus knowledge of \u200bothers\u200b: 12 Overestimation of Self-Other Asymmetry (OSA): \u200bPeople tend to overestimate the degree to which people's self-knowledge is superior to their knowledge of others. This tendency differs in two important respects from the knowability and introspection illusions. First, OSA states that people overestimate how much better \u200bpeople in general are at knowing themselves compared to knowing others. By contrast, the knowability and introspection illusions are beliefs that people habour about \u200bthemselves in particular\u200b: that \u200bI am less knowable than others, and that introspection is comparatively more important for knowing \u200bme\u200b. Second, OSA claims that we overestimate how much better people know themselves than \u200bothers\u200b, whereas the knowability and introspection illusions consist of the belief that we are in a better position to know \u200bothers than others are to know \u200bus\u200b. While this latter belief seems rather immodest (after all, why should we believe ourselves to be special?), the overestimation described by OSA is much more subtle. There is nothing obviously remarkable in thinking that we are all better placed to know ourselves than we are to know others, and it is easy to see how one could come to overestimate the extent of this difference (more on this below). It is thus also a conviction that reasonable and reflective people could easily hold. Note finally the relative weakness of OSA. The thesis does not require, for example, that people believe themselves to be \u200bperfectly reliable in knowing themselves. It suffices that they regard themselves as \u200bbetter at knowing themselves than at knowing others, as long as they overestimate this difference in reliability. What reason is there to think that OSA is true? That we know ourselves better than we know others, at least in important respects, seems like a core commitment of folk-psychology. Peter Carruthers (2008) goes as far as to maintain that a belief in what he calls the 'self-transparency' of key aspects of our minds is species-universal and innate. Carruthers relies mainly on theoretical considerations, including that an innate belief in self-transparency would make good sense from an evolutionary perspective, but he also notes some further explanatory virtues of this innateness hypothesis. For example, it would explain the 'near-ubiquity' of belief in self-transparency in Western philosophy prior to the writings of Sigmund Freud, and the surprised reactions of ordinary people to scientific 13 results and theorizing about the mind which undermine the belief in self-transparency. Indeed, when researchers in cognitive science present results indicating aspects of our mental lives to which the subject does \u200bnot enjoy privileged access, these results are often presented as surprising, thus revealing that the researchers take for granted that people tend to believe in self-transparency. Carruthers (2008) notes a lack of experimental work on the degree to which people actually presume introspective access to their own minds. However, a later study by Kozuch and Nichols (2011) sought to remedy this. They distinguished two dimensions of the putative folk belief in introspective access, namely the \u200bpower of the access, i.e. how reliable people believe their introspective access to be, and the \u200bdomain of access, i.e. what types of mental events people believe they are able to introspect. Although they didn't find that people presume universal introspective access, they found that people do assume a high degree of introspective access, especially in certain domains (we return to these domains in a moment). Given that people think that they have a kind of access to their own minds that they do not have to the minds of others, what reason is there to suppose that they \u200boverestimate the superiority of this access? Here, we can distinguish two relevant sets of considerations, one to do with the \u200bnature\u200b of the access, the other to do with the \u200breliability\u200b of the access. In a classic study, Alison Gopnik (1993) argued that while we as adults believe that our access to our own psychological states is different in nature to our access to the psychological states of others, developmental evidence suggests that it is not. We tend to believe that first-person knowledge is gained through direct perception, whereas third-person knowledge must be inferred from behavior. But developmental evidence suggests, she maintains, that both kinds of knowledge operate according to the same interpretive principles. In another discussion, Carruthers (2010) provides further reason to doubt the existence of a special form of introspective access to our own psychology, at least if introspection is understood as a kind of cognitive pathway that is distinct from the way in which we come to know psychological states of others. Carruthers advances a number of arguments for this claim, including a lack of anatomical evidence, and the unexplained 14 evolutionary extravagance that would be involved in developing a separate pathway for understanding ourselves. These claims of Gopnik and Carruthers are of course compatible with people having an accurate estimation of their relative abilities for knowing themselves and others. After all, simply by experiencing one's own behavior on a greater scale, subjects plausibly have more and better psychological evidence about themselves than they have about others. But a commitment to a false theory of self-knowledge as a matter of direct perception or introspection does seem to go hand in hand with an exaggerated sense of \u200bhow much better we are at knowing ourselves over knowing others, which is what our thesis claims. Moving on to the second set of considerations, this conclusion is in line with the very significant body of research over the last several decades, demonstrating significant limitations and exceptions to our reliability in knowing ourselves. Numerous studies suggest that there are certain classes of attitudes, tendencies, processes, and personality traits that we are systematically bad at detecting in ourselves. Following Wilson and Dunn (2003), we can distinguish two broad categories of limitations to our self-knowledge, which they label \"motivational\" and \"non-motivational.\" Motivational limitations extend to e.g. uncomfortable memories, repressed \"Freudian\" beliefs, biases, undesirable personality traits, and similar characteristics that people tend to have motivational reasons for assessing in a skewed manner. Non-motivational limitations apply especially to much 6 of the unconscious mental processing underlying reasoning, perception, motor learning, attitude formation, decision-making, and more. As such, there might in fact be certain 7 types of psychological states and characteristics that are more reliably detectable by third-person evidence than by first-person evidence. In this connection, it is worth remarking that in the aforementioned study by Kozuch and Nichols (2011), people were particularly prone to overestimating the amount of self-access they had when it came to the motivational basis for their own decisions and behavior. With this motivation of OSA in place, we can return to our main question. How does OSA lead us to underestimate other people's ability to gain insight into us? The basic 6 See Vazire (2010) for further discussion of motivational limitations to self-knowledge. 7 See, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson (1977) for a classic study. 15 mechanism that we propose is this: sometimes we become aware of what personal or psychological traits other people ascribe to us. These ascriptions may sometimes be explicitly communicated, as when someone tells me that she thinks I am shy or prone to anger. At other times, the ascriptions may be inferred from more subtle cues, as when I become aware that someone seems overly careful not to make me angry, or appears to imply that I would be uncomfortable in some particular social situation. We will not make any substantive assumptions about the exact prevalence of these cues, but we take it that we are at least sometimes in a position to make informed comparisons of our own self-assessments with other people's assessments of us. Naturally, these assessments sometimes come into conflict. I might infer from your calming tone that you regard me as anxious, while not regarding myself as anxious. Or I might take your bantering to indicate that you regard me as a resilient person, while regarding myself as rather fragile. We will again not make any substantive assumptions about the exact prevalence of such conflicts. But a number of psychological studies indicate that people quite commonly experience a feeling of being misunderstood by others. 8 In cases of conflicting assessments, OSA predicts that we will tend to regard our own self-assessment as the one most likely to be correct on the grounds that, in general, people's self-knowledge tends to be superior to people's knowledge of others. However, since we tend to \u200boverestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others, there will be more cases of conflicting assessments in which the other person is right about us than we think. Over time, we will thus come to regard other people as being less reliable in their judgments of our own personal characteristics than they really are. In other words, we will come to underestimate their interpersonal insight. As with the mechanism proposed in \u00a74.1, this mechanism also predicts the details found in Study 2, that the illusion of asymmetric insight was particularly pronounced in cases where participants felt that knowledge of them would require access to private thoughts and feelings, and in cases where the knowledge concerned negative or undesirable 8 See e.g. Lun et al. (2008) and Oishi et al. (2013) for recent studies and literature reviews on people's perception of being misunderstood by others, and the importance of this for their well-being and feeling of being socially connected. 16 qualities. As previously mentioned, we are particularly prone to overestimating our own self-knowledge when it comes to these exact qualities. In fact, when finding an increased effect with respect to qualities that require access to private thoughts and feelings, Pronin et al. focused in particular on grounds and motivations for decisions and behavior (e.g.: 'motives for action, doing things just for the purpose of fitting in, and doing things just for the purpose of pleasing others' (2001: 643)). And it is with respect to these very qualities that Kozuch and Nichols (2011) found that people were most prone to overestimate their self-knowledge. For these qualities we are therefore likely to be particularly dismissive of other people's conflicting assessments of us. Putting this effect together with the one described in \u00a74.1, we have an explanation both of the tendency to overestimate our own interpersonal insight and of the tendency to underestimate that of others. The first effect is grounded in the general tendency to accommodate evidence in a biased way, which becomes strengthened by the ambiguous nature of third-personal psychological evidence. The second effect is grounded in the exaggerated conviction that people's self-knowledge is superior to their knowledge of others, which leads us to dismiss other people's assessments of ourselves more often than we should. It is worth pointing out that our belief that we are in a better position to know ourselves than we are to know others need not be false or exaggerated for our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight to hold, although the effect will be weaker if the belief is accurate. If the belief is accurate, we will not underestimate the ability of others to know us, but rather come to a more realistic assessment of their ability. When we become aware of other people's assessments of us, and they conflict with our own self-assessments, we will still dismiss their assessments because of our belief in the superiority of self-knowledge over knowledge of others. But if our self-knowledge really is as superior as we take it to be, our dismissals of other people's assessments will be largely correct, and our assessment of their ability to know others will therefore also be more accurate. However, because of our tendency to overestimate our own ability to know others, we will still regard ourselves as better at knowing others, than others are at knowing us, thus retaining weaker version of 17 the illusion of asymmetric insight. That being said, we think that the research summarized above does give us strong reason to think that we have an exaggerated sense of our ability to know ourselves, as described by OSA. 5. Interactions of BAE and OSA We have now seen how BAE and OSA can work in tandem to generate an illusion of asymmetric insight. However, the two can also interact with each other in a more direct manner. In fact, BAE and OSA can sometimes \u200bcounteract \u200beach other. To illustrate, suppose that Alice judges Ben to be shy. How will Alice react if she learns that Ben does not consider himself to be shy? If we were to focus exclusively on OSA, we should expect Alice to trust Ben's judgment because she thinks that people in general know themselves better than others know them. But if we were to focus exclusively on BAE, we should expect Alice to place greater weight on her own judgment because she tends to assimilate third-personal evidence in a biased manner. Thus, in cases like these, OSA and BEA pull in opposite directions. What should we make of this? First and most importantly, the fact that BAE and OSA can sometimes have opposite-directed effects does not undermine the explanation proposed in the previous section. Most obviously, the second part of the explanation remains intact because BAE does not generate any countereffect in those cases where OSA leads us to place too little weight on other people's judgments of us. If anything, we should expect BAE to \u200bbolster the effect of OSA in cases where your judgment of me conflicts with my own judgment of myself. Only a little less obviously, the first part of the explanation also remains intact because the occasional countereffect of OSA does not change the fact that BAE in general makes us prone to interpret third-personal evidence in a way that supports our prior opinions. The effect of BAE may well be \u200bmitigated to some extent by the interaction with OSA. But we should expect the overall pattern to be the same, namely that we are likely to make and retain more false judgments about other people's personal characteristics than we are aware of, thereby leading us to overestimate our own interpersonal insight. Hence, the 18 interaction between BAE and OSA does not undermine our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight. On the contrary, we can use the interaction between BAE and OSA to explain two further psychological effects documented by Pronin et al. The first effect is the previously mentioned \u200bintrapersonal illusion of asymmetric insight: the tendency to think that we know ourselves better than other people know themselves. This tendency was demonstrated by the second of the studies reviewed in \u00a72, but was found to be overall less pronounced than the interpersonal illusion. The interaction between BAE and OSA predicts exactly that. To see why, suppose again that Alice and Ben make conflicting judgments about whether Ben is shy. The effect of OSA will be to make Alice inclined to trust Ben's judgment. However, BAE will have the countereffect of sometimes leading Alice to think that her own judgment of Ben is more accurate than Ben's judgment of himself. As a result, Alice will tend to underestimate, at least to some extent, how well Ben knows himself. By contrast, if Alice and Ben make conflicting judgments about whether Alice \u200bis shy, BAE will obviously not have the effect of leading Alice to underestimate how well she knows herself. On the present picture, this is why we tend to think that we know ourselves better than others know themselves. The second effect consists of a tendency to think that we know ourselves \u200bmuch \u200bbetter than others know us, whereas other people know themselves only \u200bslightly \u200bbetter than we know them. This tendency was also demonstrated by the second of the studies reviewed in \u00a72, and was found to be highly sensitive to the level of external observability of the assessed trait. For example, Alice would take her knowledge of her own \"shyness\" (a low-observability trait) to be much better than Ben's knowledge of her shyness, whereas she would only take Ben's knowledge of his shyness to be slightly better than her knowledge of his shyness. By contrast, Alice would take her knowledge of her own \"messiness\" (a high-observability trait) to be only slightly better than Ben's knowledge of her messiness, whereas she would take Ben's knowledge of his messiness to no better (in fact, slightly \u200bworse\u200b) than her knowledge of his messiness. These effects are exactly what we 9 9 These effects are illustrated in Figure 1 (Pronin et al. 2001: 644). 19 should expect from the interaction between BAE and OSA. In general, OSA makes us inclined to think that people know themselves better than others know them. However, BAE will have the countereffect of sometimes leading us to think that we know others better than they know themselves, especially for traits that are high in external observability. By contrast, BAE does not have the effect of sometimes leading us to think that others know us better than we know ourselves. As a result, we will tend to underestimate how well others know themselves, without underestimating how well we know ourselves. On the present picture, that is why we tend to think that we know ourselves much better than others know us, whereas other people know themselves only slightly better than we know them. 10 In sum, BAE and SOA not only jointly predict the interpersonal illusion of asymmetric insight, but allow us to explain in detail several related phenomena as well. 6. Comparisons with Existing Explanations In this section, we compare our explanation from \u00a74 with the ones discussed in \u00a73. We begin by revisiting the shortcomings that led us to reject the existing explanations. In relation to the explanations from the illusions of knowability and introspection, we raised the worry that they got the explanatory direction wrong. Even if people really do tend to deem themselves less knowable than others, we argued that it is more natural to explain this conviction in terms of people's tendency to deem themselves superior at knowing others, rather than letting the explanation go the other way around. Our explanation does not raise a similar worry. Although our explanation is partly based on a general belief about the comparative epistemic positions of oneself and others, the content of this belief is that subjects in general enjoy a superior access to their own mental state, which clearly cannot be explained in terms of a tendency to regard oneself as superior at knowing others. Furthermore, it is worth noting that believing oneself to enjoy superior access to one's own mental state is \u200bprima facie much more reasonable, and thus less in need of explanation, than believing oneself to be less knowable than others. Indeed, if Carruthers 10 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this effect to our attention. 20 (2008) is right, there is reason to think that an exaggerated belief in the superiority of self-knowledge is innate, or at least a very basic commitment of folk-psychology. Finally, since our explanation of the illusion of asymmetric insight does not rely on the illusions of knowability and introspection, we plausibly have an explanation of the latter two illusions as well, as argued in \u00a73. This promises to provide us with a highly unified picture of a wide range of otherwise disparate psychological phenomena. Obviously, we have not offered anything like a complete picture of how these phenomena hang together. In particular, it may require further experimental work to establish whether the knowability and introspection illusions can indeed be explained in terms of the illusion of asymmetric insight, as we have suggested, or whether they should rather be seen as arising directly from BAE and OSA, and hence as being \"on a par\" with the illusion of asymmetric insight at the level of explanation. But we take the foregoing considerations to suggest that BAE and OSA at least provide us with the basic ingredients for a unified understanding of the knowability and introspection illusions and the illusion of asymmetric insight. In relation to the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and na\u00efve realism, Pronin et al. pointed out that they are too general to account for specific details in the experimental findings. In particular, they failed to explain the heightened tendency to claim superior interpersonal knowledge about negative qualities and qualities that require access to private thoughts and feelings. By contrast, we have seen that our explanation predicts exactly this effect. A further potential weakness of the explanation from self-enhancement bias was that it is unclear from the experimental findings whether the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a result of a tendency to \u200boverestimate one's own interpersonal insight, underestimate other people's interpersonal insight, or \u200bboth\u200b. Thus, it remains unclear whether the illusion of asymmetric insight can indeed be categorized as an instance of the self-enhancement bias. By contrast, our account offers explanatory resources regardless of how this question is settled, since it relies both an explanation of our tendency to overestimate ourselves and of our tendency to underestimate others. 21 Finally, neither of the explanations reviewed in \u00a73 are well-placed to account for the effects discussed in \u00a75. Most obviously, the explanations from the self-enhancement bias and na\u00efve realism are too general to make any detailed predictions about why the effects discussed in \u00a75 should be sensitive to the level of external observability of the assessed trait. But the explanations from the illusions of knowability and introspection also fall short. As argued in \u00a73.2, it is unclear how the knowability and introspection illusions would generate a tendency to think that we know ourselves better than other people know themselves. The same goes for the tendency to think that we know ourselves \u200bmuch \u200bbetter than other people know us, whereas other people know themselves only slightly better than we know them. It seems odd to reason that since I am harder to know than you, I must know myself much better than you know me, whereas you know yourself only slightly better than I know you. Likewise, it seems odd to reason that since introspection is more important for knowing me than for knowing you, I must know myself much better than you know me, whereas you know yourself only slightly better than I know you. Thus, the knowability and introspection illusions seem unable to explain the effects discussed in \u00a75. Taken together, these considerations make what seems to us an overall strong case in favor of our explanation from \u00a74 and against the ones reviewed in \u00a73. 7. A Third-Personal Illusion? In this final section, we want to bring attention to a hypothesis that is related to, but importantly different from, the ones discussed in the foregoing. This is the hypothesis that people tend to think that they are better at knowing others than others are at knowing others. To illustrate, if Alice and Ben consider how well they know a third person Claire, 11 Alice will tend to think that she knows Claire better than Ben does, and Ben will likewise tend to think he knows Claire better than Alice does. Let us call this putative effect the third-personal illusion of asymmetric insight. To our knowledge, this illusion has not yet been tested by experiment. 11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for urging us to consider this. 22 Apart from its independent interest, the third-personal illusion is interesting in the present context because it may provide further assistance in adjudicating between the competing explanations of the illusion of asymmetric insight discussed so far. The illusion is predicted by our own explanation because, on this account, we will tend to overestimate our own ability to know others, while at the same time underestimating the ability of others to know us. And since this underestimation is not based on us believing ourselves to be especially hard to know, but rather on a belief about the superiority of self-knowledge in general, the resulting underestimation of others will not be restricted to their knowledge of ourselves in particular. The explanation thus predicts that people will tend to think that they are better at knowing others than others are at knowing others. The third-personal illusion is also predicted by the explanations from self-enhancement and na\u00efve realism. If the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a manifestation of the general tendency to think that one is above-average on a wide range of desirable qualities and abilities, including the ability to know others, one will plausibly also manifest the third-person asymmetric insight illusion. Likewise, if the illusion of asymmetric insight is primarily a manifestation of na\u00efve realism, which leads one to assume that those who disagree with oneself must be mistaken, one will also manifest the third-person asymmetric insight illusion. Note, however, that even if the third-personal illusion is eventually confirmed, we have already seen that our explanation remains superior to the explanations from self-enhancement and na\u00efve realism. Interestingly, the third-personal illusion is \u200bnot predicted by the explanations based on the illusions of knowability and introspection. According to both of these explanations, the illusion of asymmetric insight arises as a result of believing \u200boneself to be especially difficult to know. But such a belief does not have any obvious implications for how one will compare the abilities of oneself and others to know \u200bother people. One may well regard oneself as difficult to know, while regarding oneself and others as equally good at knowing others. If it turns out to be true, the third-personal illusion will thus speak in favor of our explanation, and speak against Pronin et al.'s explanations; and \u200bvice versa if the hypothesis turns out to be false. 23 8. Conclusion We began this paper by reviewing a group of studies reported by Pronin et al. (2001), which suggest that people tend to think that they know others better than others know them (\u00a72). We then argued that existing explanations of this \"illusion of asymmetric insight\" are wanting (\u00a73), and went on to propose a new explanation of the illusion, based on two other well-documented psychological phenomena: the tendency to accommodate ambiguous evidence in a biased manner, and the tendency to overestimate how much better we know ourselves than we know others (\u00a74). 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Williams contra Nietzsche Matthieu Queloz Amplifying Bernard Williams's critique of the Nietzschean project of a revaluation of values, this paper mounts a critique of the idea that whether values will help us to live can serve as a criterion for choosing which values to live by. I explore why it might not serve as a criterion and highlight a number of further difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project. I then come to Nietzsche's defence, arguing that if we distinguish valuations from values, there is at least one form of the project which overcomes those difficulties. Finally, however, I show that even on this reading, the project must either fall prey to 'Saint-Just's illusion' or fall back into the problems it was supposed to escape. This highlights important difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project and its descendants while also explaining whyWilliams, who was so Nietzschean in other respects, remained wary of the revaluation of values as a project. ABSTRACT 1. Introduction W hich values should we live by? Is there some consideration thatcan function as a criterion by which to compare the values we have with possible alternatives? Such questions, which have recently moved to the forefront of philosophy again with the rise of conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering, were of course a central concern of Nietzsche's.1 Finding that the values of Christian morality tend to stifle human flourishing by uniformly encouraging self-abnegation and asceticism, Nietzsche formulates the project of identifying and cultivating better values to live by, values thatwould enhance 1 See Cappelen (2018) and the essays collected in Burgess, Cappelen, and Plunkett (2020). Cappelen and Plunkett (2020) open the volume with a programmatic quotation from Nietzsche, in which he invites philosophers to be sceptical of all inherited concepts, make new concepts, and persuade in their favour (WP: 220\u201321). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 2 life instead of stifling it.2 This is Nietzsche's project of an Umwerthung der Werthe-a phrase whose meaning ranges from a shift in to a reversal of values, but which is usually translated as the 'revaluation of values'. On the basis of his doctrine that life is fundamentally will to power-in the technical and notably formal sense of a second-order desire to overcome resistance in the pursuit of first-order desires3-Nietzsche suggests that the corrective criterion for determiningwhich values to live by should be whether a set of values 'enhances people's feeling of power, will to power, power itself' (AC: \u00a72).4 As interpreters have pointed out, there are also passages where the relevant criterion is spelled out alternatively in terms of enhancing life, health, or flourishing.5 I shall refer to this criterion as the vitality criterion, exploiting that label's useful ambiguity between power, life, health, and flourishing. Once a criterion is at hand, it can be used to identify and adopt better values to live by. Simplifying wildly, I shall refer to this enterprise in what follows as 'the Nietzschean project'. Whatever else Nietzsche may be up to,6 this project is clearly a central strand in his thought. And yet it is a project which Bernard Williams, though a fervent admirer of Nietzsche and a self-proclaimed 'Nietzschean', always remained deeply 2 See Nietzsche (WP: 45\u201346, 522, 529, 545; GM: Preface, \u00a7\u00a73\u20136; BGE: \u00a74). See also Gemes and May (2009); Leiter (2015); Reginster (2006); Richardson (2004: 81\u201394, 120). 3 I follow Reginster (2006: 11; 2018) in the interpretation of the much-debated notion of the will to power. 4 The term 'corrective criterion' is Richardson's (2013: \u00a75). For the claim that life is will to power, see Nietzsche (GM: II, \u00a712; GS: \u00a7349; BGE: \u00a7\u00a713, 259; AC: \u00a76; eKGWB: 1884, 26[275]); for the claim that the will to power doctrine yields the standard or criterion of revaluation, see Nietzsche (GM: II, \u00a72; eKGWB: 1885, 2[131, 185], 1886, 5[71], 1887, 11[74], 1888, 14[136]). 5 For accounts of the project of revaluation that variously spell out Nietzsche's criterion in terms of life, power, health, or human flourishing, see Clark (2015a), Gemes (2013), Guay (2006), Katsafanas (2013b, 2013a), Leiter (2015), May (1999), Merrick (2018), Richardson (2013), and Ridley (2005). For an account of the criterion as being less about the effects of values than about the ideals they express, see Huddleston (2015, 2019). 6 Another strand is his critique of ascetic conceptions of values, which I have argued elsewhere is logically prior to the revaluation of values; see Queloz and Cueni (2019). 3 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz wary of.7 His grounds for doing so are, characteristically, as elusive as they are suggestive. My main concern in this paper will therefore be to elucidate and amplify his worries so as to articulate precisely what Williams's critique is, and what it can teach us about the difficulties faced by the Nietzschean project. Williams agrees with Nietzsche on three cornerstones of the Nietzschean project: that genealogical inquiry can help us determine whether a set of values has helped us to live; that where our own values are concerned, the verdict will in many respects be negative; and that going forward, the question is whether some other set of values will help us to live (2000: 160\u2013161). But Williams is adamant that this consideration 'does not function as a criterion' (2000: 161), and so he resists laying down the fourth cornerstone-the actionguiding criterion-that would be required to support the Nietzschean project of revaluation as an enterprise for practical deliberation. It is not, of course, thatWilliams takes revaluations of values to be impossible: there clearly can be revaluations, because there obviously have been.8 The point is rather that the possibility of a revaluation of values becomes doubtful once that revaluation is conceived as a project rather than as a historical phenomenon. Once conceived as a project, it properly becomes an object of practical deliberation and calls for choices between the values we have and possible alternatives. But unless they are to be arbitrary, these choices will have to be guided by some criterion (even if, as some interpreters of Nietzsche have suggested, that criterion is context-sensitive, personalized, or embod7 Pressed by Habermas to say whether he was an Aristotelian or a Wittgensteinian, Williams answered (perhaps not altogether in earnest): 'How about I'm Nietzschean?' (1999a: 246). For explorations of Williams's debts to (or parallels with) Nietzsche, see Clark (2015a), Katsafanas (2016), Leiter (manuscript), Prescott-Couch (2014), Queloz and Cueni (2019), Queloz (2017, forthcoming-a; forthcoming-b: ch. 7), and Robertson and Owen (2013). 8 As Nietzsche himself argues (GM: I, \u00a7\u00a77\u201310; BGE: \u00a746). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 4 ied).9 And this is where the Nietzschean project goes wrong on Williams's view: It is not-and this is vitally important-that an increase in power can serve as a criterion of what interpretation or outlook we should adopt. We do not survey a range of perspectives or sets of values and choose one by considering the extent to which it will increase our power. (2006d: 327) An 'increase in power, in a sense adequate to Nietzsche's purposes', Williams maintains, could not 'be the criterion of anything' (2006d: 327). Interestingly, however, Williams's critique of the Nietzschean project does not simply stem from a disagreement over the substance of Nietzsche's criterion. Williams's misgivings are deeper than that, and his critique all the more powerful for being insensitive to what exactly the substance of Nietzsche's criterion is taken to be: he would resist the Nietzschean project on any interpretation of the operative criterion, because he thinks that whether we should move over in the direction of alternative values is, quite simply, 'not a question for deliberation or practical reason' (2000: 161). It is a question to be answered by life itself, and all we can deliberately do is discover after the fact how it was answered: It is not a matter of choosing some concept or image on the ground that it will help us to live. It is a matter of whether it will indeed help us to live, and whether it will have done so is something that can only be recognized first in the sense that we are managing to live, and then later at a more reflective level, perhaps with the help of renewed genealogical explanation. (2000: 161) The crucial point, then, is that the merits of values as measured by some criterion-not just the extent to which they serve the will to power, but any criterion-can only be assessed retrospectively. The question whether 'some other ways of living, something which includes other ways of thinking about 9 See, e.g., Richardson (2013). 5 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz living, will help us, or other human beings who follow us, to live' (2000: 161), Williams insists, does not function as a criterion. Somewhat puzzlingly, Williams presents this as 'one of Nietzsche's most important lessons' (2000: 161). But how can it be Nietzsche's lesson? Is it not precisely the point ofNietzsche's project that it takes that question as a criterion and thereby empowers 'free spirits' to liberate themselves from the stifling grip of inherited values and choose a better way to live? And more importantly, why is it that neither an increase in power nor any other way in which values help us to live functions as a criterion by which to choose values? Should it not, or can it not? These are the questions I propose to address in what follows. 2. Williams's Critique of the Nietzschean Project One clue for why the question whether a set of values will help us to live does not function as a criterion lies in Williams's remark that other ways of living include other ways of thinking about living. This means that as we consider possible future values and evaluate them according to our present ways of thinking about living, a different evaluative basis will be nested in the object of our evaluation, and the question arises of which evaluative basis-which standard-is the relevant one. Let us call the evaluation of possible future values by the standard of our present values evaluation from here: Evaluation from Here: At t1, I evaluate, according to the vitality criterion as spelled out in terms of my values Vt1, to what extent, at t2, a given set of alternative values, Vt2, would help me to live. The other possibility is to consider whether these values will be seen to help us to live at t2 given the values we have at t2. Let us call this evaluation from there: Evaluation fromThere: At t1, I evaluate, according to the vitality criterion as spelled out in terms Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 6 of a given set of alternative values Vt2, to what extent, at t2, the values Vt2 would help me to live. Themain thrust ofWilliams's critique of theNietzschean project is to argue that Evaluation fromHere is feasible but not relevant while Evaluation fromThere is relevant but not feasible. Let us start with the relevance claim: it is a plausible default assumption that what we-as Nietzschean revaluators-would really like to know is how future values shape up from the point of view of those who actually live by them. After all, they are the ones who have to live with those values. But could there not be conditions under which we would have reason to treat Evaluation from Here as the relevant standard? In order to be able to say with confidence that Evaluation fromThere really is the relevant standard for Nietzschean revaluators, we first need to grasp what conditions, if any, would license privileging present values over future ones. In 'Persons, Character, andMorality', Williams suggests that in order to be justified in evaluating from here, i.e. in givingmy present values authority over the life of my future self with different values, I would need an understanding of how those future values relate to my present values, and that understanding would have to be such as to vindicate my privileging my present values over my future values. To illustrate this point, Williams discusses Derek Parfit's example of a Russian nobleman who knows he will inherit vast estates, but whose socialist ideals now make him want to give those estates away when he does so. To guard against a change of heart, the Russian nobleman arranges for the estates to be given away automatically, and makes any revocation conditional on the consent of his wife, whom he asks to disregard any future change of mind on his part.10 In this case, Williams argues, it is not clear that the nobleman's present values really have more authority than his future ones, for even if he has some story to tell about why his later values should be discounted, it is not clear why that story should have more authority than the 10 See Parfit (1984: 326\u2013327). 7 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz countervailing story that he can expect his later self to tell about his earlier self. As Williams puts it, he may have 'a theory of degeneration of the middle-aged, but then he should reflect that, when middle-aged, he will have a theory of the naivet\u00e9 of the young' (1981: 10). But we can easily think of an example where authority is more clearly on the side of the present. When Odysseus instructs his men to tie him to a mast as they approach the sirens and to disregard whatever orders he may give once they get there, he is privileging his present attitude in light of a theory explaining why his future attitude, under the influence of the sirens, counts for less. He knows he will change his mind and ask to be freed, but he also knows that he will only think that because he will come under the spell of the sirens. This explanation relating his present to his future self vindicates discounting the opinion of his future self. Accordingly, in order for one's present values to possess enough authority to defeat one's future values, two conditions would have to be fulfilled: first, one would need what might be called a theory of change, a robust understanding of how and why one's future values came to differ from present ones; and second, that theory would have to vindicate one's present values against one's future values, thus explaining why these should count for less. This is true not just where the person doing the evaluating and the person being evaluated are the same person-though that case does raise problems of its own having to do with personal identity11-but also at the level of society. The kind of understanding relating successive outlooks to each other is often available when it comes to relating past outlooks to present ones, because we have access to many of the facts explaining how we came to be where we are; but it is not, typically, available when it comes to relating present outlooks to future ones. And absent such an understanding, there is no reason to think that Evaluation from Here possesses more authority than Evaluation fromThere. 11 See Williams (1973a: 93; 1981: 9\u201310). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 8 Granted that Evaluation from There is the relevant standard, the issue becomes that of its feasibility. Williams is clearer about the fact that he thinks it unfeasible than about his reasons for thinking this. Two compelling rationales can, however, be reconstructed from his remarks. The first is that the content of future values is likely to be inaccessible to us; and the second is that even if those future values were accessible to us in terms of their content, life with those values would not be recognizable to us as an improvement except insofar as it realized the values we now have. The problem of the inaccessibility of the content of future values is highlighted by Williams when he writes that in contemplating a set of possible future values we do not yet live by, we cannot understand in advance what kind of power it will create, what new forms of life it will make possible, or how those forms of life could express human vitality-just as the ancients could not have foreseen the distinctive shape of that world the creation of which [Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality] claims to describe, a world centered on Christianity; nor could they have understood how that utterly strange thing could come to represent a new way of giving life a meaning. (2006d: 328) Wemay be able vaguely to envision what would be involved in living with a certain set of future values by situating them in a space of human problems or concerns, or by characterizing them in terms of their effects. But this is merely to consider these values from the outside, when what we really need is to understand them from the inside, so that we can see what life looks like from there. From where we are now, we may anticipate the coming of values that are not the ones we presently have, but this is a long way from grasping what it is that one values when one has those values, and why one values it. Insofar as future values involve the introduction of genuinely new concepts that differ both from those we now live by and from those we have inherited, we will not be able to think the ethical thoughts expressible in terms of those concepts (it is partly for this reason, Williams (2006c: 197) suggests, that Marxism and many other ethical and political conceptions culminate in static utopias). Yet 9 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz thinking the ethical thoughts expressible in terms of the future values at issue is what one certainly must do before the question of one's ability to evaluate from these future values can even arise. The second problem is that even if those future valueswere accessible to us in terms of their content, living by those values would not be recognizable to us as a genuine improvement except insofar as it served values we shared already.12 What would be recognizable to us is that to them, i.e. to the possible future agents living by those values, it would be recognizable as an improvement; but that does not make it a genuine improvement in our eyes. For even if we understood that the envisioned life was going better, by the light of some future values, than our life was going according to our values, this would still not amount to an ethical judgement that the envisioned life was simply going better and we should move towards it. From where we are now, any picture of future human life that failed to embody the values we now live by would elicit a sense of loss. As Williams puts it, we cannot overcome our outlook. If a possible future that figures in those shadowy speculations does not embody some interpretation of [the] central elements of our outlook, then it maymake empirical sense to us-we can see how someone could get there-but it makes no ethical sense to us, except as a scene of retrogression, or desolation, or loss. (2006c: 197) To those future people with different values, it would of course not appear as a scene of retrogression, or desolation, or loss. But the point is that this vicarious judgement is not an ethical judgement in the relevant sense. We cannot, in the relevant sense, try on values for size. What we can do, as Williams himself insisted (1986: 203), is take up the ethnographic stance and imaginatively inhabit an evaluative viewpoint-that of a different contemporary culture, or that of 12 Thus, when someone in a slave-holding society envisages a possible future society without slavery, the measure of the improvement this would bring is provided by the values the society has already. What is at issue in Williams's critique are even more radical changes recognizable as improvements only as measured by values they themselves instil. I am grateful to a reviewer for pressing me on this point. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 10 a culture in the past-without fully making it our own.13 But even if we had enough of a grip on a future evaluative viewpoint to imaginatively inhabit it, so that we could see how someone inhabiting that viewpoint would evaluate things, this remains crucially different from actually evaluating them. To actually evaluate them is to make sense of them in an ethically engaged way.14 This yields judgements of the form: 'Values V help/do not help people to live'. To evaluate them vicariously, by contrast, is to make sense of them in an ethically disengaged way. This yields judgements of the form: 'To people with values V, it looks like these values help/do not help them to live'. But this is not to express or take up an ethical stance towards those values. The force of the two judgements is different-only the judgement expressing values one actually holds is what might be called a full-throated ethical evaluation, while the vicarious judgement is a disengaged evaluation more akin to a proposition of anthropology. Even if future values were accessible to us in terms of their content, therefore, they would still not be accessible to us as a basis of fullthroated ethical evaluation. Imaginatively inhabiting a future in which values we do not share are successfully realized does not get us past the fact that insofar as this future fails to realize values we actually have, it can only make ethical sense to us as a scene of retrogression or loss. The vitality criterion is no help here, because what counts as an expression of vitality-as an increase in people's feeling of power, will to power, or power itself, for example-is similarly sensitive to one's actual outlook. The power 13 See also Williams (1995c: 206; 1995b: 239; 1995e: 185\u2013187; 1996: 29; 2006b: 61). 14 The engaged/disengaged terminology hails fromMoore (2006). A helpful account of the distinctive form of agency involved in aspiring to acquire values one does not yet possess is Callard (2018). More decision-theoretic framings of related problems are discussed in Ullmann-Margalit (2006) and Paul (2014). Eklund (2017) explores how the possibility of alternative normative concepts relates to certain forms of metaethical realism, and in particular whether it is possible for concepts with the same normative role to have different referents-a focus which renders it orthogonal to the Nietzschean concerns at issue here, however. 11 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz that a different way of life will embody 'will not reveal itself as recommending it until it is a power that someone already possesses' (Williams 2006d: 329). It might be objected that this rather overstates the difference between values we live by and values we do not live by. After all, we seem to manage well enough when it comes to evaluating whether the values of past societies have helped them to live by their own lights as opposed to ours. Some societies were clearly disasters on their own terms, and our ability to understand this becomes important when we seek to explain why some societies decided to move away from slavery or honour killings, for example. Indeed, our capacity for this kind of detached retrospective judgement seems to be presupposed by Williams himself when he grants Nietzsche that genealogical inquiry can reveal to what extent values have proved life-promoting in the past (unless the idea is to assess even values from the distant past only by our present values-an exercise whose result for large swathes of history can only be so indiscriminately negative as to be futile). What is so different about future values? The answer is that both with regard to the accessibility of future values in terms of their content and with regard to their accessibility as an evaluative basis, there are important asymmetries between the past and the future. One is what we might call the hermeneutic asymmetry: while past societies used to make ethical judgements that we no longer make, we often still take the content of those judgements to be accessible to us, because the terms in which they were articulated have been handed down to us. Ethical outlooks may have been lost, but our picture of a lost ethical outlook is paradigmatically one where the terms in which that outlook was expressed have not been lost. By contrast, future ethical outlooks have yet to arise, but our picture of a future ethical outlook is one where the terms in which that outlook will be expressed Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 12 have not yet arisen either. As a result, the content of many past outlooks is accessible to us in a way that the content of future outlooks is not.15 In addition, Williams suggests that there is also an asymmetry between past and future with regard to the second problem of the inaccessibility of future values as an evaluative basis, an asymmetry which might be labelled the identification asymmetry. We can explore our present values 'on this side, in relation to their past, and explain them', and in contemplating the past, 'we can identify with the process that led to our outlook because we can identify with its outcome' (Williams 2006c: 197).That history presents alternative ways of living merely in terms of a wider 'us', because we have available to us a story detailing how 'they' became 'us'. But with regard to the future, that story has yet to be written. As a result, we find it much harder to identify with 'them' as a future 'us'. This in turn makes it much harder to identify with their future values, since on Williams's account, historical narratives about how a society came by its values enable the society to make sense of its values as its own (2006c: 193\u2013197; 2006d: 328\u2013329). Without this kind of narrative continuity, we cannot identify sufficiently with values other than those we now have to be able to evaluate from them. And the identification asymmetry is that while such narrative continuity often obtains (or is taken to obtain) between the past and the present, it is lacking between the present and the future. This is why Williams writes that 'we cannot in our thought go beyond our outlook into the future and remain identified with the result: that is to say, we cannot overcome our outlook' (2006c: 197). We thus reach the conclusion that the prospective value of another set of values, to the extent that we even understand it, will have to be judged in terms of its tendency to promote the values we already have, while the respects in which adopting this different outlook promotes values it itself instils will only be recognizable retrospectively. 15 See Williams (2006e: 174\u2013175). 13 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz These hurdles might encourage one to think that Nietzsche's vitality criterion needs to be construed in maximally perspective-independent and neutral terms. This would give us a neutral standpoint from which to identify a set of values which, by that criterion, would be absolutely best. But this, quite apart from being dubious as a reading of Nietzsche, would certainly be a mistake in Williams's eyes. In ethics, Williams maintains, we should not try and determine which values are absolutely best according to some maximally abstract and perspective-neutral standard.16 This is not merely the trite point that we cannot do so, because we cannot entirely stand back from our values if we are to evaluate alternative values. That is also true-as Williams puts it, there is no Archimedean standpoint, and even if there were, it is a standpoint from which we could not decide the respective merits of values, because we would shed the evaluative resources to do so in striving for what George Eliot called 'that bird's eye reasonableness which soars to avoid preference and loses all sense of quality' (1999: 814).17 But the fact that one needs to evaluate from something would be allowed for as long as one had the vitality criterion as an evaluative basis. Williams's objection is not just that there is no Archimedean standpoint, but that the very urge to move towards such a standpoint, while legitimate in science, is out of place in ethics. Ethics is radically first-personal in a way that science is not, and it is a misunderstanding of ethical evaluation to think that we should aim to be 'unencumbered intelligences selecting in principle among all possible outlooks'-it is a 'scientistic illusion' to think that it is 'our job as rational agents to search for, or at least move as best we can towards, a system of political and ethical ideas which would be the best from an absolute point of view, a point of view that was free of contingent historical perspective' (Williams 2006c: 193\u201394). Bringing my personal loyalties and attachments to bear on ethical evaluation is not necessarily a distortion to be avoided, because the 16 Williams (1995d: 164\u2013170; 2003; 2006c: 193\u201394). 17 This is a central theme in Williams (2011: esp. ch. 2). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 14 evaluation is not just incidentallymine: 'my life, my action, is quite irreducibly mine, and to require that it is at best a derivative conclusion that it should be lived from the perspective that happens to be mine is an extraordinary misunderstanding' (Williams 1995d: 170). Hence, the very ambition to rank values according to some perspective-neutral criterion that will tell us which are absolutely best is a scientistic misunderstanding of ethics. In ethics, the Archimedean urge must be resisted.18 For Williams, then, Nietzsche's question whether some other set of values will help us to live both cannot and should not function as a criterion. It cannot function as a criterion if it is construed in terms that render it sensitive to the content of the evaluative outlook under consideration, because that renders the only version of the criterion that is accessible to one irrelevant. And it should not function as a criterion if it is construed in content-neutral terms, because that would embody a scientistic misunderstanding of the ethical evaluation at stake. So either way, the question does not function as a criterion. In addition to this main line of criticism, Williams also sees a number of other structural difficulties for the Nietzschean project which, while they do not in principle threaten the idea that one might choose values on the basis of the vitality criterion, nonetheless highlight some serious epistemic and practical hurdles. These are worth attending to also because they are revelatory of howWilliams interpreted the project itself. First, Nietzsche conceives of his project in overly individualistic terms on Williams's view. His 'models of overcoming and transforming our values, which is his most enduring concern', Williams points out, 'tend to be personal, individualistic, occasionally heroic' (2006d: 327). Often, the undertaking 'is regarded as an expression simply of a personal endeavour, like that of an artist; sometimes it takes on an historically transformative note, as though the individual's feat of transvaluation will itself change society' (2006d: 327). In 18 The phrase 'Archimedean urge' hails from Srinivasan (2015). 15 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz opposition to this individualistic model, Williams insists that values come in socially shared webs which individuals, however heroic, would be powerless to change on their own.19 The project is also overly individualistic in a different sense, moreover: there is something remarkably apolitical about considering the question of what values an individual should live by in order to flourish in isolation from the political order in which these values are expressed. That orderwill itself reflect political values, and the question ofwhat personal values would help a given individual to live cannot be answered independently of the question of what political values a society should embody. But as Williams repeatedly emphasizes, Nietzsche betrays a severe lack of sensitivity to the political dimension of his concerns.20 Second,Nietzsche's conception of his project is too voluntaristic: we cannot simply choose to value something, for in order to succeed in valuing it, we need to be able to make sense of it as valuable, and what 'makes sense to someone is not, in any connection, a matter of will' but rather 'comes as a discovery' (Williams 2002: 261\u201362). What determines whether something can make sense to us as valuable? Williams highlights two conditions.21 On the one hand, it must engage our ethical emotions, and whether it does so depends, not on an act of will, but on one's education, socialization, and other processes by which one has cultivated a certain emotional sensibility. On the other hand, it must be conceptually articulated and intelligibly related to other things that we value, as instantiating, bearing, expressing, or facilitating them, so that there can be an answer to the question of what it is about something that one values. Merely understanding that adopting some value would help us in some respect does not yet suffice to internalize that value. In a Prisoner's Dilemma, for example, understanding that I have instrumental reason to come 19 See Kusch (2009) and Queloz (2018; forthcoming-b: ch. 7) for further discussion of this aspect of Williams's conception of values. 20 See Williams (1999b: 150; 1999a: 257; 2006d: 326\u2013327; 2012: 141). 21 See Williams (2002: 91\u201392; 2006a: 135\u2013137). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 16 to treat the welfare of other players as intrinsically valuable provides no stable ground for me to do so: if all I have to support the value I am trying to reason myself into is the thought that I have reason to treat it as a value, this will not be enough for me to make sense of it as a value, and my attempt to pretend otherwise will unravel upon reflection.22 It must be possible to say more about why something is valuable. As long as we remain unable to do so, the value remains humanly unintelligible. Isaiah Berlin offers a vivid illustration of this point: If I find men who worship trees, not because they are symbols of fertility or because they are divine, with a mysterious life and powers of their own, or because this grove is sacred to Athena-but only because they are made of wood; and if when I ask them why they worship wood they say 'Because it is wood' and give no other answer; then I do not know what they mean. (1997: 10) Williams's own example is the value of truthfulness: the Greeks made sense of truthfulness as a value by relating it to other things that they valued, such as honour and nobility of character; later societies have made sense of it in different terms, by relating it instead to notions of freedom and absence of manipulation; but in each case, people could coherently make sense of truthfulness as a value because that value was fleshed out and supported by its connections to other things of value.23 When we discover that something makes sense to as a value, part of what we discover are these connections to other things that we value. But such connections cannot be forged by an effort of will. Hence, we cannot simply choose to value something. Third, new thoughts have to be generated out of the material made available to us by history. We 'do not make our thoughts out of nothing' (Williams 2006d: 327), and societies can no more transcend their historical conditions in this respect than individuals can transcend their social conditions. Part of 22 This is howWilliams attacks Gauthier's (1986) proposed solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma (Williams 2002: 91). 23 See Williams (1973b; 1997: 26; 2002: 89\u201392, 115; 2006a: 136). 17 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz Williams's point is that since nothing comes from nothing, innovation is subject to developmental constraints or path dependences: new valuations have to be forged out of the old ideas we have inherited by combining, elaborating, or extending them; moreover, taking up once more the idea that values have tomake sense to us as values-merely recognizing the practical necessity of coming to see something as valuable does not suffice actually to do so-the conceptual material in terms of which we make sense of these better values will itself have to be drawn from our conceptual inheritance. But there is also an internalist rationale for highlighting the constraints imposed by our conceptual inheritance: for an internalist about reasons such as Williams, the very reasons for adopting new values will have to tie in with antecedent motivational states, the content of which will have to be articulated in terms of extant concepts. One's conceptual inheritance does not just impose limits on what values one can adopt, therefore, but also on what values one can find that one has reason to adopt. Fourth, Williams adds that the material out of which we develop values is in many respects obscure to us, because we only dimly and incompletely understand what the ideas we inherit entail, where they conflict with one another, and what historical deposits they carry with them. Our thoughts and ideas are the product 'of an obscure mixture of beliefs (many incompatible with one another), passions, interests, and so forth' (2005: 12\u201313), and when new thoughts and ideas form, these 'come in part from what is around us, and we have a very poor grasp, for the most part, of what their source may be' (2006d: 327). In addition to being limited in the values we can adopt or have reason to adopt, we are thus also epistemically limited in our understanding of where and what we draw these values from. Finally, these epistemic limitations apply even more severely with regard to the future consequences of adopting possible values. We have difficulties anticipating what the effects of adopting a value will be, because too many of Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 18 the consequences of concept use are unintended by and opaque to conceptusers: What ideas actually do is not under the control of their creators, and is rarely what their creators intend.Their ideas may help to shape other people's aims, but they are more deeply at the mercy of those other people's needs, and of opaque historical contingency. (Williams 2006d: 327) Wemay think we have a firm grasp of the practical consequences of adopting a value. But a value that has beneficial consequences in one set of circumstances may have pernicious consequences in another set of circumstances; moreover, as the value comes to be adopted by an increasing variety of people, it will also be adapted to their needs and situations in ways that may alter both the value and its practical consequences. Once in circulation, a concept is open to appropriation, reinterpretation, and repurposing by others in ways that render its net effect on human lives extremely difficult to foretell. Nietzsche's own ideas of the will to power or the \u00dcbermensch-appropriated, distorted, and exploited by just the nationalistic and anti-Semitic movements he himself despised and deplored-are a case in point. In the face of all these structural problems for the Nietzschean project, Williams concludes that there can be no question of making a criterial choice between the values we have and the values we might come to live by-'there is no way in which, in these fundamental respects, the understanding of life can get ahead of life itself' (2006d: 328). All we can do is recognize whether or not the values we have help us to live, as measured by those same values. Whether that is the case will be immediately manifest in howwe are managing to live, and, as Williams's pointer to genealogical explanation indicates, it will be manifest in retrospect in how we and others have managed to live in the past. But there is no room for a prospective criterial choice between values.24 24 A reviewer points out thatWilliams's critiquewill seem to have less bite if one readsNietzsche as advocating what is sometimes called moral 'experimentalism' (Bamford 2016; Hunt 1991: ch. 7), which invites one to experiment with new values and evaluate them as one goes 19 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz 3. A Mere Reversal of Valuations Before we come to Nietzsche's defence, it is worth noting that many of the ideas that Williams deploys against the Nietzschean project are very much Nietzschean ideas. Most notably, there are several places where Nietzsche proves mindful of the perspectival character of the criterion for whether something helps or hinders the attainment of the 'highest power and splendor of the human type' (GM: Preface, \u00a76). He does not take himself to be in a position to say-indeed clearlywishes not to say-what this future human type should look like. The notion of the highest power and splendour of the human type functions as a placeholder: unlike Aristotle, Nietzsche does not believe in a constant anduniformhuman nature fromwhich an absolute, one-size-fits-all notion of the 'full realization' of humannature couldbe derived. Andunlike the Christian morality he opposes, he does not believe that there is a one-size-fitsall ideal of a human being which unites all definitively desirable properties.25 As he says, the point is precisely not 'to direct and edify, to maintain one's own type as the first and highest' (eKGWB: 1888, 14[225]). He condemns as a relic of the 'Christian prejudice' the 'optical habit' [optische Gew\u00f6hnung] of estimating the value of the human being according to how close it comes to some 'ideal human being' (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]): 'one thinks one knows what, with regard to the ideal human being, is of definitive desirability' (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]). But 'any careful examination of this \"ideal type\"' will lead one to abandon it immediately. It is the 'Christian ideal' that leads one to 'think one knows, first, that approximation to One single type is desirable; second, what this type is like; third, that any deviation from this type constitutes a along. But either the choice of which values to move over to and experiment with is a rationally grounded choice, in which case even the experimentalist reading remains-at least where radical value experiments are concerned-vulnerable to Williams's point that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself, or the choice is an initially arbitrary choice that then proves its worth in the course of the experience of living by those values, in which case the experimentalist reading ends up conceding Williams's point. 25 See Leiter (2015) for a valuable discussion of this point. Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 20 decline, an inhibition, a loss of strength and power for mankind' (eKGWB: 1887, 11[226]). These and other passages suggest that Nietzsche is keenly aware that the assessment of whether a set of values helps us to live depends on who and where we are. Similarly, many of the other issues Williams raises arguably turn on Nietzschean ideas. The idea that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself is sometimes attributed to Nietzsche under the heading of 'experimentalism'.26 That the sources and consequences of our thoughts are in many respects opaque to us is a leitmotif throughout Nietzsche's work, and his conception of a revaluation of values is less na\u00efve than Williams's critique may lead one to think: To revalue values-what would that mean? The spontaneousmovements must all be there, the new, future, stronger ones: it is only that they still stand under false names and valuations and have not yet become conscious of themselves. (eKGWB: 1887, 9[66]) Any doctrine is pointless if all the accumulation of forces and explosive materials it demands are not yet in place. A revaluation of values is achieved only when there is a tension from new needs, from the newly needy [NeuBed\u00fcrftigen], who suffer from the old valuation without coming to consciousness [ohne zum Bewusstsein zu kommen]. (eKGWB: 1887, 9[77]) As these little-known passages bring out,Nietzsche does show some awareness of how the success of the project of revaluation depends on the necessary material and the necessary driving forces being available in society. He knows that individuals cannot transcend their social and historical conditions, that they do not create their thoughts ex nihilo, and that the understanding of life cannot get ahead of life itself. In effect, Williams channels one current in Nietzsche's thought to drive back another, and as we saw at the beginning, Williams himself conceives of what he is doing in these terms: he presents the main point of his critique as 26 See Hunt (1991: ch. 7) and Bamford (2016). 21 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz 'one ofNietzsche'smost important lessons' (2000: 161); he prefaces his criticism of the idea that one might anticipate the effects that adopting a value will have with the claim that this idea 'belies one of [Nietzsche's] thoughts' (2006d: 327); he notes that the individualistic or artistic model of value creation 'is not true to much else that Nietzsche believed' (2006d: 327), and remarks that while Goethe's dictum, 'in the beginning was the deed', was not in fact cited by Nietzsche, it 'might well have been' (2006d: 328). In a conciliatory tone, Williams also emphasizes that Nietzsche was anyway keener on spelling out the character traits of creators of values than on spelling out the content of their values (2006d: 329), and he intriguingly suggests at one point that Nietzsche's individualismmight be a feature of hismode of presentation rather than a substantial commitment about how the revaluation of values actually works, because 'a social process which in actual fact no doubt has many stages, discontinuities, and contingencies . . . can be illuminatingly represented on the model of a certain kind of psychological strategy' (2000: 158). Since Nietzsche anticipates much of the Williamsian critique, and since Williams himself is aware of that fact, the Williamsian critique can thus be seen as an internal critique of Nietzsche's thought. Even conceived as an internal critique, however, the Williamsian critique seems to leave us at precisely the point in Nietzsche's intellectual development where Nietzsche had the means to make sense of a devaluation of values, but not of a revaluation of values: roughly, it vindicates the Nietzsche of Human, All Too Human against the more ambitious Nietzsche of Daybreak and later works.27 But perhapswe can come to the defence ofNietzsche's ambitions by specifying more carefully how ambitious the envisaged revaluation itself is supposed to be. Revealingly, Williams takes it to be quite ambitious: he writes that Nietzsche 'leaves us for the most part with an image of some solitary figure 27 See Owen (2007: 20) and Ridley (2005). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 22 bringing new values into existence' (2006d: 327), and that although he 'rightly foresaw' that the false presuppositions of many of our present values 'would one day come to be generally recognized', he 'almost completely failed in his visionary attempts to grasp what could take their place' (1984: 255). As we noted at the beginning, however, the GermanUmwerthung suggests a shift in or a reversal of values rather than the wholesale de novo creation of values, and, especially in the work that until the last minute was to be called The Revaluation of All Values (and which Nietzsche eventually retitledThe Anti-Christ: A Curse on Christianity), Nietzsche can give the impression that his chief concern is not to create new values ex nihilo, but to reverse the polarity of existing valuations in order thereby to undo the revaluation of values that brought usChristianity.28He even singles out the Renaissance ofCesare Borgia as the time that came closest to completing just the revaluation of values that Nietzsche advocates: the replacement of Christian values by 'opposite values, noble values' (AC: \u00a761).29 AsDavidOwen (2018: 73\u201375) and others have argued, these values are humanistic values encouraging the continual setting and overcoming of ideals in this life rather than the next. Roughly, they are the values of Renaissance virt\u00f9, which Nietzsche liked to call 'moraline-free virtue' (AC: \u00a72; eKGWB: 1887, 10[45, 50, 109], 11[43, 110, 414], 1888, 15[20]). Particularly in his late work, there are thus passages in which Nietzsche seems to understand 'revaluation' not as a bringing into existence of new values, but merely as an inversion of our present valuations aiming to bring back valuations that formerly existed. Of course, for each of these passages, there are countervailing passages where Nietzsche speaks of the need for 28 See, e.g., Stern (2018). 29 Borgia was the son of the Pope, and had he not fallen ill, this ruthless operator-Machiavelli's model for the Machiavellian-might well have become Pope himself, something which Nietzsche thought would have spelled the end of Christianity. As Jacob Burckhardt already remarked, Borgia 'could have secularized the States of the Church, and he would have been forced to do so to keep them . . . He, if anybody, could have . . . annihilate[d] the Papacy' (1990: 88). 23 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz 'law-givers' and 'creators' of new values while studiously avoiding to specify what these future values should look like (GS: \u00a7\u00a7301, 335; BGE: \u00a7\u00a7211, 253; EH: 'Fate', \u00a74; TSZ: Preface, \u00a79; eKGWB: 1884, 26[243], 1886, 6[25], 1887, 11[411]).30 And even where he talks about the 'fear-inspiring consistency' with which the 'aristocratic value equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God)' was inverted to suggest that the 'miserable', 'poor', 'powerless', 'suffering', and 'ugly' were beloved of God (GM: I, \u00a77), it is clear that some values are exempt from this inversion: the rank order between truthfulness and lying, for example, is not inverted.31 But the point remains that at least insofar as revaluation issues only in new valuations rather than in new values, it merely requires changing the valence of existing concepts. The distinction between valuations and values therefore gives Nietzsche the means to resist Williams's critique. Insofar as the idea is to revert back to valuations that have helped us to live in the past, revaluation can be guided by retrospective assessments of what kinds of lives values historically tended to foster. There will then be no need to evaluate values whose content we do not yet grasp and whose effects on society we cannot fathom. Nor will one need to create entirely new ways of thinking. One will only need to present the properties and character traits in terms of which we already think in a contrasting moral light. In that sense, the revaluation of values involves not value creation, but merely the old rhetorical strategy that Quintilian termed the paradiastolic redescription of virtues as vices and vices as virtues-a redescription, moreover, which by Nietzsche's lights is just the reversal of a previous redescription along these same lines.32 The title Der Anti-Christ, which in German can also meanThe Anti-Christian, then appears 30 On Nietzsche's ambition to create values, see Clark (2015b), Dries (2015), Langsam (2018), and Lambert (2019). 31 For different attempts to explain why the rank order between truthfulness and lying is not inverted, see Owen (2007: 70) and Queloz (forthcoming-a). 32 The connection to paradiastolic redescription is also drawn by Skinner (2002: 185), Owen (2018), and Srinivasan (2019: 144). Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 24 well-chosen: Nietzsche characterizes what he advocates negatively, as a mere reversal of Christian valuations. 4. Saint-Just's Illusion Even this mere reversal of existing valuations must seem suspicious to Williams, however, for its optimism that formerly helpful values can be safely revived and expected to work just as well for us, under our very different circumstances, is precisely what Williams attacked under the heading of 'Saint-Just's illusion'.33 Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, the French revolutionary who became Robespierre's right hand and is often seen as the purest embodiment of the Jacobin ideology (his angelic features and steely ruthlessness during the Reign of Terror earned him the sobriquet 'Angel of Death'), tried to recreate, in eighteenth-century France, an ideal of civic virtue drawn from Roman antiquity. 'Let Revolutionists be Romans' (2004: 820), he urged. 'The world has been empty since the Romans' (2004: 735).34 The illusion from which Saint-Just suffered according to Williams was the illusion of thinking that the values of ancient Rome were a live option for revolutionary Paris-that these values could simply be transplanted from antiquity into aworldwith completely different needs and social and economic structures.The particular way in which a value such as freedomwas expressed and concretely elaborated in ancient Rome may have answered to the needs of Roman society. But as Williams points out, a value 'can demand different social and political expressions at different times', and what makes a value 'viable in one set of historical conditions may make it a disaster in another: that was the nature of Saint-Just's illusion' (1995a: 137). Blind to the way in 33 See Williams (1995a). He takes the phrase fromMarx and Engels'The Holy Family. 34 See Linton (2010) and Andrew (2011: chs. 6 and 7) for accounts of how Saint-Just selfconsciously modelled himself and his ideals on those of the Roman republic. In this he was but an extreme example of a general tendency among the revolutionaries. 25 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz which the viability of particular expressions of values is a function of the sociohistorical context in which they are put to work, Saint-Just tried to impose ideas on modern French society that were entirely alien to it and could never have worked in it. Now Nietzsche, in calling for a reversal of the Christian revaluation, likewise lays himself open to the charge of succumbing to Saint-Just's illusion. There is every reason to fear that what made virt\u00f9 a viable alternative to Christian virtue in the Italian Renaissance will make it a disaster under conditions of modernity-and Nietzsche's enthusiastic pointer to Cesare Borgia is hardly reassuring. By interpreting Nietzsche's project so that it can sidestep some of the problems we highlighted above, then, we just render the project vulnerable to the objection that the inference from the success of an older set of values in their particular socio-historical circumstances to the idea that they will similarly succeed under modern-day conditions is both a lapse of historical sense and a dangerous ethical and political error. Yet it turns out that Nietzsche appears to have been aware of that difficulty as well. InThe Gay Science, he speaks to this very issue and even employs the same example: TheFrench of Corneille's age as well as those of the Revolution seized Roman antiquity in a way we no longer dare to-thanks to our higher historical sense. And Roman antiquity itself: how violently and yet naively it laid its hand on everything good and lofty in the older Greek antiquity! How they translated things into the Roman present! . . . They seem to ask us: 'Should we not make new for ourselves what is old and put ourselves into it? Should we not be allowed to breathe our soul into their dead body? For it is dead, after all: how ugly everything dead is!' They did not know the pleasure of a sense for history. (GS: \u00a783) Nietzsche uses the phrase 'historical sense' in a variety of ways, but the relevant sense here seems to be exactly the one at stake in Saint-Just's illusion: one betrays a lack of historical sense if one fails to grasp how past values were Choosing Values? Williams contra Nietzsche \u2022 26 embedded in, and drew their point from, an entire form of life. As Nietzsche writes in Human, All Too Human, the historical sense consists in the ability to rapidly 'conjure up a certain horizon' or 'system of ideas and sensations', just as one conjures up 'the impression of a temple on the basis of a few pillars and pieces of wall that chance to remain standing' (HA: I, \u00a7274). In Beyond Good and Evil, historical sense is characterized as the ability 'quickly to guess the rank order of the valuations that a people, a society, an individual has lived by' as well as the 'connections between these valuations' (BGE: \u00a7224). The draft of this passage in his notebook revealingly adds: 'the relation of these valuations to the conditions of life, the relationship between the authority of values and the authority of effective forces (the presumed relationship usually even more than the actual one): the ability to reproduce all this in oneself is what constitutes historical sense' (eKGWB: 1885, 35[2]). On Nietzsche's view, one displays historical sense notably by grasping the connection between valuations and the form of life in which they are embedded. If one assumes that Nietzsche the philologist was too historical a thinker to fall for Saint-Just's illusion-if one assumes, in particular, that he was aware of how the viability of particular expressions of values depends on the context in which they are deployed-then the insight animating the charge of Saint-Just's illusion might be turned into a steppingstone by which to overcome it. The tel quel transplantation of Renaissance conceptions into modern society may founder on the fact that viable values demand new expressions and elaborations in different socio-historical contexts; but this just shows that what is needed are new expressions and elaborations of the values underlying Renaissance conceptions, expressions and elaborations adapted to the modern context. What we should aim to recreate, therefore, is not the Renaissance conception of virtue itself, but the benefits and possibilities it brought in its wake. The guiding question will then be: what new elaborations and expressions of values do new contexts demand in order to deliver the same goods as past elaborations and expressions of those values in past contexts? 27 \u2022 Matthieu Queloz There is some textual evidence to suggest that Nietzsche indeed understood that values would require different expressions and elaborations in different contexts. For example, he suggests at one point that the contest of valuations that concerns him unfolds throughout Western history, with two sets of valuations re-emerging again and again in notably different guises (GM: I, \u00a716). The crunch, however, is that even if Nietzsche is aware of the pitfalls involved in Saint-Just's illusion, this awareness can only drive him back to the idea that what we need are values that, at least in their expression, elaboration, and concretization, are not the recycled values of a bygone era, but values which are adapted to our own, novel circumstances; and to the extent that they are that, they will be precisely what we were trying to avoid, namely genuinely new values whose anticipation and assessment must once again give rise to the difficulties we started out from. The line of interpretation leading past Saint-Just's illusion thus runs into just the host of problems that the line of interpretation leading to Saint-Just's illusion was intended to get away from in the first place. On either interpretation of the revaluation of values as a project, then, the Williamsian critique highlights serious difficulties for it, difficulties which are neither specific to Nietzsche nor to the substance of his criterion. Perhaps further reflection on these matters can show that some of these difficulties can be overcome. But what the present discussion suggests is that they really do need to be overcome, and the value of flagging these difficulties lies in the guidance it offers in that regard, not only to those seeking an interpretation of Nietzsche's project on which it emerges as viable, but also-since the difficulties have not gone away-to those in conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering who seek to continue what he began.35 35 I am grateful to Damian Cueni, Amia Srinivasan, Johannes Steizinger, Rebekka Hufendiek, Jelscha Schmid, Markus Wild, David Owen, Friedemann Bieber, Alexander Prescott-Couch, Choosing Values? 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Our aim is not to undermine this project or argue that no coherent framework or frameworks is possible in principle. Rather, we aim to show, with reference to two particular issues, that at this stage it is unclear if and how differing approaches can be integrated into a unified picture. The two issues we go on to discuss are, first, the role of punishment within the models and, second, how they deal with the context dependence of norm triggering. In each case it is the question of whether or not the model should be one of repeated or one-shot interactions that is the source of problems for integration. When it comes to different modelling approaches, the recent literature provides two presentations of social norms. Ken Binmore outlines a model that frames social norms in terms of repeated interactions (1994, 1998, 2005). In contrast, Cristina Bicchieri's model is of one-shot interactions and involves utility transformations, triggered by social context, that make norm conformity the rational behaviour (2006, 2008). Both of these authors repeatedly refer to each other's work as belonging to a common programme but, we argue, their difference on the question of repeated interaction models makes integration of their approaches problematic. We draw attention to the fact that differences on the question of whether we should think in terms of repeated encounters or not lie at the very foundations of the models. Such disagreement makes common approaches to punishment and context dependence deeply problematic. This is not to say that having multiple approaches is unwelcome in principle. Still, those unfamiliar with the literature could be forgiven for taking it that there are core similarities common to all game theoretic treatments of social norms. In 1] This paper stems from our earlier \"Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?,\" (Paternotte & Grose, 2012). This paper shares its overall diagnosis but adds to it by providing a deeper analysis of several points. 2] Despite their disagreements on specific issues; see for instance the issue 9 (vol. 3) of Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2006. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 4 fact, the only issue on which they unambiguously agree is that norms should be modelled as being equilibria of a game theoretic model. This leaves open the question of what is the correct game to be modelled and it is to that issue that we move in section two. II. TO R EPE AT OR NOT TO R EPE AT? First, note that it would be totally unreasonable to demand that all social interactions be modelled by the same game. Our point in this section is that a fundamental difference in the models presented by Binmore, Bicchieri and others makes it difficult to see them as compatible analyses that can sit on the shelf next to each other and be called upon depending on the strategic nature of the situation at hand. Rather, they disagree at a deep level about the way in which we should model norms and important features such as punishment. The core difference between these approaches to social norms that we consider is the type of interaction modelled. It has been common to identify the fundamental problem of social cooperation with the prisoner's dilemma (PD). For instance, it has been suggested Hobbes' Leviathan presents an informal analysis of PD interactions (1991). More recently, Brian Skyrms (2004) stresses the value of thinking about social interactions in terms of the \"Stag hunt\" game, citing Rousseau as a precursor. Previously, Skyrms (1996) devotes chapters to the PD and to Hawk-Dove / Chicken games. These studies reflect one aspect of norm-following that has been stressed in the literature, that being that norms pull us towards actions not in accordance with our narrow self-interest (Young 2008). In most of the above games the equilibrium outcome is at odds with that which is optimal from society's point of view. The exception being the stag hunt in which there is a coordination problem between two equilibria, one of which is Pareto superior to the other. Bicchieri's account of social norms is broadly in keeping with these approaches. She stresses that norms operate in \"mixed motive\" interactions. These are loosely characterised as those in which there is a conflict of interest and the potential for mutual gain. Given this loose characterisation, her definition appears to apply to a very wide class of games. Demanding that a game contains conflict to some degree can be taken as meaning that different players' payoffs are not perfectly correlated. Requiring the presence of a mutual benefit can be translated as requiring that there be a Pareto-dominant payoff profile or a Pareto undominated one, or even one which provides a better average payoff. Although her characterisation is imprecise we can see that the focus is on norms overcoming conflicts of interest. This becomes apparent when we examine the way in which the action of norms is modelled. Bicchieri is very explicit that, \"the problem that a social norm is solving in the first place is never a coordination problem.\" (Bicchieri 2006, 34; her emphasis) When a social norm exists, it changes the agents' utility functions. Preference for conformity comes about via a transformation of player i's utility function which converts a mixed-motive Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 5 game to a coordination game in which all (or, more accurately, enough) players prefer to conform. Once the players' utilities have been transformed, mutual norm compliance becomes an equilibrium of the transformed game. When the norm is triggered, agents' utilities are modified for every result of the game as a function of the highest loss caused by anyone's deviations from the norm. My being sensitive to the norm makes me consider as less valuable the consequences of actions that do not follow it (whether these actions are mine or others'), in proportion to the highest loss that this combination of actions entails (Bicchieri 2008, 199, Appendix 9.1). When it comes to reasons for this preference transformation when a norm is triggered, Bicchieri makes a number of suggestions. Agents may be motivated by the desire to please others, recognition that others normative expectations are reasonable and, most importantly for our purposes, fear of punishment (Bicchieri 2006, 29). At this point we emphasise the feature of this account on which we subsequently focus. The model is of so-called one-shot games with no modelling of repeats of the interaction. Norm-following becomes rational, equilibrium behaviour in the one-shot game once the players' utilities have been transformed. In this respect Bicchieri's model is similar to Herbert Gintis's recent model in which a \"normative disposition\" discounts non norm-following acts (2010). In contrast, Binmore's account is explicitly one of repeated interactions. For him, one-shot interactions are not those for which we are prepared by either our biological or cultural heritage. The \"game of life\" is an indefinitely repeated game. (Binmore 1994, 25) It is this focus on repeated interactions that makes Binmore concerned with a different role for norms than that of transformation of preferences. He focuses on the coordinating role of social norms that helps us to make our actions fit appropriately with each other. In game theoretic terms this fit is framed in terms of behaviours being in equilibrium with each other, where neither player would want to unilaterally change their action. The \"folk theorem\" of repeated game theory demonstrates that indefinitely repeated games have multiple equilibria, that is, multiple different ways in which actions can be mutually appropriate, and thus players face an equilibrium selection problem. (Myerson 1991, \u00a77.5) For Binmore, social norms solve this problem by making a particular behaviour salient in a particular context. Our shared cultural heritage is what allows us to coordinate on an equilibrium. Notice that in the case of Bicchieri's (and Gintis's) norms, the coordination role of norms need not arise because the utility transformation makes norm-conformity the one rational outcome. It should also be emphasised that Binmore's focus on repeated games makes his account totally general when it comes to the base games that can be repeated. PDs, stag hunts, hawk-dove, coordination games and so on can all fall under this approach and in each case the equilibrium selection is between equilibria of the repeated game rather than what would be the equilibria if the games were played just once. At this point it appears that there need be no incompatibility between these approaches to social norms and scope for them to be integrated. Preference transformations Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 6 attempt to capture the notion of norm-following pulling people to act against their narrow self interest and their coordination role is reflected in the difficult equilibrium selection problem faced in repeated games. Integration would take the form of the Bicchieri's games forming the base games for Binmore's repeated interactions. However, we first argue, at least on the important issue of punishment, the different accounts cannot be straightforwardly integrated. We then show that they both fail to adequately describe how context-dependent social norms are, for related but different reasons. III. W H AT PL ACE FOR SA NCTIONS? There are at least three ways in which to model game theoretically the action of punishment or social sanctions. As we will see, different approaches to norms model them in different ways. In itself this is not a problem. As we stressed in section one, there is potential value in having multiple modelling approaches. The problem here is that the different ways of thinking about punishment makes them appear incompatible with each other in the sense that they cannot be integrated. This is of particular concern because punishment of non-compliance is one of the central features of any informal account of social norms. Returning to the three game theoretic models of punishment, one possibility is for the sanction to feature as a payoff alteration. For instance, if defection in a PD is punished, and payoffs following defection are reduced, mutual cooperation can become an equilibrium outcome. This payoff transformation option is certainly the one taken by Gintis. He emphasises the \"choreographing\" role of norms in (one-shot) games with multiple equilibria. However, where compliance is not already part of an equilibrium outcome, sanctions can play a formal role as an argument in the utility function, thereby tipping the balance in favour of norm-following being an equilibrium (2010). In the case of Bicchieri, punishment does not feature explicitly in her formalization. However, as raised in section two, sanctioning is cited as a reason for the utility transformation that is a central feature of her model. In fact, it is unclear precisely how punishment connects with her formal model and in this sense the role of sanctions is poorly integrated with that formal account. An obvious possibility is the payoff altering role we are considering here. In that case the discounting of payoffs associated with non-conformity with the norm would reflect punishment received. However, if we look closely at Bicchieri's formalization it seems that this cannot be a correct interpretation, something emphasised by Daniel Hausman (2008). Remember that the discounting of norm-breaking actions is a function of the negative consequences of all players' deviations from norm-following. If the discounting of my payoffs were due to potential punishment of me then we would expect such discounting to be a function only of my own deviations from the norm. So, while it is clear that, according to Bicchieri, sanctions play a role in transforming utilities, it is unclear precisely in what way this is cashed out in the model. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 7 A second formalization of sanctioning is to expand the game to make the punishment action an explicit move. This has the advantage of prompting the modeller to pay attention to the possible consequences of punishing for the punisher. In particular, punishing is very often taken to involve paying costs oneself.3 We will not expand further on this option since it is not one taken by either Bicchieri, Gintis or Binmore, to whose repeated interaction model we now move. In models of repeated interactions punishment behaviour can be modelled in a way unavailable to one-shot models. In this case some plays of the base game constitute sanctioning behaviour. Take, for instance, the indefinitely repeated PD. Permanent mutual cooperation can be the outcome of equilibrium strategies. One, but not the only, possible equilibrium strategy is the famous \"Tit-for-Tat.\"4 In this case cooperative behaviour is reciprocated but, importantly for its being an equilibrium, so is defection. Retaliatory defection is interpreted by Binmore as a punishment for breaking the cooperative norm. A less forgiving strategy is the so-called \"GRIM strategy\" (Binmore 1994, 197). This cooperates until it is defected against and then switches to the punishment of permanent defection. A strength of interpreting punishment in terms of strategies in repeated games is that it naturally makes explicit that punishment can take many forms in terms of its duration and by what it is provoked. For instance, \"Tit for two Tats\" requires two successive defections before it punishes with defection. However, a weakness is that punishment loses some of its special status found in informal accounts of social norms. What we mean by this is that there is nothing distinctive about punishing as represented by a repeated game strategy compared to any other behaviour that is conditional on ones partner's actions in previous rounds of play. Having raised some tensions in both Bicchieri and Binmore's framing of punishment we move on to the question of integrating their models since, even if the issues raised above are not fatal to their accounts, there remains a problem with bolting them together. Remember that the integration suggested at the end of section two was that the utility transformation role of norms acts on the base game and that we can then examine the coordination role for norms when repetitions of these games create, via the folk theorem result, an equilibrium selection problem. However, we have already seen that punishment plays a role in both accounts but is characterised in different ways. For Bicchieri (and Gintis), punishment triggers norm-following in a one-shot context, potentially via it being represented as altering players' payoffs. In contrast, in the repeated game framework, punishment is a constitutive part of the strategies themselves. A potential response to this difference is that the repeated game approach can be reinterpreted into the one-shot case by taking the expected payoffs of the repeated payoff 3] Something Gintis and others stress in their claims for a disposition in humans towards \"strong reciprocity\" (Gintis 2000). 4] See Binmore 1994, \u00a73.2.5 for powerful arguments that TFT's importance as a repeated PD strategy has been overemphasised. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 8 stream as the payoffs of a new one-shot game. This approach is followed by Skyrms when he argues that the repeated PD can be rewritten as a one-shot stag hunt game (Skyrms 2004). However, this is a reframing of the repeated scenario rather than an integration of the two approaches. To reiterate, our concern is that in one case punishment features as a reason for action and in the other it is just one of the moves in the game. When attempting to apply an integrated model to actual cases of norm-following where social sanctions are present it would then be ambiguous in which of the two ways we should model those sanctions. At this point we are left with the question of whether one interpretation is to be preferred in general or in specific cases of norm-following or whether we should accept a plurality of modelling approaches. It is not our intention to adjudicate on this point here. What we stress is that such an adjudication (including agnosticism) would not be a move towards an integrated game theoretic account of social norms. Moreover, the following sections suggest that before any possible integration, both interpretations have to be completed in order to integrate the fact that norms are highly context-dependent. I V. CON TE XT DEPEN DENCE: TH E TR IGGER I NG A N D STR ATEGIC ROLES OF E X PECTATIONS Despite the striking variance in their analysis, as shown in the case of the nature and role of punishment, all accounts of social norms suffer from at least one common shortcoming, for related reasons. The basic problem is the following. A certain situation of interaction, formalised by a game (the sets of agents' actions and payoffs), may well trigger various social norms, depending on the background context of the interaction. When an interaction is repeated, should we say that the context changes so that a new social norm may appear, or that it does not since the base game describing each interaction is unchanged? In other words, when during a repeated interaction should we expect a social norm to be stable and when unstable? First, let us recall the characteristics of one-shot and repeated interaction approaches to social norms, respectively exemplified by Bicchieri's (2006) and Binmore's (1998, 2008). For Bicchieri, a social norm is cued in certain situations by the agents' beliefs about others' behaviour and expectations. As seen in section two, this triggers a change in preference that makes it rational for agents to choose certain actions. For Binmore, whether a norm is triggered depends on the similarity of the situation with a known one. Agents' actions are not explained by a preference change, but by their behaving as they are used to in a similar situation. In other words, when facing new situations in the laboratory, agents either conserve preferences or habits from their outside life (Woodward 2008). Do the starting game's characteristics constrain the existence of a social norm? Not really. Theorists usually reckon that cooperative norms can appear in any kind of cooperative dilemma, that is, of games containing an outcome that, although not an Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 9 equilibrium, Pareto-dominates an equilibrium.5 However, this expresses the theorists' interest for certain kind of games (those in which cooperative behaviour calls for an explanation) rather than a logical necessity or an empirical fact. Indeed, social norm theorists are disposed to see norms appear in almost any kind of game. Binmore does not discuss the issue, and we have seen in section two that Bicchieri holds that norms can appear in any 'mixed-motive games,' that is, games containing potential for mutual benefit and some conflict of interest; this description suits most games. Defenders of the competing 'group identity' explanation of cooperation are not any more precise. For instance, Bacharach (2006) only talks of situation of 'strong interdependence,' which is nothing else than the presence of a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium although he provides no explanation why this condition is paramount. Overall, virtually any game could cue a social norm. This makes context all the more important to social norms. The term \"context\" refers to anything that cannot be expressed by games' parameters. So the absence of constraints or payoff structures on the existence of social norms increases the importance of expectations or of the similarity with real-life situations in determining when social norms may appear.6 Of course, games still play a role in determining what social norms may appear. On this point though, somewhat unexpectedly, one-shot and repeated interaction approaches are not as separated as it seems. Expectations matter in the former, but even if they are not explicitly mentioned in the latter, their role is merely hidden. Suppose an agent is confronted with laboratory game A and deems it similar to reallife situation B, in which she would choose to do X. She will then do X in A for the same reason that she would have done so in B: because it is part of an equilibrium (she thinks mistakenly). But by definition, agents play according to an equilibrium if they believe that others will do the same. In a repeated game approach, expectations about others' behaviour and their expectations determine what an agent is going to do; the only difference is that they do not also lead to a preference change. Note that expectations also play this role in one-shot approaches, in addition to their triggering effect: once a game is transformed, expectations about others still influence a player's choice in the new game. In other words, expectations can have both a triggering role and a strategic role (this distinction will become important in the next section). One-shot and repeated interaction approaches to social norms both recognize the strategic role of expectations, but only the former also explicitly mentions their triggering role. A related reason why the two approaches are closer than it may seem is that the factors that cue norm-following behaviour are not necessarily different. In the one-shot interaction approach, certain expectations trigger preference change, but there is no 5] E.g. the Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the mutual cooperation outcome makes both players better off than the mutual defection one does, although only the latter is a Nash equilibrium. 6] An example of the effect of similarity between games on behaviour is found in Binmore 2010: when individuals had to play an Ultimatum game, \"recognised\" it as a familiar situation called \"harambee\" and then played accordingly. An example of the role of expectations can be found in Bicchieri 2008. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 10 constraint on the expectations that agents may or may not form. This reflects a widespread practice in rational choice theory: theorists determine what is the best, or rational choice for an agent given her preferences and beliefs, without asking whether those can be considered as rational or acceptable themselves. Now an agent's expectations about others may perfectly stem from the similarity of the laboratory game with a real-life situation: because A is similar to B, I may expect others to play according to B's equilibrium. So the role of game similarity could find a space even in one-shot approaches, as one possible origin of agents' expectations. In both approaches, similarity between games may cue a social norm and resulting expectations influence the agents' behaviour. What are the differences then? First, according to the one-shot interaction approach; other factors than similarity between games may trigger a social norm. However, the main difference lies in the link between the base game and the game that agents are actually playing. According to a repeated interaction approach, the laboratory game A is replaced by one representing the similar real-life situation B, in which players then play according to one of B's equilibria. According to a one-shot approach, the payoffs of laboratory game A are transformed into those of a game C. The difference is that there need not be a payoff transformation function that leads from A to B, and more precisely not one that corresponds to Bicchieri's description (2006, 52-54). In both cases, the characteristics of game A partly influence the game that players are really playing; only the way to determine the latter from the former varies. V. CON TE XT-DEPEN DENCE I N R EPE ATED G A M ES When agents interact only once, context-dependence is not deeply problematic, as it all depends on which expectations agents have or which real-life situations they deem similar to the one at hand. Surely, this makes social norm following behaviour hard to predict, as a theorist would need to know all possibly related real-life situations and all expectations linked to a social norm in a given population. Still, the analyses provided by both one-shot and repeated interaction accounts are clear. What happens to a social norm when the same game gets repeated? What makes agents keep sticking to it or start following another one along the way? On this point, the two accounts described above start to differ significantly, even if none of them provide a satisfactory answer. On the one hand, as the base game is just repeated and does not change, agents may well keep following the same norm. However, there are always multiple equilibria in a repeated game, and according to Binmore each of them could be a norm. There are also multiple ways in which the game's payoffs can be modified through preference change functions, and so just as many norms according to Bicchieri. As a game is repeated, agents observe each other's behaviour and consequently may see a change in their expectations; they may also start to understand the nature of the game they are playing and as a result adapt their behaviour to it. For these reasons, both one-shot and repeated interaction Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 11 accounts of social norms may predict that a social norm that agents follow changes as time passes. What does this change depend on? One way to put the problem is: when should observations of behaviour during repeated play lead to a change in the social norm an agent follows? It is a fact that most often, agents' behaviour varies with time when they play a repeated game. As may be expected, the repeated interaction account of social norms fits some of such cases well. For instance, the rate of cooperation in a repeated public good game tends to decrease with time (Camerer 2003, 59). In an Ultimatum game, offers can usually stabilize around one arbitrary value, although in the Dictator's game (when they cannot be refused) they get closer to zero. In these three cases, agents' strategies converge towards one of the game's Nash equilibria (no contribution in the public good game, any nonzero offer in the Ultimatum one, zero offer in the Dictator game). This is consistent with what the repeated interaction account predicts: when playing game A, agents may start to act as if they were playing game B, but as repetitions of the game accumulate, their understanding of the situation will improve and they will gradually learn to play according to A's equilibria. The effects of the context (that is, the existence of a similar real-life situation) can thus be offset by the success of an agent's strategy, in terms of its concrete payoff. Is this interpretation consistent with all experiments? It seems so. Consider Isaac and Walker's (1988) experiment (discussed by Bicchieri, 2006, 149ff.), consisting of two separated runs of ten successive public good games. Conversation between participants was allowed either only before the first sequence, only before the second sequence, or not at all. What was observed is although the level of contributions typically declines as the game is repeated, allowing conversation before a sequence led to higher, sometimes increasing contributions, and that the effect of a conversation before the first sequence carried over to the second one. The increasing effect is puzzling from a repeated interaction account, because in any equilibrium of a repeated social dilemma, there should be a decrease of the contribution level at least in the last round. If agents were slowly learning not to mistake the situation for a different one, their behaviour should converge towards such an equilibrium. It may be that the learning process needs longer than a handful of repetitions to kick in. However, such an argument threatens to render the explanation ad hoc: agents could be said to learn whenever they play according to an equilibrium (which are many in repeated games), and not to learn yet whenever they do not.7 Moreover, whenever agents do not play according to a finitely repeated game's equilibrium, such as when their contributions increase in the last period, one can always say that they are still behaving as if in real life, when it is hardly ever sure that an interaction will not be repeated some 7] Note that the carry over effect in itself need not be a problem for a repeated interaction account. There is a repeated game equilibrium in which agents make high contributions all the time, except towards the end. As long as the contribution level decreases at some point, it may stay high for a long time before, and there is no reason why this would not carry over between several sequences of games. Social Norms: Repeated Interactions, Punishment, and Context Dependence 12 time in the future. Any behaviour in the last repetition could thus be seen as part of an equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. Even if players perfectly understand that the numbers of repetitions in an experiment is finite, they might be behaving partly intuitively, based on the similarity between laboratory and real-life situations. Put differently, to be satisfying the explanation should tell us when agents act strategically (by considering the payoffs and structure of the actual interaction) and when habitually. How does a one-shot interaction account fare? It actually faces a similar problem. Let us start with a difference: one-shot accounts based on preference transformations have no problem explaining that contribution levels in a social dilemma should not decrease in the last game. This is because the preferences of norm-following agents may be such that contributing zero is not an individually dominant strategy anymore (by contrast, without a preference change, payoffs are such that defecting is always individually beneficial). Still, it is just as difficult to say when agents should start following different social norms. The problem stems from the unknown balance between the triggering and strategic effect of expectations (as described in the previous section). When agents can have different preferences (or type) and are uncertain about others' types, a useful game-theoretic concept is that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, 231-37). When applied to repeated games for instance, it says that agents start with a prior belief about everyone's possible type, which they will then update by Bayesian conditionalisation as they observe others' action. Observations constantly modify agents' beliefs about others' types and expectations about their behaviour. These changes of beliefs are part of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium: two strategies can only be at equilibrium if when agents implement them, the change of beliefs they cause is consistent with the strategies' prescriptions. This models the strategic role of expectations, that is, the way in which they help determine the behaviour agents who maximize their expected utility. Now recall that in Bicchieri's one-shot interaction account of social norms, expectations have a triggering role, that is, they can lead to a change in preferences. So a change in expectations may well cause an agent swapping types, and in particular can lead to the appearance of new types. This cannot be made part of Bayesian Nash equilibria, in which a list of possible types is set from the beginning and cannot evolve. The problem is that the theory can then explain virtually any observed behaviour: either agents follow a well-defined norm, in which case expectations play a triggering role at the start and then only a strategic role (preferences do not change as the game is repeated); or it does not and can be explained by the fact that the expectations changed over time and so triggered another norm. Overall, both kinds of accounts seem able to fit any data, thanks to the liberal definitions of context. Expectations can be part of the context; as they routinely change during any repeated interaction, they may trigger a change in norms at any time and thus allow one to explain any behaviour. Learning processes determine when the context's influence stops overcoming benefit-related considerations; but in the absence of a precise definition of such processes, the effect of context can also be used to explain any behaviour. Jonathan Grose & Cedric Paternotte 13 V I. CONCLUSION We have argued that despite surface-level similarities, game-theoretic accounts of social norms are not easily integrated. This is due to the existence of two main kinds of accounts, based on one-shot or on repeated interactions. This distinction gives rise to different treatments of the role played by punishment. Moreover, the problem is not merely to choose between them, as they both suffer similarly from difficulties to account for the context-dependence of social norms while conserving their explanatory power. jonathan.grose@bristol.ac.uk cedric.paternotte@lrz.uni-muenchen.de R EFER ENCES Bacharach, M. 2006. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Edited by N. Gold and R. Sugden. Princeton University Press. Bicchieri, C. 2006. The Grammar of Society The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---. 2008. How Expectations Affect behavior: Fairness Preferences or Fairness Norms?. In Rationality and Responsibility, edited by J. Krueger. New York: Psychology Press. Binmore, K. 1994. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 1: Playing Fair. M.I.T. Press. ---. 1998. Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 2: Just Playing. M.I.T. Press. ---. 2005. Natural Justice. Oxford University Press. ---. 2006. Why do people cooperate?. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 5 (1): 81-96. ---. 2008. Do conventions need to be common knowledge?. Topoi 27: 17-27. ---. 2010. Social norms or social preferences?. Mind & Society 9 (2): 139-57. Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press. Gintis, H. 2000. Strong reciprocity and human sociality. Journal of Theoretical Biology 206: 169-79. ---. 2010. Social Norms as Choreographer. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3): 251-64. Hausman, D. 2008. Fairness and Social Norms. Philosophy of Science 75: 850-60. Hobbes, T. 1991. Leviathan. Edited by R. Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Isaac, R., and J. Walker. 1988. Communication and Free-Riding Behaviour: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Economic Inquiry 26: 585-608. Myerson, R. 1991. Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press. Osborne, M.J., and A. R. Rubinstein. 1991. A Course in Game Theory. M.I.T. Press. Paternotte, C., and J. Grose. 2012. Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or discord. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axs024. Skyrms, B. 2004. The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---. 1996. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Woodward, J. 2008. Social Preferences in Experimental Economics. Philosophy of Science 75 (5): 646-57. Young, H. P. 2008. Social Norms. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by S. Durlauf, N. and L. Blume. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan."], ["IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 1 Reformulation of Dirac's theory of electron to avoid negative energy or negative time solution Biswaranjan Dikshit Laser and Plasma Technology Division Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Mumbai-400085, INDIA Email address: bdikshit73@yahoo.co.in ABSTRACT Dirac's relativistic theory of electron generally results in two possible solutions, one with positive energy and other with negative energy. Although positive energy solutions accurately represented particles such as electrons, interpretation of negative energy solution became very much controversial in the last century. By assuming the vacuum to be completely filled with a sea of negative energy electrons, Dirac tried to avoid natural transition of electron from positive to negative energy state using Pauli's exclusion principle. However, many scientists like Bohr objected to the idea of sea of electrons as it indicates infinite density of charge and electric field and consequently infinite energy. In addition, till date, there is no experimental evidence of a particle whose total energy (kinetic plus rest) is negative. In an alternative approach, Feynman, in quantum field theory, proposed that particles with negative energy are actually positive energy particles running backwards in time. This was mathematically consistent since quantum mechanical energy operator contains time in denominator and the negative sign of energy can be absorbed in it. However, concept of negative time is logically inconsistent since in this case, effect happens before the cause. To avoid above contradictions, in this paper, we try to reformulate the Dirac's theory of electron so that neither energy needs to be negative nor the time is required to be negative. Still, in this new formulation, two different possible solutions exist for particles and antiparticles (electrons and positrons). Keywords Dirac's theory of electron, Negative energy, Negative time, Antiparticles INTRODUCTION In an effort to explain the fine (doublet) structure in hydrogen atomic spectra, Pauli introduced the idea of spin ( 2/h\u00b1 ) which was just a hypothesis to explain the experimental results. Then came the Dirac's rela9vis9c theory of electron [1] in which spin of electron naturally came into picture with a solid mathematical justification and gyro-magnetic factor (g=2) could be successfully predicted. Dirac's theory however resulted in two possible solutions, one with positive total energy and other with negative total energy [2] (note that total energy here refers to kinetic plus rest energy). Although positive energy solutions accurately represented particles such as electrons, interpretation of negative energy solution became very much controversial in the last century [3-4]. By assuming the vacuum to be completely filled with a sea of negative energy electrons, Dirac tried to avoid natural transition of electron from positive to negative energy state using Pauli's exclusion principle. During pair production, an electron in sea of negative energy electrons is excited to positive energy state creating a hole in the sea. Dirac interpreted that since a hole or absence of a negative energy and negatively charged electron in space is equivalent to presence of a positive energy and positively charged particle, this hole acts as positron which was later experimentally detected. However, many scien9sts like Bohr [3] objected to the idea of sea of electrons as it indicates infinite density of charge and electric field and consequently infinite energy. In addition, till date, there is no experimental evidence of a particle whose total energy (kinetic plus IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 2 rest) is negative. In an alternative approach, Feynman while formulating quantum field theory, proposed that particles with negative energy are actually positive energy particles running backwards in 9me [5-6]. This was mathematically consistent since quantum mechanical total energy operator ( t iE \u2202 \u2202= h ) contains change in time in denominator and the negative sign of energy can be absorbed in it. However, concept of negative time is logically inconsistent since in this case effect has to happen before the cause violating the principle of causality. In an another recent attempt, Trubenbacher [7] assigned a new quantum mechanical operator sgn for the property \"sign of particle charge\" and assumed from beginning of derivation that energy is given by ratio of Dirac Hamiltonian operator and sgn operator. However, in our opinion, this assumption is arbitrary and also if \"sign of particle charge\" is taken to be an operator having eigen values \u03c3 = \u00b11, quantum mechanics must allow the electron to be in a mixed state so that in some measurement it should act as electron and sometimes it should act as positron. But this uncertainty of charge has never been experimentally observed. Although some experts working in the field for long might be habituated with these inconsistencies, a student or a new learner certainly becomes uncomfortable with the idea that energy is negative or time is negative. Therefore to avoid above contradictions, in this paper, we try to reformulate the Dirac's theory of electron so that neither energy needs to be negative nor the time is required to be negative. Still, in this new formulation, two different possible solutions exist for particles and antiparticles (electrons and positrons). A NEW APPROACH IN DIRAC'S THEORY OF ELECTRON In the Einstein's relativistic expression for total energy relating the numerical values of momentum and energy, we can just keep the positive sign before square root ( 4222 cmpcE ++= ) and ignore the negative sign due to physical impossibility of negative total energy (kinetic + rest) since neither kinetic energy nor rest energy can become negative. However, in quantum mechanics, all possible solutions of the Hamiltonian equa9on have to be considered [6, 8] as all of them together constitute a complete set generating the Hilbert space. So, numbers corresponding to each solution must be physically realizable. In this sense, when both positive and negative values for energy of electron came out in solution of Dirac equation, he had to take both the values as physically possible. This ultimately motivated him to bring the hypothesis of sea of negative energy electrons. But in this section, we will see that two possibilities don't appear for energy, rather it appears for some other property of the particle identified in this paper. In quantum mechanics and quantum field theory, we generally start from a wave representation of a particle. Interestingly, it has been pointed out by Hobson [9] that there are no par9cles in nature, there are only fields (or waves) although these fields interact with other objects at a point in space. In general, such a propagating wave can be represented as, )( Etpx i Ae \u2212 = h\u03c8 (1) In Eq. (1) we can calculate the wave velocity by, ConstantEtpx =\u2212 (for a specified point in wave pattern) So, Wave velocity = p E dt dx w == Thus, if Eq. (1) represents an electron of momentum p and positive energy E, its wave velocity 'w' is in same direction as momentum p. Now, if we want to find out the wave equation of a positron of same momentum p and energy E, then only property that can be different is the wave velocity which can be opposite to its own momentum i.e. p E dt dx w \u2212== . In that case, propagating wave representing a positron must be, )( Etpx i Ae + = h\u03c8 (2) So, the generalized expression for propagating wave representing any particle or antiparticle (electron or positron) can be written as, )( Etpx i Ae \u00b1 = h\u03c8 Or )( \u03bcEtpx i Ae \u2212 = h\u03c8 (3) Where 1\u00b1=\u03bc is a property of particle representing the orientation of the wave velocity with respect to its momentum. If it is +1, then wave velocity is in direc9on of momentum and if it is -1, then wave velocity is in opposite direction of momentum. We will call \u03bc in short as \"wave velocity orientation\" and it is a constant number for a specific particle (Not an eigen value of some quantum mechanical operator). Now using Eq. (3), we can find the energy operator and momentum operator. IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 3 \u03c8 \u03bc \u03c8 \u03bc \u03bc \u03bc EAeE t Ae i t i Etpx i Etpx i =\uf8fa \uf8fb \uf8f9 \uf8ef \uf8f0 \uf8ee = \u2202 \uf8fa \uf8fb \uf8f9 \uf8ef \uf8f0 \uf8ee \u2202 = \u2202 \u2202 \u2212 \u2212 )( )( h h hh Thus energy operator is, t i E \u2202 \u2202 \u03bc = h (4) Similarly, we can show from Eq. (3) that momentum operator remains same as conventional expression i.e. \u2207\u2212= hip (5) Relativistic energy equation is given by, 42222 cmpcE += (6) Where, m is rest mass. If we put total energy operator ( )\u00ca and momentum operator ( )p in above equation, we get a differential equation which is second order in space and time. However, for a determined evolution of wave function with time, the differential equation for wave function needs to be first order in time. So, we have to write the right hand side as a perfect square so that exponent from both sides can be cancelled. This is possible by writing, 224222 ).( mcpccmpc \u03b2\u03b1 +=+ rr (7) Where \uf8f7\uf8f7 \uf8f8 \uf8f6 \uf8ec\uf8ec \uf8ed \uf8eb = 0 0 \u03c3 \u03c3 \u03b1 r r v and \uf8f7\uf8f7 \uf8f8 \uf8f6 \uf8ec\uf8ec \uf8ed \uf8eb \u2212 = I I 0 0 \u03b2 , \u03c3r is made up of three Pauli matrix, \uf8f7\uf8f7 \uf8f8 \uf8f6 \uf8ec\uf8ec \uf8ed \uf8eb = 01 10 x\u03c3 , \uf8f7\uf8f7 \uf8f8 \uf8f6 \uf8ec\uf8ec \uf8ed \uf8eb \u2212 = 0 0 i i y\u03c3 and \uf8f7\uf8f7 \uf8f8 \uf8f6 \uf8ec\uf8ec \uf8ed \uf8eb \u2212 = 10 01 z\u03c3 I is identity matrix, \uf8f7\uf8f7 \uf8f8 \uf8f6 \uf8ec\uf8ec \uf8ed \uf8eb = 10 01 I From Eq. (6) and (7) and since 12 =\u03bc , we can write, 2222 ).( mcpcE \u03b2\u03b1\u03bc += rr Or ).( 2mcpcE \u03b2\u03b1\u03bc += rr Writing quantum mechanical operators from Eq. (4) and (5) in place of energy and momentum in above equation, Or \u03c8\u03b2\u03b1\u03bc \u03c8 \u03bc ).( 2mcci t i +\u2207\u2212= \u2202 \u2202 r h h As 12 =\u03bc , above equation reduces to original Dirac equation i.e. \u03c8\u03b2\u03b1\u03c8 ).( 2mcci t i +\u2207\u2212= \u2202 \u2202 r hh (8) Now let us solve the Dirac equation. Since the operator on right side of Eq. (8) is a 4\u00d74 matrix, wave func9on \u03c8 is a four-component Dirac spinor. From Eq. (3), if we separate space and time dependent part, solution should be of the form, Et i ertr \u03bc \u03c8\u03c8 h \u2212 = )(),( Putting the above general solu9on in Eq. (8), we get, )().()( 2 rmccirE \u03c8\u03b2\u03b1\u03c8\u03bc +\u2207\u2212= rh (9) For a free particle of specified momentum p, wave function \u03c8(r) will be of the form, pr i er h\uf8fa \uf8fb \uf8f9 \uf8ef \uf8f0 \uf8ee = \u03c6 \u03c7 \u03c8 )( Where \u03c7 and \u03c6 are each two-component spinors. Putting this and values of \u03b1 and \u03b2 in Eq. (9), 0 . . 2 2 =\uf8fa \uf8fb \uf8f9 \uf8ef \uf8f0 \uf8ee \uf8fa \uf8fb \uf8f9 \uf8ef \uf8f0 \uf8ee +\u2212 \u2212\u2212 \u03c6 \u03c7 \u03bc\u03c3 \u03c3\u03bc mcEpc pcmcE rr rr (10) Solving the above matrix equation, we get, \u03c6 \u03bc \u03c3\u03c7 2 . mcE pc \u2212 = rr and \u03c7 \u03bc \u03c3\u03c6 2 . mcE pc + = rr Using above in Eq. (10), 0).())(( 2222 =\u2212+\u2212 \u03c7\u03c3\u03c7\u03bc\u03bc pcmcEmcE rr Since we know, 22).( pp =\u03c3 rr IJTPC, Vol. 13, March 2017. www.IJTPC.org 4 0])()[( 22222 =\u2212\u2212 \u03c7\u03bc pcmcE As the wave function has to be non-zero, quantity in bracket must be zero. So, we get, pcmcE 222 )( +\u00b1=\u03bc (11) It is to be noted that in Eq. (11) we have taken both the signs i.e. positive and negative. Still, in both the cases, energy can be always positive as \u03bc can be +1 or -1 to keep energy positive. Thus we have been able to generate two possible solutions without requirement of negative energy. In place of energy, now the property called \u03bc i.e. \"wave velocity orientation\" with respect to the momentum has become positive or negative to account for electrons (particles) and positrons (antiparticles). Now the question comes why an antiparticle (e.g. positron) has opposite charge compared to that of particle (e.g. electron). The answer is as follows. For particle, \u03bc = +1 and for an9par9cle, \u03bc = -1. If we put these \u03bc values in Eq. (3), 9me dependent part becomes Et i Ae h \u2212 for particle and Et i Ae h + for antiparticle. Because of opposite sign in time evolution part in states of particle and antiparticle, dynamics of antiparticle becomes opposite to that of particle. But, since charge of an object is conventionally inferred by its sequence of events (for example trajectory of electron or positron), we attribute the opposite dynamics of particle and antiparticle to their (assumed) opposite charges. However, it is truly due to the value of '\u03bc' i.e. wave velocity orienta9on which may be +1 or -1. In his original formulation, by ignoring '\u03bc', Dirac had unknowingly included its' value (-1) in energy of antiparticle and so, got the problem of negative energy. Feynman and quantum field theory include the value of '\u03bc' in time and so, problem of negative time arises. But, we have shown that we can avoid both the problems of negative energy or negative time if we recognize and retain the parameter '\u03bc' i.e. wave velocity orientation in generalized wave function. CONCLUSION In this paper, we have reformulated the Dirac's theory of electron so that neither total energy (i.e. kinetic plus rest) nor time becomes negative for the case of antiparticles (e.g. positrons). We have found a new parameter (\u03bc) in wave function of the particle i.e. \"wave velocity orientation\" with respect the particle's momentum which becomes +1 or -1 genera9ng two different solutions corresponding to particles and antiparticles. By avoiding the negative energy solution in our approach, we can escape from the problems of sea of electrons hypothesized by Dirac which leads to infinite charge density. Similarly, by avoiding the idea of negative time, we can preserve the principle of causality in modern physics. REFERENCES [1] P A M Dirac, 1928, \"The Quantum Theory of the Electron\", Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A, 117, 610-624 [2] P A M Dirac, 1930, \"A Theory of Electrons and Protons\", Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A, 126, 360-365 [3] Donald Franklin Moyer, 1981, \"Evaluations of Dirac's electron, 1928-1932\", Am. J. Phys. 49 (11), 1055-1062 [4] J R Oppenheimer, 1930, \"On the Theory of Electrons and Protons\", Physical Review A, 35, 562-563 [5] R P Feynman, 1949, \"The Theory of Positrons\", Physical Review A, 76 (6), 749 [6] David Griffiths, 2008, Introduction to Elementary particles, (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH Verlag), p 230 [7] E Trubenbacher, 2010, \"Theory of Dirac Equation without negative energies\", Electronic Journal of Theoretical Physics, 7 (23), 355-382 [8] Victor F Weisskopf, 1949, \"Recent developments in the theory of the electron\", Reviews of Modern Physics, 21(2), 305-315 [9] Art Hobson, 2013, \"There are no particles, there are only fields\", Am. J. Phys., 81(3), 211-"], ["A C T A U N I V E R S I T A T I S L O D Z I E N S I S FO L IA G E R M A N IC A 1, 1997 Aleksandra Czechowska-Blachiewicz WELCHE ROLLE SPIELEN BEI DER ENTLEHNUNG DIE GRAMMATISCHEN EIGENSCHAFTEN? GEZEIGT AM BEISPIEL DEUTSCHER ENTLEHNUNGEN IN DER POLNISCHEN GEGENW ARTSSPRACHE G egenstand folgender U ntersuchung sind deutsche E ntlehnungen1, die im Polnischen von heute lebendig sind. Es w urden ca. 800 Beispiele untersucht, die in verschiedenen Bereichen des Alltags verwendet werden und die au f unterschiedliche Weise stilistisch m otiviert und gef\u00e4rbt sind. Die wichtigsten Quellen dieser Analyse waren: S\u0142ownik j\u0119zyka polskiego von M. Szymczak, S\u0142ownik etymologiczny j\u0119zyka polskiego von A. Bruckner, S\u0142ownik wyraz\u00f3w obcych von J. Tokarski sowie T onbandaufnahm en und selbst durchgefiihrtc Alltagsgespr\u00e4che. Die letzte Quelle war auch f\u00fcr meine U ntersuchung in vielen F\u00e4llen die beste und sicherste, zum al hier die M ehrdeutigkeit der Schrift nicht in Frage kom m t. Innerhalb der gegenw\u00e4rtig in Polen gebrauchten W \u00f6rter deutscher H erkunft kann m an drei G ruppen unterscheiden2. Die erste G ruppe um fasst W \u00f6rter, bei denen einerseits eine \u00c4 hnlichkeit in der phonetischen G estalt vorlicgt, zugleich aber entsprechende graphische V er\u00e4nderungen zu verzeichnen sind, z.B.: bruderszaft (Br\u00fcderschaft), bryle (Brille), fa n t (P land), glanc/glans (G lanz)1, kapsel (Kapsel), rausz (Rausch), akselbant (Achselband), kocher (Kocher), maswerk (M asswerk), preser (Presser), U nter E ntlehnung verstehen wir W \u00f6rter frem der H erkunft, die in der jeweiligen Sprache in graphischer und m orphologischer Hinsicht m odifiziert worden sind. A us m einer U ntersuchung schliesse ich die Frage nach dem U nterschied zwischen den L ehn\u00fcbersetzungen, L ehnpr\u00e4gungen und L ehnw endungen aus, d a diese einer besondern U ntersuchung bed\u00fcrfen. In diesem T ext treten auch E ntlehnungen auf, die im heutigen Polnisch salopp verstanden werden und fr\u00fcher vorwiegend zur Sprache der H andw erker geh\u00f6rten. szpunt (Spund), zecer (Setzer) u.a. Zu dieser G ruppe geh\u00f6ren Entlehnungen (es sind grunds\u00e4tzlich Substantiva), die nach den Regeln der polnischen Flexion dekliniert werden, z.B.: fa n t, fan ta , fantow i, fa n t, fan tem , fancie oder: kapsel, kapsla, kapslowi, kapsel, kapslem, kapslu. Viele von ihnen bilden die D erivationsbasis f\u00fcr polnische W ortb ildungsstruk tu ren , z.B. kartofel kartoflanka (K artoffclsuppc), cukier cukiernica (Zuckcrdose), grunt gruntowny (gr\u00fcndlich), pech pechowy (Pechvogel), druk drukarski (D ruck ...), drukarnia (Druckerei) u.a. Die hier besprochene Lexik um fasst Entlehnungen, die au f zweierleiweise durch das Polnische angecignet worden sind. Neben den Form en, die die gr\u00f6sstm \u00f6gliche \u00c4 hnlichkeit der graphischen gestalt aufweisen, z.B.: handel Handel, rekrut Rekrut, to r f T orf, fach Fach, jubel Ju bel, haben wir solche Form en, in denen die gr\u00f6sstm \u00f6gliche \u00c4 hnlichkeit (der K om petenz des polnischen Lautsystems entsprechend) in der phonetischen G estalt zu verzeichnen ist, was selbstverst\u00e4ndlich zu den entsprechenden graphischen Ver\u00e4nderungen gef\u00fchrt hat, z.B.: Kittel kitel, A kkord akord, Fehler J'eler, Schlauch szlauch, Spitz szpic, Filz file , K lotz kloc, Setzer zecer, Pfand J'ant, Wechsel weksel, M eisterst\u00fcck majstersztyk, Gesch\u00e4ft geszeft, K n\u00f6del knedel, Schnitzel sznycel, Giesser giser, K am m erdiener kamerdyner, Regal regal, F u tte ra l fu tera \u0142. Es ist anzunehm en, dass im Falle der letzten vier Beispiele die graphische G estalt als Grundlage f\u00fcr die E ntlehnung diente. In der zweiten G ruppe befinden sich Entlehnungen, die sowohl durch Substantiva als auch durch Verben repr\u00e4sentiert werden. Die M orphem konstruktionen, die sie darstellen, bestehen aus dem deutschen G rundm orphem und einem polnischen Form ans, z.B.: blokada Blockade, kombinowa\u0107 kom binieren, flanca Pflanze, pasowa\u0107 passen, rama - R ahm en, rolowa\u0107 rollen u.a. M orphologische Substitutionen k\u00f6nnen in dieser G ruppe folgenderm assen zusam m engefasst werden: 1. Am produktivsten ist das Form ans -a. Die F unktion dieses Form ans ist die Z uordnung des entlehnten Substantivs zum polnischen weiblichen Paradigm a. Polonisiert wurden in erster Linie deutsche weibliche Substantiva au f -e: Felge felga, Halle hala und deutsche weibliche Substantiva auf einen K onsonanten: Schicht szychta, K lam m er klamra, Muschel muszla. Seltener polonisierte m an m it Hilfe von -a deutsche m \u00e4nnliche Substantiva: F ang fanga, Raspel raszpla, R iss rysa. 2. Z ur Polonisierung diente weiter das Form ans -ka, das neben der Zureihung des W ortes zum weiblichen Paradigm a auch eine dem inutive F unktion erf\u00fcllen konnte: M utter (Schraubenm utter) muterka, K lappe klapka, F ass fa ska , Spule szpulka. 3. Z ur Polonisierung der deutschen Verben diente haupts\u00e4chlich das Form ans -owa&. jodeln jod\u0142owa\u0107, putzen pucowa\u0107, schlachten szlachtowa\u0107, tapezieren tapetowa\u0107. 4. Seltener tritt das F orm ans -a\u0107 auf: sp\u00fcren szpera\u0107, st\u00f6ren sztura\u0107. Die dritte G ruppe um fasst W \u00f6rter, die zwar ohne Zweifel aus dem D eutschen entlehnt wurden, das G rundm orphem aber schon in den meisten F\u00e4llen eine, m orphologisch gesehen, m odifizierte F orm im Polnischen angenom m en hat4, z.B.: browar Brauerei, fa lda Falte, gmina Gemeinde, rynsztok R innstein, blacha Blech, drut D rah t, lufa Lauf, ryngraf R ingkragen u.a. Auch in dieser G ruppe \u00fcberwiegen Substantiva. Neue m orphologische Substitutionen (das F orm ans -a und -ka wiederholt sich in dieser G ruppe auch, z.B.: bela Ballen, szopa Schuppen, \u00dfszb inka Fischbein, firanka F \u00fcrhang (V orhang), die in dieser G ruppe erscheinen, sind f\u00fcr Substantiva: a) das Form ans -arz/erz: wachlarz F\u00e4cher, stolarz Tischler, ku\u015bnierz K \u00fcrschner. b) das Form ans -ik /y k : lufcik Luft, Oberfenster, capstrzyk Z apfenstreich. c) das F orm ans -arka: gr\u0119plarka Krem pelm aschine, cykliniarka Ziehklingemaschinc . d) das Form ans -\u00f3wka: zel\u00f3wka Sohle, szpachl\u00f3wka Spachtelkitt. e) das F orm ans -nia/arnia: farbiarnia F\u00e4rberei. Verben, die m an in diese G ruppe einordnen kann, haben ebenfalls das Form ans -owa\u0107 angenommen, z.B.: strofowa\u0107 strafen, cembrowa\u0107 zimmern, selten -a\u0107, z.B.: sztura\u0107 st\u00f6ren. Adjekt\u00edva, die durch das Polnische entlehnt w urden, erscheinen m it folgenden Form ans: -ny, -owy, -owny, -ski, z.B.: felerny, trafny, pluszowy, szamotowy, frajerowaty, kunsztowny, rentowny, drukarski, szlisserski usw. Die durchgef\u00fchrte Analyse l\u00e4sst folgende Schlussfolgerungen ziehen: 1. Bei der \u00dc bernahm e des deutschen W ortgutes durch das Polnische war die phonetische G estalt vielfach entscheidend. D .h. die heute vorliegende graphische G estalt entspricht den M \u00f6glichkeiten des polnischen Lautsystem s, bestimmte K onsonanten bzw. Konsonantenverbindungen und Vokale m iteinander zu kom binieren. 2. Bei der \u00dcbernahm e verschiedener W ortarten ins Polnische konnten folgende F aktoren eine Rolle gespielt haben: a) Bei Entlehnungen, die in eine bestim mte gram m atische K lasse einordnenbar waren, m achte sich die D om inanz der phonetischen G estalt deutlich ' D ie entlehnten W \u00f6rter unterscheiden sich von den deutschen Lexemen, au f d ie sie zur\u00fcckzuf\u00fchren sind, auch in sem antischer H insicht sehr deutlich. D er Weg, a u f welchem zur B edeutungsver\u00e4nderung des jeweiligen Lexems gekom m en ist, wird sp\u00e4ter anhand von D ia lek tw \u00f6rterb\u00fcchern und anderen historischen Quellen n\u00e4her untersuch t werden. bem erkbar: die gram m atische Bedeutung, die sich in erster Linie im G enuswechscl ausdr\u00fcckte, spielte eine sekund\u00e4re Rolle, z.B. (m) bruderszaft (0 Br\u00fcderschaft, (m) kapsel - (f) Kapsel, (m) fach - (n) Fach, (m) kartojfel, - (f) K artoffel, (m) furm an - (m) Fuhrm ann, (m) stem pel - (m) Stempel. K onsonantisch auslautende W \u00f6rter wurden also m eistens als M askulina im Polnischen adaptiert. Die deutsche Form wurde in jedem Falle als N om inativform im Polnischen angenomm en. b) Die deutsche G estalt des zu entlehnenden W ortes m usste im Polnischen ver\u00e4ndert werden, da die Entlehnungen verschiedenartigen m orphologischen A daptationen unterlagen. Es k\u00f6nnen hier folgende G ruppen unterschieden werden: b,) Substantiva, bei denen die G enuskenntnis die entscheidende Rolle spielte, z.B.: deutsche Substantiva auf -e bekamen im Polnische das Form ans -a und blieben alle feminin: (f) Felge - (0 felga, (f) Blende - (f) blenda. b2) Substantiva und Adjekt\u00edva, die im Polnischen einer differenzierterer m orphologischen A dap ta tion unterlagen, da die deutsche U rform dem polnischen W ortbildungstyp nicht entsprach, z.B.: Substantiva auf: -a, -ka, -arz/erz, -ik /yk, -arka, -nia, -arnia, darunter auch zusamm engesetzte Substantiva , z.B.: gmina Gemeinde, leberka Leberwurst, kajzerka K aisersemmel, \u015blusarz Schlosser, pr\u0119gierz Pranger, gwintownik G ewindebohrer, placyk Platz, hafeiarka - (m hd.) haft, waltornia W aldhorn, latarnia Laterne; A djekt\u00edva auf: -ny, -owy, -owaty, -owny, -ski, z.B.: krajeowany K reuz/krcuzcn, pluszowy Pl\u00fcsch, frajerow aty frei/Freier, kunsztowny K unst, szachrajski Schacherei usw. Die semantische M otivation spielte bei vielen Entlehnungen keine Rolle. D er D em otivierungsprozess, der zu vielen K \u00fcrzungen gef\u00fchrt hat, m acht sich bem erkbar z.B. bei: (f) firanka - (m) F\u00fcrhang/V orhang, (m) kiermasz - (f) K irchm esse u.a. c) Verben, die durch das polnische Verbsystem assimiliert werden konnten, d .h. solche, bei denen es m\u00f6glich war, zum deutschen G rundm orphem die polnische E ndung -owa\u0107 bzw. -a\u0107 hinzuzuf\u00fcgen, z.B.: packen pakowa\u0107, sch\u00e4tzen szacowa\u0107, lackieren lakierowa\u0107, spachteln szpachlowa\u0107 usw. Die durchgef\u00fchrte Analyse sollte einen Nachweis liefern, dass der Prozess der Entlehnung aus dem Deutschen als Quellensprache sich nach ganz bestim m ten M ustern im Polnischen vollzogen hat. Dabei wollte ich insbesondere Entlehnungen, die ihre spracheigene G estalt in der Zielsprache beibehalten haben, den Entlehnungen gegen\u00fcberstellen, in denen der frem dsprachige Einfluss au f das jeweilige polnische W ort nicht immer deutlich erkennbar ist. Dieses interessante Sprachph\u00e4nom en w urde hier in seiner Vielschichtigkeit ansatzweise angedeutet. Eine W eiterf\u00fchrung dieser A rbeit sei somit angedeutet. Aleksandra Czechowska-Blachiewicz JA K \u0104 R O L \u0118 O D G R Y W A J\u0104 W Z A PO \u017b Y C Z E N IA C H W \u0141A \u015aC IW O \u015aC I G R A M A T Y C Z N E ? P R Z Y K \u0141 A D Y N IE M IE C K IC H ZA PO \u017bY C ZE\u0143 W PO LSK IM J\u0118 Z Y K U W SP\u00d3 \u0141C ZESN Y M A rtyku \u0142 trak tu je o cechach gram atycznych niem ieckich zapo\u017cycze\u0144 we wsp\u00f3\u0142czesnej polszczy \u017cnie. A naliza m ateria\u0142u leksykalnego przeprow adzana jest w trzech grupach. Pierwsza grupa obejm uje zapo\u017cyczenia o najw i\u0119kszym stopniu podobie\u0144stw a fonologicznego, d ru g a grupa to deryw aty z niem ieck\u0105 baz\u0105 s\u0142ow otw \u00f3rcz\u0105 i polskim form antem , a g rupa o sta tn ia zawiera s\u0142ownictwo, k t\u00f3rego posta\u0107 m orfologiczna uleg\u0142a znacznym m odyfikacjom ."], ["r e r i s t a \u00e1e !\u2022\u00bb a l u n a s \u00e9e fil#a#f\u00eda \u00e1e Salamanca \" P A R A V I V I R S \u00d3 L O H A Y Q U E SER U N A N I M A L 0 U N DIOS , S E G U N A R I S T O T E L E S . F A L T A E L TERCER CASO: H A Y Q U E SER L O U N O Y L O OTRO, U N F I L \u00d3 S O F O \" . (NIETZSCHE, EL CREP\u00daSCULO DE LOS \u00cdDOLOS) Editorial. Diario de un genio 2 La dictadura de la vida 3 E. M. Cioran: filosofar sobre la sangre 6 Sobre la ontolog\u00eda trascendental... 9 Secci\u00f3n de poes\u00eda 13 Entrevista a Dionisio Ca\u00f1as 19 Alcuza 22 Verse en la mirada de otro 24 La s\u00e9ptupla mirada 25 Undergroundman\u00eda 28 A la sombra de las santas 32 Suspiria, revista de los alumnos de la Facultad de Filosof\u00eda, n\u00famero 2, a\u00f1o I I . REDACCI\u00d3N: Guillermo da Costa Palacios, Carlos Rodr\u00edguez Gordo, Santiago Arroyo Serrano. DISE\u00d1O: Carlos Rodr\u00edguez, Guillermo da Costa. MAQUETACI\u00d3N: Trafotex. IMPRESI\u00d3N Y ENC\u00dcADERNACI\u00d3N: Gr\u00e1ficas Cervantes. EDITA: Delegaci\u00f3n de Alumnos de Filosof\u00eda de la Universidad de Salamanca, Campus \"Miguel de Unamuno\", F.E.S. 004, tel\u00e9f. 923 293 390, correo electr\u00f3nico: suspiriadigital@hotmail.com ILUSTRACIONES: p. 2 Juan Mar\u00eda Moreno, p. 32 Ricardo Hirschfeldt, pp. 25, 26, 27, 30 David de la Mano, p. 16 Iv\u00e1n Rojas, p. 6 Irmeli Jung, p. 8 Jacques Sassier. RESTO DE ILUSTRACIONES: MAN RAY. DEP\u00d3SITO LEGAL: S. 675-2002 o o Segundog\u00e9nita publicaci\u00f3n de Suspi\u00f1a. He aqu\u00ed otro fruto de la inquietud y, por extensi\u00f3n, del laberinto existencia! que nos atrapa. Los \"suspiros\" prorrumpen nuevamente en el so\u00f1oliento escenario cultural intentando aguijonear la conciencia de los lectores. Ro\u00eddos por el apetito de divulgar manifestaciones intelectuales de \u00edndole heterog\u00e9nea, ofrecemos una particular panor\u00e1mica del quehacer humano y de cuanto le envuelve. Con respecto al n\u00famero pr\u00edncipe procuramos en \u00e9ste continuar la direcci\u00f3n proyectada en aqu\u00e9l apostando, reiteradamente, por todos esos autores a los que refer\u00eda nuestro primer Editorial. As\u00ed pues, hemos compilado una suerte de exploraciones f\u00edlos\u00f3fico-art\u00edsticas con el prop\u00f3sito de invitar al lector a que sea sujeto de una reflexi\u00f3n en torno a s\u00ed y al mundo. Esta vez prevalecen el ensayo y la poes\u00eda como expresiones literarias leg\u00edtimas del \u00e1mbito \u00edntimo. Los suspiros son de naturaleza miscel\u00e1nea: unos hay producto del estremecimiento amoroso, otros motivados por una ilusi\u00f3n, por vitalismo o incluso por hast\u00edo e impotencia, etc.: y durante la gestaci\u00f3n del proyecto hemos podido exhalar cada uno de ellos, bien sea a causa de circunstancias hist\u00f3ricas, bien a consecuencia de nuestras experiencias personales o como resultado de una tensi\u00f3n interior. Tras cada una de estas p\u00e1ginas se ocultan las vidas del autor, editor, impresor y, por supuesto del lector. Compartamos pues la experiencia Suspiria nuevamente. Con vuestra lectura honr\u00e1is nuestro trabajo -tanto mejor si adem\u00e1s os complace. Disfruta, hip\u00f3crita lector... S O B R E L A ONTOLOG\u00cdA T R A S C E N D E N T A L ALBERTO-LUIS L\u00d3PEZ Comencemos ref lexionando sobre la filosof\u00eda y su actual estar alejada de la b\u00fasqueda, hasta hoy insoluble, del ser. Pero no s\u00f3lo ref lexionando sino adem\u00e1s dando u n giro a la inamovible e inmodificable f o r m a de explorar al ser. A pesar de no haber acertado a lo largo de todos estos milenios de constante creer-saber o creertenerla , h a n o lv idado (en muchos casos) que la exploraci\u00f3n tambi\u00e9n incluye el campo de la ontolog\u00eda como la v\u00eda o el trayecto hacia la superaci\u00f3n de la i n f o r t u n a d a indagaci\u00f3n por el ser, idea que en tanto que es necesaria retomar, es a su vez necesaria uti l izar, ampl iar y concretizar. A l var iar sobre el m\u00e9todo que durante siglos se ha uti l izado como preponderante y ahora explorar desde el campo ontol\u00f3gico tambi\u00e9n es necesario extender la visi\u00f3n un\u00edvoca del ser, cambiar la f o r m a pero sobre todo el fondo. La pregunta por \u00bfqu\u00e9 es el ser? ha sido suplida por u n \u00bfvale la pena preguntarse-por?, \u00bfser\u00e1 posible creer-en?, \u00bfel ser, la verdad? \u00a1es algo superado!, o en su defecto se ha llegado a aseveraciones tales como \u00a1es algo obsoleto!, \u00a1a qu\u00e9 nos ha llevado\u00a1, \u00a1mera subjet ividad! , \u00a1a qui\u00e9n le i m p o r t a ! El planteamiento correcto se nos ha dado, fue otorgado desde tiempos inmemorables y hoy en d\u00eda se ha ca\u00eddo en la ret\u00f3rica sofista o en la repetici\u00f3nt ransmit i r de lo ayer claro, ta l vez a\u00fan en la no-comprensi\u00f3n del ah\u00ed. El cerrar impl ica la no-posibilidad de seguir avanzado en el camino del desocultamiento del ser como verdad. Conforme contin\u00faan las habladur\u00edas 1 , en ellas impl\u00edcitas las escribidur\u00edas por parte no s\u00f3lo, hoy, de los sofistas profesionales y falsos fil\u00f3sofos sino tambi\u00e9n por la intromisi\u00f3n de ciencias que divergen con el fin mismo del acto del reflex ionar sobre lo oculto a efectos de ser desocultado (hecho que debe ser superado por la filosof\u00eda), nos vemos en la necesidad de replantearnos lo esencial en el campo ontol\u00f3gico-epistemol\u00f3gico y retomar la cuesti\u00f3n esencial de acuerdo con los tiempos actuales para seguir avanzando en el sendero del destapardesarropar-revelar-descubrir el significado de ser y como consecuencia desvelar y desarrollar el \u00bfqu\u00e9 es? Esto, claro, sin menospreciar los intentos de anta\u00f1o por resolver e incluso m\u00e1s que resolver por asegurar (sus \u00fanicas v\u00edas) de acceso al ser, acciones que nos h a n clarificado el hecho de que se ha dado u n nodicho sobre lo dicho o incluso u n no-dicho acerca de lo a\u00fan no-dicho y por lo tanto u n caer en semi-habladur\u00edas de tipo inconcebible sobre los intentos trascendentales del encuentro con el ser. 1 Mart in Heidegger: Ser y Tiempo, \"las 'habladur\u00edas'\", par\u00e1grafo 35, p. 186. Fondo de cultura econ\u00f3mica, Madrid, 1971. r e i i a t a A\u00bb la\u00bb aluna\u00bb El t\u00edtulo ontol\u00f3gico-trascendental para s i tuar al ser or i l l a a pensar en u n a paradoja o inclusive en u n a contradicci\u00f3n de p r i m e r orden, por ello es necesario ampl iar el porqu\u00e9 de ontolog\u00eda-traseendental . Para poder c o n t i n u a r con la evoluci\u00f3n del pensamiento se necesita (como lo he dicho anter iormente) remontarnos a u n a visi\u00f3n ontol\u00f3gica en contraposici\u00f3n con u n a perspectiva metaf\u00edsica l a contraposici\u00f3n no impl ica u n enemigo-de o u n a n i q u i l a m i e n t o d e - \u00bfPor qu\u00e9 ontolog\u00eda y no metaf\u00edsica si ambos se enfocan en el ser?, \u00bfa qu\u00e9 se debe lo trascendental? A l ser ontolog\u00eda, claro esta, se habla del ser mas no u n ser-fuera-de, exterior-a, trascendente-metaf\u00edsico sino m\u00e1s bien a u n ser que m\u00e1s que haya de situarse en el all\u00e1, esta en el aqu\u00ed, en el ahora. No s\u00f3lo no va a u n alejarse-de sino que por el contrar io se r e m o n t a en todo m o m e n t o a u n aqu\u00ed estar presente, cerca-de. De esta f o r m a al tener u n cerca-de existe la entera posibil idad de u n tomar-a y por lo tanto se da de manera coherente la verdadera posibi l idad de l levar del ser en-s\u00ed a la perspectiva \u00f3ntica del para-s\u00ed del para-el-hombre, del en-el-hombre. A l alinearse al fuera-de (metaf\u00edsico) se sit\u00faa al ser ya no en lo f\u00e1ctico; esto quiere decir que la facticidad del ser queda superada y de hecho aniqui lada por u n a imposibi l idad del estar cerca-de. El t ratar de desocultar al ser desde la postura de u n alejamiento sujetoobjeto= fil\u00f3sofo-ser (ser=objeto en tanto b\u00fasqueda y tarea del pensamiento) representa de facto u n error si lo que se pretende es revelar al ser \u00f3ntico. La metaf\u00edsica nos remite al all\u00e1, por ello lucha incesantemente y de f o r m a def ini t iva contra el aqu\u00ed, el cual es representado por el bando ontol\u00f3gico que simboliza la facticidad del aqu\u00ed en el ser. En tanto que la onto log\u00eda desvela al ser de lo \u00f3ntico, permite u n asir, da la pauta para poder tomar-a . La his tor ia de la filosof\u00eda (desde la perspectiva ontol\u00f3gica) nos ha demostrado que el in tento metaf\u00edsico para desvelar al ser cay\u00f3 en desviaciones filos\u00f3ficas como el pante\u00edsmo, la teolog\u00eda o incluso el n ih i l i smo as\u00ed como equ\u00edvocos, hoy insostenibles, que nos h a n llevado a la necesidad de dar u n giro y maniobrar de dist inta f o r m a para as\u00ed co nt inua r s in mesura el encuentro con el ser, hoy t a n soslayado, esto a pesar de que la metaf\u00edsica tuvo o tiene todos los elementos para poder descubr i r o in tervenir en el plano abierto de la u n i d a d esencial del ser. A l tenerlos, nos demuestra perfectamente que sus elementos o herramientas para la desocultaci\u00f3n h a n sido u n no-explotado o ta l vez u n no-correcto llev\u00e1ndonos a la necesidad de tomar otro camino. En el siguiente apartado es necesario c o m p r e n der el porqu\u00e9 de trascendental , s\u00f3lo as\u00ed la paradoja filaaaf\u00eda \u00abf Salamanca 9 Man Ray planteada en un principio se ver\u00e1 reducida totalmente a un vac\u00edo, al sin-sentido y por lo tanto a un no-existente. El t\u00e9rmino trascendental aqu\u00ed empleado est\u00e1 determinado por la filosof\u00eda kantiana del siglo XVIII, donde se formulaba la trascendentalidad como nombre gen\u00e9rico de su nueva filosof\u00eda y se inclu\u00eda el yo, una filosof\u00eda del ego. En aquel tiempo se entend\u00eda trascendental como posibilidad o afecci\u00f3n del conocimiento a-priori puro, una facultad en potencia. Se dio la contraposici\u00f3n de filosof\u00eda inmanente, no trascendente y, por el contrario, s\u00ed trascendental. Para efectos de la exposici\u00f3n retomar\u00e9 esta visi\u00f3n de trascendental como aquella facultad humana del conocimiento remitida a lo apriori puro, aquello que puede ser, que es inmanente en el hombre pero que no es, inclusive puede nunca serlo pero existe la potencialidad de que llegue a ser, una visi\u00f3n del principio de finalidad: el ser desocultado. Desde esta visi\u00f3n la b\u00fasqueda ontol\u00f3gica-trascendental del ser es una potencialidad en intento de acto que representa una facultad en el hombre-fil\u00f3sofo de descobijar al ser y, por ende a la verdad, no s\u00f3lo descobijarlo sino inclusive hacerlo suyo, hundirse en la unidad de ser-en, de sercon. En tanto que la postura es trascendental y ontol\u00f3gica no por ello existe una limitaci\u00f3n hacia el intento de llevar a cabo un an\u00e1lisis del yo subjetivo que se remita a una visi\u00f3n objetiva, por consiguiente estar\u00edamos hablando de una filosof\u00eda trascendental con fines objetivistas. Una vez expl\u00edcito esto es necesario remitirnos a los elementos metodol\u00f3gicos con cierta carga epistemol\u00f3gica y de investigaci\u00f3n trascendental (ya aclarado el uso de este concepto), para estar inmersos en la continuaci\u00f3n de la b\u00fasqueda por el descobijamiento del ser como verdad. Tiempo atr\u00e1s Heidegger dio cuenta perfecta del camino hacia el encuentro con el ser utilizando los elementos del habla. Utiliz\u00f3 la f\u00f3rmula ser-pensar-hablar intercambiando los t\u00e9rminos (sin cambiar el sentido) por un llevar el habla como habla al habla en busca del ser=verdad. Desde esta perspectiva es igualmente factible hacernos preguntas epistemol\u00f3gicas del habla que servir\u00e1n como delimitadoras para el posterior desarrollo del habla como v\u00eda del acercamiento-a, de la posesi\u00f3n-de. Preguntas como \u00bfd\u00f3nde est\u00e1 el habla?, \u00bfes posible aseverar que el habla esta en alg\u00fan punto de la cabeza?, \u00bfes externa a nosotros?; hablo, \u00bfpero de d\u00f3nde surgen mis palabras si no se da el enlace previo de pensamiento con lenguaje puesto que es inmediato el abrir la boca y hablar, inclusive saliendo las palabras deseadas sin ser anteriormente reflexionadas e inquiridas en el apartado especial del cerebro para el habla? Partiendo de esto se puede pensar que el habla es una \"entidad fantasmal\"2 puesto que es un algo fuera-de que marca el adentro. Un algo que es dado quiz\u00e1 por la divinidad o por un ser alejado-de. Pero si nos enfocamos en el habla como camino al ser que desvelar\u00e1 la verdad nos vemos en la necesidad de inferir que el habla, no es un externo-a sino por el contrario que a partir del habla misma como facultad o actividad del hombre y por lo tanto si est\u00e1 intr\u00ednseco en \u00e9l, la posibilidad de ser un atributo externo-a dispuesto por una entidad divina queda 2 Martin Heidegger: De Camino al habla. Secci\u00f3n \"El Camino al habla\", Serbal, Barcelona, Espa\u00f1a, 1990, p. 230. refiaia de la\u00bb alumaa ie \u00edilaaaf\u00eda \u00e9\u00bb Salanaaca 10 relegada. Para clarificar m\u00e1s este p u n t o podemos llegar a ejemplos tales como: el caminar es u n a facultad del hombre (trascendental en Kant en tanto posibil idad, en tanto potencializaci\u00f3n), y si todo hombre puede caminar \u00bfeso me llevar\u00eda a pensar en u n algo externo-a, quiz\u00e1 divino que hace que el hombre camine? La respuesta ser\u00eda no. El movimiento de u n dedo se debe al movimiento mismo de los ligamientos en uni\u00f3n con los huesos, elementos que son parte de la total idad org\u00e1nica del cuerpo, o \u00bfser\u00e1 que la absolutez misteriosa trascendente ha decidido i l i m i t a r m e con u n ben\u00e9fico movimiento de mis extremidades? Si por el contrar io hay hombres que sufren de migra\u00f1a, \u00bfeso me indica que el sufrimiento proviene del enojo i racundo de Zeus y ese dolor es su castigo, o m\u00e1s bien que el problema radica en accesos de cefalalgia v io lenta, que afecta preferentemente a las regiones orb i ta l y temporal del cerebro? Las ciencias modernas nos h a n dado elementos coherentes para pensar ya no en ese ser externo-a sino en simples facultades fisiol\u00f3gicas integrantes del organismo en el hombre. Facultades potencia, en la mayor\u00eda de los casos llevadas a actos. La v\u00eda epistemol\u00f3gica nos gu\u00eda a pensar qu\u00e9 es el habla y (dependiendo de su uso), si por ese medio podemos llegar a u n conoc imiento del ser. Me he inc l inado a pensar que el ser es aquella ventana por la cua l , u n a vez l legando a ella, podemos visualizar perfectamente la verdad \u00f3nt ica en t a n t o que es u n a verdad que si parte de la subjet ividad hacia la objet i v i d a d tiene por fuerza que guiarnos a la verdad del hombre en tanto que ente. Part iendo, claro, de la ob jet ividad del ser, que al ser puesta (para su estudio) a la subjet ividad del h o m b r e puede a lcanzarse por ese medio ya no la subjetiva objet ividad sino m\u00e1s bien la objetiva ob jet iv idad. Cosa que nos har \u00eda pensar en la desvelaci\u00f3n del ser como acto plenamente objetivo. Pensando al habla no s\u00f3lo desde las preguntas hacia las respectivas respuestas del conocimiento , sino ya como u n a act iv idad del sujeto que a pesar de in tegrar u n a serie de cuestiones a resolver es u n acto ( indiscutible) su capacid a d en el h o m b r e del hablar , podemos dar el siguiente paso que nos llevar\u00eda a pensar al habla como v\u00eda del encuentro con el ser y por consiguiente c o n la verdad. El habla como ser-pensar-hablar es el elemento pr imar io en el hombre, es quiz\u00e1 la facultad que hace al hombre hombre, que verifica y cerciora al homo sapiens como ta l . El pensar esto se debe a que el habla no s\u00f3lo se encuentra como u n sonido art iculado o fon\u00e9tico sino como v\u00eda indiscutible para el se\u00f1alamiento del ser en tanto total idad y es a su vez el habla misma la que lleva el peso hist\u00f3rico de llevarnos a la f\u00f3rmula ser=verdad. Es imprescindible no entender al habla s\u00f3lo desde lo fon\u00e9tico sino tambi\u00e9n como silencio y pensamiento. Para poder acercarnos-a, y no s\u00f3lo eso sino inclusive u n incorporarse-a, u n hacer m\u00edo se necesita forzosamente del habla; de hecho la superaci\u00f3n hist\u00f3rica del ser incluye la comprensi\u00f3n, llegar plenamente a la comprensibil idad del habla. Si entendemos al habla como totalidad-desveladora que integra ser-pensar-hablar, caemos en la r a r i a t a \u00e9e l a s a l u n a s cuenta de que descobijar la u n i d a d esencial del habla como v\u00eda al encuentro con el ser es el t\u00f3pico que asoma a la ventana esperando ser visto, y u n a vez visto, poder se\u00f1alarlo. Pero para poder ser visto debe estar esa ventana transparente, sin lo cual , la posibil idad del se\u00f1alamiento -posterior a u n a plena comprensibilidad del a c t o imposibilitar\u00eda el acto mismo del se\u00f1alar ese acercamiento y el descobijar quedar\u00eda relegado de toda probabilidad. Entromoa ort el d c s c r i v o l v i i i i i c i i t u J c Z L C I I I I \u00cd I I U al habla como v\u00eda para la captura del ser=verdad. Las preguntas formuladas anteriormente de corte epistemol\u00f3gico sirven de apoyo para desarrollar el habla, su camino directo con el hablar, el se\u00f1alar y no s\u00f3lo se\u00f1alar o pensar sino inclusive apalabrar. Remitirse al habla es sujetarse al trazo abriente como la un ida d esencial del habla (plenamente objet iva , que part iendo del sujeto el cual es postrado por el objeto objetivo como habla se objetiviza su comprensi\u00f3n y por lo tanto su ser mismo) , en el cual se da u n a conglomerac i\u00f3n de puntos interconectados entre lo trascendental, que es el habla en tanto facultad no siempre desarrollada con el hablar fusionados por el decir del Decir (como medio de comunicaci\u00f3n del habla en-s\u00ed con su para-s\u00ed, o sea, el decir del Decir=mostrar) , que nos env\u00eda al apalabramiento y \u00e9ste a su vez nos dirige a descobijar al ser=verdad como concepto ontol\u00f3gico-trascendental-transformador de la realidad. Nos encontramos en el trazo abriente el cual como es dicho anteriormente se remite a esa unidad. Este trazo es cruc ia l para la realizaci\u00f3n del ciclo del habla y de su correspondiente interconexi\u00f3n en tanto que representa el p u n t o neur\u00e1lgico y de potencializaci\u00f3n en la formaci\u00f3n del camino del habla como ser=verdad. \u00bfC\u00f3mo hablar primeramente del habla? Y, \u00bfen qu\u00e9 p u n t o situarnos ante su di\u00e1logo, ante su comunicaci\u00f3n? Primeramente el habla es algo que debemos escuchar, el escuchar el habla se remite al habla esencial, el habla del habla que es el decir, su decir del Decir=mostrar como p u n t o que interrelaciona el escuchar-habla con el silencio. El decir del Decir  m o s t r a r es el sendero manejado por el habla para, al ser escucha, escuchar uti l izando la comprensi\u00f3n-de, aqu\u00ed es donde entra la aletheia. He ah\u00ed de la necesidad de pensar en el habla tambi\u00e9n como silencio, como u n no-sonoro. Arist\u00f3teles en el l ibro X I de su metaf\u00edsica plante\u00f3: \"...los que quieren conversar entre s\u00ed deben comprenderse, porque, \u00bfc\u00f3mo puede sin esta condici\u00f3n haber entre ellos comunicaci\u00f3n de pensamientos? Es preciso, por lo tanto que cada u n a de las palabras sea conocida, que exprese u n a cosa, no muchas, sino u n a sola; o bien, si t ienen muchos sentidos, es preciso que indiquen claramente el objeto que al presente se quiere indicar con la p a l a b r a \" 3 . Somos o\u00eddo del habla que por medio del decir del Decir se nos muestra, ese Decir es igual a l mostrar , a u n manifestar-se. A l i g u a l que Arist\u00f3teles lo plante\u00f3, es necesario u n a comprensibi3 Arist\u00f3teles: Metaf\u00edsica, libro XI, 5 (Espasa-Calpe, Madrid 1998, p. 279-280). filasa\u00ed\u00eda 4t Sala\u00bba\u00bbca 11 Man Ray lidad plena del escucha hacia el hablante (el habla). Se nos des-vela, se nos da un mostrar del habla que necesita primeramente para llegar a esta comprensibilidad el silencio como parte de la inter-comprensi\u00f3n con el habla. \u00bfComprendemos y conocemos el lenguaje del habla? El escucha nos remite al callar, ese callar es la base de la comprensi\u00f3n plena de la esencia del habla aunado al estar introducidos en el trazo abriente (que necesita del escucha-callar), nos da los elementos necesarios y constitutivos del habla misma. Al callar-escuchar existe la conexi\u00f3n \u00edntima con el lenguaje no-sonoro del habla que es escuchado en la interioridad. El papel trascendente de la comprensibilidad es el de no caer en el trasmitir-repetir que demuestra la falta del escuchar-callar y por consiguiente la imposibilidad del apalabrar. La comprensi\u00f3n es el acto de junto-a de posesi\u00f3n-de como \u00fanica v\u00eda de superaci\u00f3n y de acercamiento-a del habla por medio de su advenimiento apropiador para el desvele del ser como verdad transformadora. El planteamiento de lo trascendental nos lleva a pensar en esa facultad inmersa en el ente que genera la probabilidad de poder llegar a la comprensibilidad del habla por medio de su Decir=mostrar, utilizando la f\u00f3rmula callarescuchar-comprender-apalabrar-desvelar-transformar. Una vez llegado a la comprensibilidad del habla y por lo tanto a la posesi\u00f3nde, entra el apalabramiento. Para apalabrar algo, el mismo Arist\u00f3teles dijo: \"Si la palabra designa la existencia, esta existencia es una realidad\"4. El camino al habla tiene como fin el apalabrar al ser. Si se ha seguido la v\u00eda del habla en su unidad esencial en el escucha y en el nombrar (hablar-se\u00f1alar) se puede apalabrar. Este apalabrar necesita forzosamente de la interioridad, aquella voz silenciosa que manifiesta la comprensi\u00f3n total del ser como totalidad, el ser en su esencia que al ser escuchado, previamente comprendido, manifiesta el entendimiento pleno del hombre con su esencia, esto es el hombre-con, el hombre-de, el hombre-en, el principio de finalidad (ya no s\u00f3lo enfocado al ser sino al entehombre) que es el concebir al ser del hombre como totalidad, un todo que necesita ser exteriorizado para la transformaci\u00f3n total ontol\u00f3gica trascendental. Aqu\u00ed entra el advenimiento apropiador como la posesi\u00f3n del habla sobre m\u00ed mismo. En tanto que el ser puede ser apalabrado, existe, y si existe es una realidad. El apalabramiento necesita forzosamente el desocultar aquello oculto en la realidad que ser\u00eda el punto transformador m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de las ciencias y las artes, nos conducir\u00eda a la alteraci\u00f3n del todo. Apalabrar como un se\u00f1alar al ser que es desocultado para, as\u00ed, mostrar el concepto trascendental transformador de la totalidad. Este concepto ontol\u00f3gico trascendental, como lo no-dicho ser\u00e1 la verdad ya no en el all\u00e1 sino en el aqu\u00ed, en el ahora. Esa verdad \u00f3ntica existe en tanto potencialidad en espera de ser descubierta y dirigida al acto, ya en acto, metamorfosear\u00e1 a plenitud la realidad misma. Ib\u00edd. rerieta de la\u00bb aluna\u00bb de fileae\u00ed\u00eda de Salaaaica"], ["Actor Network, Ontic Structural Realism, and the Ontological Status of Actants Corrado Matta Department of Education, Stockholm University, corrado.matta@edu.su.se Abstract In this paper I discuss the ontological status of actants. Researchers have argued that actants are the basic constituting entities of networks in the framework of the actor-network theory (Latour, 2007). I introduce two problems concerning actants that have been highlighted by Collin (2010). The first problem, according to Collin, is that actants cannot simultaneously be constituents and products of a network. The second problem, as Latour suggests, is that if actants are fundamentally propertyless, then it is unclear how they combine into networks. I suggest that both of the problems Collin ascribes to actants rest on the assumption of a form of object ontology, i.e., the assumption that the ontological basis of reality consists in discrete individual entities. I argue that the solution to this problem consists in the assumption of an ontology of relations and, furthermore, that Ontic Structural Realism (Ladyman & Ross, 2007) is the kind of ontological theory of relations that can solve this problem. While my proposal can be considered as an attempt to solve two problems, it is also an experiment of reconciliation between the analytic and constructivist philosophies of science. Keywords Actor network theory, ontic structural realism, relational ontology, actants/actors Introduction This paper is an exercise in the ontology of networks. Throughout the text I use the term network consistently within the actor-network theory (ANT) framework presented and discussed by Latour (2007)1. The main aim of this paper is to propose a solution to two philosophical problems pointed out by Collin (2010) that concern the ontological status of the basic constituents of networks, i.e., actants (or actors)2. The first problem, according to Collin, is that the same actant that participates in the production of a network be produced by the same network. Collin observes that this seems to generate a vicious circle (Collin, 2010, p. 120). Collin formulates the second problem as follows: \"How can actants generate the world through their interaction, if they are fundamentally propertyless, beyond their penchant for combining?\" (Collin, 2010, p. 137). The solution I propose for these two problems draws on a theory about the ontology of scientific theories usually labeled as ontic structural realism (OSR) (discussed in detail in Ladyman & Ross, 2007). In short, I argue that the possibility for propertyless actants to constitute a network rests on the abandonment of object ontology in favor of an ontology of only relations. Object ontology refers to the assumption that the world 1 Actor-network theory is more a family of approaches than a unified theory or method. It is therefore important to remark that in this paper I only discuss Latour's formulation of the theory as discussed in Latour (2007). My conclusions can be extended and applied to other formulations of ANT as long as they are consistent with Latour's. 2 The choice of the term \"actant\" in the text is problematic. It is sometimes avoided in favor of the term \"actor.\" However, the main sources of the discussion in this paper are Collin (2010), Latour (2007), and Harman (2009). While Harman seems to use the terms \"actor\" and \"actant\" interchangeably, Latour attempts a distinction. As Latour writes, \"any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor-or, if it has no configuration yet, an actant.\" (Latour, 2007, p. 71). I am going to use this distinction as a default position, unless when directly discussing Collin's claims. In this latter case I use the term actant exclusively since that is the only one used by Collin (I wish to thank the anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 195 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 basically consists of discrete individual objects that have intrinsic properties. Object ontology is a basic intuitive ontological assumption both in scientific and ordinary discourse; however, as others have previously argued, it rests on neither conceptually nor empirically necessary grounds. OSR claims instead that the analysis of actual scientific theories (both in the natural and social sciences) suggests that we should have an ontological commitment to only a universe of relation without relata. In other words, external relations are irreducible to intrinsic properties. Relations organize and emerge as patterns; scientific theories track these patterns. The fact that theories imply ontological commitments in discrete entities is just a matter of epistemic clarity. Thus, patterns of relations have the capacity of constructing individual entities in the epistemic sense. Thus, I argue that the problems pointed out by Collin rest on the assumption of object ontology. However, I argue that the employment of OSR can, at the price of little modification for both theories, solve both of Collin's two major troubles concerning ANT. I start my discussion by introducing some background terminology for ANT and OSR. I continue by proposing that, in light of OSR, the status of actants is not of individual entities but of structural entities; that is, actants are themselves patterns of relations without relata. In the text I refer to such structural entities as patterns of relations without relata. Finally, I point out some alleged discrepancies between the two theories and argue that these do not constitute a real problem for the project of framing ANT within the context of OSR. Throughout the text I seek support for my claims by referring to examples of application of ANT to the context of networked learning. Arguably, the complexity of the phenomenon of networked learning gives us a convenient vantage point from which we can clearly understand many important aspects of both ANT and OSR. Collin's analysis of ANT The brevity of this paper does not allow me to provide a complete review of ANT or the vast number of ways it has been variously interpreted. Thus, with the help of Collin's analysis (F. Collin, 2010), I briefly analyze a number of claims of Latour's ANT (Latour, 2007) that will be central to my discussion. In short, ANT is an approach to social theory that was developed from science and technology studies (STS) but which diverges from STS in that it takes social constructivism as an ontological claim, and not only, as is the case in classical STS, an epistemological claim. What exists, i.e. the existence of facts, is ultimately the result of a network of actors. ANT's most characteristic and perhaps most controversial feature is the claim that both human and nonhuman actors play a role in networks and, as such, both participate in the construction of social and scientific facts. Networks of actors ontologically constitute facts; this seems to be ANT's main claim. As mentioned above, ANT is the result of the ontological turn in STS. This justifies the requirement of some clear-cut ontological grounds from ANT. However, \"clear-cut\" here does not refer to any kind of foundational ontology, since that would go against the main tenets of constructivism. What is required here is a number of principles that at least partially regulate the existence of networks. Even antirealist ontologies, such as nominalism or instrumentalism, have often been framed by strict logical principles. The same concern pervades Collin's examination of ANT (Collin, 2010, ch. 6\u20137). As he states, Certain actants only come to exist as result of the activities of a well-established network. The conclusion seems inevitable that those actants could not have contributed to establishing the network in the first place (F. Collin, 2010, p. 117). Actants seem to constitute the ontological base of networks. Whatever it is that has a role in the production of facts, be it human or nonhuman, is an actant. However, as Collin points out, it is unclear how actants can explain networks and be produced by networks at the same time. Actants cannot be the explanans of the establishment of networks and at the same time be explained as generated by networks, on pain of circularity. However, Latour seems to be clear that certain actors, such as measurement instruments or chemical formulas, are themselves produced by networks of actors (Latour, 1987, p. 99). Yet, in some cases, they are actors in the same network that generated them. Networked learning provides us with many clear examples of this problem. For instance, as discussed by Fox (2005), the phenomenon of learning communities in networked learning is Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 196 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 produced by a network of human and nonhuman actors. These nonhuman actors include resources such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC), virtual educational platforms, or the hardware tools used to implement these platforms. As Fox points out (2005, p. 102), when learning communities are the object of analysis, the actors in the network that produces the learning community are black-boxed. However, we should not consider actors such as virtual platforms as stable discrete entities. The platform is produced itself by a network that involve the learning community. A learning platform is produced in the practice of its application, which is itself a complex network of actors, including users, economical interests, school policies, curricula, and so on. As David Lewis described the empty set in mathematics, the platform without these actors is nothing but \"a little speck of sheer nothingness\" (Lewis, 1993, p. 9). However, how can the learning platform explain and, at the same time, be explained by the learning community? This is not only an explanatory problem; it is an ontological problem as well. In Latour's monist ontology, actants are all of the same kind. Yet actants seem to lack any property besides their \"penchant for combining\" (F. Collin, 2010, p. 137). How can they then generate the world? According to Collin, it is utterly mysterious how actants generate reality \"through some kind of bootstrapping process that is essentially beyond explanation\" (Collin, 2010, p. 137). In the next section I introduce a new ontological framework that might provide an answer to these problems. Ontic Structural Realism In this section I provide a brief review of OSR and explain the aim and the main arguments. I also highlight some of the important points of contact between ANT and OSR. According to the pessimistic induction argument (Laudan, 1981), which is one of the best-known arguments against scientific realism, the history of science motivates us to not believe in the existence of the entities that appear in scientific theories. Paradigm shifts in disciplines such as physics or psychiatry suggest that the unobservable entities that inhabit our best theories, such as electrons or consciousness, are the result of cultural and social negotiation and not of scientific discovery. Thus, the role of theories ought not to be considered as describing reality. Ontic structural realism holds that, with the exception of the last sentence, all of the above argument is correct. Theoretical entities are constructions, but this does not imply that scientific theories do not describe reality. The structural part of theories is in fact not affected by the pessimistic induction, since structure is retained throughout the paradigm shift (Worrall, 1989). OSR suggests therefore that we should not have an ontological commitment to the individual entities that scientific theories talk about since the content of the terms denoting these entities is destined to change. However, we should hold the structural part of the theories \u2013 that is, all the mathematical and logical relations expressed by the theory \u2013 as true. One simple way to illustrate this is by imagining a scientific theory in which all theoretical terms referring to individual entities are changed into variables or dummy names such as x. This is not a suggestion that individual terms should be eliminated from our theories, since they play an important epistemic role in theories. However, we should not consider them as referring to any individual entity. It is not only the criticism against anti-realism that animates OSR. A number of philosophers have suggested that the strongest argument for OSR is that the analysis of micro-physical theories supports the claim that individual entities such as electrons are essentially relational (Esfeld & Lam, 2011; Ladyman & Ross, 2007, ch. 3; Muller, 2011). Thus, according to OSR, successful theories describe reality since they describe the structure of reality. Individual entities populating our descriptions are just constructions that are useful as epistemic bookkeeping devices (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, p. 121). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 197 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 Fig. 1: Actor-network Theory in an Ontic Structural Realism frame Therefore, OSR's main ontological claim is that reality is essentially relational3. The structural parts of scientific theories track patterns of relations. Hence, OSR argues that structures represent real patterns of relations. In this sense, OSR is a form of scientific realism. Patterns of relations exist independently from our knowledge of reality. OSR proposes an antireductionist ontology. First of all, ontological reductionism implies object ontology. In the case of a learning community, the possibility of reducing the phenomenon of learning to cognitive content implies the existence of human individuals having cognitive content. Patterns are not hierarchically ordered according to complexity or to any other property. Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. 199-204) call this claim the scale relativity of ontology, according to which everything that (really, mind-independently) exists is relative to the scale at which it is measurable. The pattern of relations tracked by the theory of learning communities exists only at the particular scale at which it is measured. Shifting the focus to the cognitive aspects entails a different scale of measurement and thus a different pattern of relations. Hence, OSR shows a number of interesting similarities with ANT. First of all, it is impossible to draw a sharp ontological distinction between social and natural reality, since the only ontological category is that of relations. Even the elements that are in play in the process of tracking a pattern of relations are themselves the result of a relational pattern, since another scientific theory can describe them. As discussed above in relationship to Fox's analysis of learning communities, the actors in the network that produces networked learning are themselves explainable as networks. We have then another theory, explaining, for instance, the economic aspects of a particular learning community. This theory tracks another pattern of relations. Both theories stress the relational character of social and natural reality. Latour talks about sociology as \"the tracing of associations\" (Latour, 2007, p. 5, original italicized). Harman (2009) has extensively argued for the relational aspect of Latour's metaphysics. As he states, \"things are not real by being less connected with others, but become more real the more they are linked with their allies\" (Harman, 2009, p. 80). In the same way, as explained above, OSR claims that theories are about real patterns and not about discrete entities. However, the similarity claim between patterns in OSR and networks in ANT is not valid for all aspects of networks and patterns. As we are going to see in the following sections, there are some crucial differences between the two concepts. 3 The concept of relations without individual relation bearers, i.e., relation without relata, is controversial. A way of making sense of it is rephrasing it as the thesis of the irreducibility of relations to intrinsic properties. Individual entities are necessary if relations supervene on intrinsic properties, since intrinsic properties are necessarily tied to their individual property bearer. However, if relations are irreducible to intrinsic properties, then theories that are ontologically committed to these relations are not ontologically committed to individual entities (Esfeld, 2003; MacBride, 2011). Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 198 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 This brings us to the main point of contact between OSR and ANT: naturalism. Discussing ANT, Latour talks about \"empirical metaphysics\" (Latour, 2007, p. 51). Both projects are motivated by the aim of naturalizing ontology. That implies that conclusions about ontology are not drawn in light of a priori assumptions but on the basis of empirical evidence. If something exists as the social then it will be the result of an empirical investigation. In Latour's seminal work Laboratory Life (Latour & Woolgar, 1979), the track is already set for the project of naturalizing philosophy by substituting \"deep-seated ontological commitments\" with \"empirical evidence\" (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 280). Even though Latour seems to be willing to dismiss the largest part of the analytical philosophy of science, we can remark that the advocates of OSR could not agree more with Latour and Woolgar's criticism of a priori philosophy of science. In the frontispiece of Ladyman and Ross' Every Thing Must Go, we read the following claim: The only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science (Ladyman & Ross, 2007, frontispiece). Just as in ANT and STS, the project of OSR is grounded in empirical evidence. The strongest argument for the ontological claim that everything is relational is that both the natural sciences as well as the social sciences (Dennett, 1991; Kincaid, 2008; Ross & Spurrett, 2004; Ross, 2000, 2008) seem to suggest that the claim is correct. Actants in the OSR frame \u2013 the case of networked learning Before we consider the ontological status of actors, it is necessary to clarify the relations between patterns within OSR and networks in ANT. Patterns and networks are arguably not the same kind of entity. As represented in Figure 1 above, the framework of OSR consists of data models, synthetic models (the product of the analysis of the data models), and theories (families of synthetic models). Data models are logically embedded in synthetic models, while synthetic models are embedded in theories. A structure is the result of the analysis of a theory. The theory's structure is what is left of the theory when individual entities are eliminated. A structure represents a pattern of relations, which is what there really is. Networks analyzed in ANT belong to the domain of synthetic models, since not all kinds of products of data analysis are networks. Thus, according to OSR, although networks can locate a pattern, not all patterns are networks in the ANT sense. According to OSR, all synthetic models from all empirical sciences track a pattern. This does not completely settle the question. In the spirit of the STS roots of ANT, it is possible to interpret Latour so that any kind of data analysis is a network in disguise, or that (even stronger claim) at any scale of measurement, the most correct analysis of data is done in agreement with ANT methodology. This could open up a discussion concerning the status of ANT as a meta-theory, that is, a theory that provides an account of how science, at any level, is produced. This would imply that networks and patterns are arguably the same kind of entity. However, Latour's critique of philosophy of science as meta-theory makes look this hypothesis implausible. I will therefore assume that networks and patterns are different kinds of entities. This does not imply that ANT and OSR refer to different things when they talk about relational ontology, but only that a) either the models generated within ANT pertain to the area that is described as theoretical level in Figure 1, or b) that ANT models are a priori committed to a meta-theory very much like OSR (this latter is unpalatable from the point of view of naturalism). We must leave these two possibilities open. Let us return to Collin's explanatory and ontological problems concerning ANT and consider them in relation to the concrete case of networked learning discussed by Fox (2005). Recall Collin's first problem: actants cannot explain the same network that concurs in producing the actant. The problem with Collin's analysis of the explanatory role of actants in networks is that it implies an ontology of objects. If an object is the explanans of a network, it cannot also have the same network as its own explanans. If we consider actors as relational entities, however, we can escape this circularity problem. The pattern of relations from which an actor emerges lies at a different scale of measurement than the pattern from which the network emerges. A networked learning community and one of the actors in the network that produces it are Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 199 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 both produced by the same network only if a) we think of networks as consisting of rigid points (nodes) and connections among them, and b) that we can simply isolate one of these objects and analyze it. This is what object ontology implies if applied to networks. However, if we consider networks as tracking patterns of relations, then the question of the ontological nature of the IT resource used to implement networked learning in a particular learning community is tied to the scale of measurement that is most appropriate for analysis of the ITC resources. From this perspective, if we analyze the network that produces the learning community, then there is no point in discussing how the IT resource is constructed because there is no (real, mind-independent) IT resource from the scale of measurement of the whole learning community. Shifting the focus to whichever other actor in the network produces the learning community means assuming yet another scale of measurement, and thus tracking another pattern of relations. Of course, we might want to consider how that particular learning community concurred together with other actors to establish the reliability of that particular IT resource. Yet again, we are looking at another pattern of relations. At this scale of measurement there is no (real, mind-independent) learning community. However, two different patterns cannot result from the same synthetic model (in this case from the same network). This entails that we must be speaking of different networks. As a result, there can be no explanatory circularity. These two arguments speak for a difference between patterns and networks. It looks therefore like the solution to Collin's first problem require to extend ANT so that it can be embedded in the meta\u2013theoretic framework of OSR. We can appreciate how the example provided by the ANT frame analysis of networked learning is capable of shedding light on crucial aspects of ANT and OSR. There is no ordering between patterns, and no macro-micro distinction. The shift of scale of measurement from one network to another explaining one of its actants by no means implies a shift downwards in the scale of complexity. Fox's discussion of the concept of community is very helpful in this sense. The actors that concur in producing a network are not more ontologically primitive than the network itself, since a network can be an actor of the network that explains the network's actors. No hierarchy exists among patterns. The solution to Collin's ontological problem should therefore be stated as follows. From the perspective of a network, actants are propertyless, in that networks consist of only relations. Networks represent patterns. Only for the sake of epistemic simplicity do we attribute dummy identities to actants at this level. OSR does not imply any commitment to claims of immutability of structure, for example, in the context of social science. Structures are ways of considering theories and theories are genidentical entities. This means that they grow, split, merge, and eventually die. Patterns are what really exist, and patterns are just as fluid and complex as we expect reality to be. If a social theory tracks a pattern via its structure, then it does not mean that this pattern is immovable since social reality, or social patterns, are not immovable. Nor can a social pattern determine individual choices, due to the scale relativity of ontology. The existence of holistic social structure does not determine the psychological lives of individual members of societies. As we have seen, at the scale of measurement of a community there are no (real, mind-independent) individual members of the community. At this point it is crucial to ask ourselves the following question: would the ANT theorist be willing to trade off a solution for Collin's problem of actants in exchange of a form of realism? Apparent Discrepancies ANT inherits the critical stance against philosophical and foundational theories of science from STS (Latour & Woolgar, 1979, p. 280). Latour has criticized analytic philosophy of science on many occasions, especially the idea that scientific rationality, evidence, and prediction lie at the core of science. This criticism should make us skeptical of the possibility of framing ANT within OSR. In the end, if the term analytic has any meaning, OSR is a form of analytic theory of science. However, one main flaw in the STS and ANT criticism of philosophy of science is that the object of criticism looks more like a straw man than a real concurring position. The picture of analytical philosophy of science as resting on a clear-cut scientific rationality; on the symmetry prediction/explanation; on the centrality of inductive evidence; and on the search for laws is, at best, an old relic of logical positivism. OSR is a post- Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 200 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 positivist theory of science with a strong focus on the practices of science, and this implies that many of the STS's criticisms against analytical philosophy of science might not affect OSR. Thus, in the following section I consider the positions in which ANT and OSR seem to deviate from one another. As I shall argue, much of the apparent disagreement is only apparent. A first source of discrepancy was actually introduced in the last section and discussed in this section. This discrepancy concerned the status of networks as synthetic or meta-theoretic models. The solution proposed here is to consider ANT models as synthetic models on a par with other scientific models, and to consider OSR as a general ontological framework for scientific theories. This comports some deviation from ANT orthodoxy. This deviation is however arguably a small price to pay in exchange for the solution of Collin's problems. Let us then see which other differences can be observed between OSR and ANT. Two further discrepancies The first discrepancy between OSR and ANT regards the concept of practice. According to Collin's analysis of ANT, \"[R]eality only exists where practices exist, that is, as far as networks of actants extend\" (Collin, 2010, p. 136). It is not so easy to infer from OSR a clear claim concerning practices. As we shall see below, it is arguable that not all existence entails practice within OSR. Nonetheless, this discrepancy can be solved without any cost for ANT. In fact, it would simply be too strong an anthropocentric claim for ANT to intend the term of practice to only refer to human practice. It would contradict one of the main methodological claims of ANT, i.e., the rejection of the social-natural and human-nonhuman dichotomies. The problem, however, is not completely solved yet. Since human and nonhuman elements play an evident role in the emergence of theories, and since ontological categories such as human and nonhuman within OSR are only accepted a posteriori, it can be argued that even OSR endorses the claim that all scientific theories are constituted by networks of human and nonhuman actors. This is a strong detour from standard OSR that might appear to be too permissive toward social constructivism. In fact, and without going into too much detail, microphysical phenomena in OSR are understood as only ontologically consisting of their physical relations (Esfeld & Lam, 2011). This implies that the real pattern tracked by some particle physics might be considered in isolation from their technological context. This sounds like an unacceptable concession from ANT. Would the ANT advocate accept a purely information-theoretic explanation of the IT resource involved in the production of a networked learning community? Would that explanation be exhaustive? There is a possible way out of this problem. We can interpret the scale relativity of ontology in a way that allows us to observe, at some scales of measurement, the kind of pattern that Esfeld and Lam talk about. At this scale of measurement we will not find any purely physical system intended as something completely isolated from technological and human influence. Patterns in OSR are intimately connected with data models (the latter of which are embedded in patterns) and experimental set-ups. However, we can claim that the pattern we find at that scale of measurement is simply not a network in the ANT sense. It is important to remark that this is the natural interpretation of the scale relativity and that it by no means prevents the existence of the ANT-type networks. This solution entails an ontological pluralism grounded on the plurality of scientific approaches, all of which are just as correct as long as they are able to track a real pattern. This brings us back to the discussion concerning networks and patterns in the previous section. OSR clearly entails that ANT is not the only possible way of looking at science; rather, it is just one of many. All of these approaches describe a different reality, and all of these realities are equally real. The second discrepancy concerns the problem of realism. It is intuitively clear that a form of scientific realism such as OSR is not destined to fare particularly well in the company of ANT. As Collin clearly states, it is unclear how we should interpret statements such as \"learning communities existed in 1200 BC.\" We can expect that the realist will try to argue that the statement is in some way true, while the constructivist will try to argue that the same statement is in some way false (since the term \"learning community\" is produced by theories of learning). How can these two interpretations coexist? Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 201 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-4 Latour, according to Collin's reconstruction, solves this problem by using a double index to the effect that \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is false in 1200, while \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is true in 2013 (F. Collin, 2010, p. 140). Latour seems to claim that for all the time before the development of theories of learning communities, the claim \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is simply false (F. Collin, 2010, p. 141; Latour, 1987, p. 258). This discrepancy is simply apparent. The problem completely depends on the assumption of object ontology. If we disregard the entities involved in these statements (such as community), we obtain that the structural part of the theory of learning community applies to patterns of behavior that precede the development of the theory. Thus, even though it is true that the concept of learning community is a product of the late twentieth century, we can still say that the statement \"learning communities existed in 1200\" is structurally true. Conclusion In this short paper I have argued that the use of OSR as an ontological framework for ANT implies a number of major rewards at a small price and without distorting ANT's original claims. If ANT is framed within an ontology of only relations, we obtain a clearer and less problematic conception of actant/actor. I have also argued that despite a number of apparently irreconcilable discrepancies, ANT and OSR seem to integrate into one another fairly well. References Collin, F. (2010). Science studies as naturalized philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer. Collin, F. (2011). Latour's metaphysics. In F. Collin, Science studies as naturalized philosophy (pp. 127\u2013145). Dordrecht: Springer. Dennett, D. (1991). Real patterns. The Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 27\u201351. Esfeld, M. (2003). Do relations require underlying intrinsic properties? A physical argument for a metaphysics of relations. Metaphysica, 4(1), 5\u201325. Esfeld, M., & Lam, V. (2011). Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects. In A. Bokulich, P. Joshua M. Bokulich (Eds.), Scientific structuralism (pp. 143\u2013159). Springer. Fox, S. (2005). An actor-network critique of community in higher education: Implications for networked learning. Studies in Higher Education, 30(1), 95\u2013110. Harman, G. (2009). Prince of networks: Bruno Latour and metaphysics. Melbourne: Re. press, 2009. Kincaid, H. (2008). Structural realism and the social sciences. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 720\u2013731. Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Latour, B. (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press. Latour, B. (2007). Reassembling the social: An introduction to actor-network-theory. OUP Oxford. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton University Press. Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48(1), pp. 19\u201349. Lewis, D. (1993). Mathematics in megethology. Philosophia Mathematica, 1(1), 3\u201323. MacBride, F. (2011). Relations and truthmaking. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Vol. 111, pp. 161\u2013 179). Muller, F. A. (2011). Withering away, weakly. Synthese, 180(2), 223\u2013233. Ross, D. (2000). Rainforest realism: A Dennettian theory of existence. In D. Ross, A. Brook, D. Thompson (Eds.), Dennett's philosophy: A comprehensive assessment (pp. 147\u2013168). MIT Press. Ross, D. (2008). Ontic structural realism and economics. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 732\u2013743. Ross, D., & Spurrett, D. (2004). What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(5), 603\u2013627. Worrall, J. (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43(1-2), 99\u2013124. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Networked Learning 2014, Edited by: Bayne S, Jones C, de Laat M, Ryberg T & Sinclair C. 202 ISBN 978-1-86220-304-"], ["Aesthetic Value, Cognitive Value, and the Border Between It is sometimes held that \"the aesthetic\" and \"the cognitive\" are separate categories.1 I disagree. I doubt that we can carve up the conceptual space so neatly. Accordingly, in this paper, I will challenge the independence or autonomy of aesthetic and cognitive categories. But I will do so in an unorthodox fashion. Most attempts proceed by arguing that cognitive values can bear upon aesthetic ones. Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims and values. They require distinct modes of attention and reward divergent kinds of appreciation. Thus, we must avoid running together aesthetic and cognitive matters. 2 I will approach from the opposite direction. I will show that a work's aesthetic merits can affect its cognitive ones and, more provocatively, its philosophical ones.3 1. Definitions Some definitions are in order. First, I will take aesthetic value to refer to that which makes an object worthy or unworthy of being perceived, contemplated, or otherwise appreciated for its own sake.4 1 See, for example, Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2009), 253\u2013254, Ch. 7; Peter Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries,\" in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2006), 134. Accordingly, I will not take it to reside simply in those aspects of an object productive of sensory pleasure or its opposite, such as beauty, gracefulness, elegance, and their contraries. I will treat it as being realized by a range of fea2 Aesthetic cognitivists take this route. See, for example, Berys Gaut, \"Art and Cognition,\" in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, ed. Matthew Kieran (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2006); Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005); M. W. Rowe, \"Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth,\" The Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 188 (1997): 322-341. 3 For other discussions of this claim, see Lee B. Brown, \"Philosophy, Rhetoric and Style,\" The Monist 63, no. 4 (1980): 425\u201344; Arthur C. Danto, \"Philosophy as/and/of Literature,\" Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 58, no. 1 (1984): 5-20; Charles Griswold, \"Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues,\" Monist 63, no. 4 (1980): 530-546; Steven Fuller, \"When Philosophers are Forced to be Literary,\" in Literature as Philosophy/Philosophy as Literature, ed. Donald G. Marshall (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1987), 24-39; Lawrence M. Hinman, \"Philosophy and Style,\" Monist 63, no. 4 (1980): 512-529; Bernd Magnus, \"Deconstruction Site: The 'Problem of Style' in Nietzsche's Philosophy,\" Philosophical Topics 19, no. 2 (1991): 215-243; Martha C. Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3-53. 4 Here I follow Peter Kivy, \"What Makes 'Aesthetic' Terms Aesthetic?,\" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36, no. 2 (December 1, 1975): 211; Alan H. Goldman, Aesthetic Value (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 20. 2 tures, including what No\u00ebl Carroll calls expressive properties (e.g. somber, melancholic, gay, bold, stately, pompous), Gestalt properties (e.g. unified, balanced, tightly knit, chaotic), taste properties (e.g. gaudy, vulgar, kitschy, garish), and reaction properties (e.g. sublime, beautiful, comic, suspenseful).5 I will exclude from the purview of my investigation aesthetic value properties that are cognitive in nature, such as being profound, insightful, true, or misleading. Although they qualify as aesthetic on some accounts, 6 Second, when I turn to cognitive values, I will focus on a proper subset of them, namely those we might call philosophical values. Doing otherwise would once again diminish the interest of my thesis. The general category of cognitive value includes such things as pedagogical or instructional value. including them would render my thesis trivial. Mere substitution would generate the conclusion that aesthetic value can affect cognitive value. 7 There is nothing novel or profound about trumpeting the importance of aesthetic considerations here.8 What is philosophical value such that attention to it possesses greater interest in this context? We can begin with the point that philosophical texts aim at truth. Their goal is to convey ideas that are true. Texts that move us or display eloquence and wit more often hit home. We more frequently remember them, incorporate their conclusions into our web of beliefs, and integrate their ideas into our practical deliberations. 9 5 No\u00ebl Carroll, Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1999), 190. It should be apparent from this list that, following Goldman, I do not believe aesthetic properties have to be directly perceptible. See Alan H. Goldman, \"Aesthetic Qualities and Aesthetic Value,\" The Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 27. Accordingly, their value qua philosophical texts- their philosophical value-partly consists in whether they achieve this goal. Another portion concerns how well they support the truths they proclaim. Indeed, the strength of a text's arguments is likely the most decisive measure of its philosophical merit. However, other considerations deserve mention, including the internal consistency of the text and its contributions to issues of perennial interest to the philosophical community. Although not exhaustive, this list is sufficiently informative for our purposes. 6 For a discussion of this point, see Gaut, \"Art and Cognition\"; Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts.\" 7 See Gaut, \"Art and Cognition,\" 115. 8 See Horace [Quintus Horatius Flaccus], Ars Poetica, trans. Henry Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library 194 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), lines 343\u2013344; Peter Kivy, Philosophies of Arts: An Essay in Differences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 88\u201389. 9 See Peter Lamarque, \"Learning from Literature,\" Dalhousie Review 77, no. 1 (1997): 10; Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts,\" 134. 3 The foregoing account of philosophical value might appear to undercut my thesis. We might wonder how it could matter to our philosophical assessment of a work whether it exhibited great literary eloquence, profoundly moved us on an emotional level, or contained that high level of implicit meaning known as \"semantic density.\"10 Indeed, of what philosophical importance could it be whether the prose of a text was lifeless, serene, dynamic, vulgar, vivid, or suspenseful? Such considerations look irrelevant to the strength of a work's arguments, its internal consistency, or the truth of its conclusions. Claiming otherwise seems to involve a category mistake.11 Nevertheless, I will defend the counterintuitive line. I will argue that the aesthetic value of a text can bear upon the philosophical value of a text. That is not to say that it always does so, or that it is ever the sole determining factor, only that it sometimes does so and to some degree. 2. Clarifications In principle, aesthetic value could bear upon cognitive value in two ways. First, some aesthetic values might be constitutive of cognitive value. In other words, possession of them could be commendatory or pejorative in a cognitive sense. Second, some aesthetic values might ground judgments about cognitive value. The fact that a work has them could provide reasons for a positive or negative assessment of its cognitive merit. I shall proceed along the latter front. I will argue that some aesthetic values bear upon cognitive values by grounding them. Now aesthetic values supervene on aesthetic properties. Such supervenience takes two forms.12 First, some aesthetic properties are themselves evaluative.13 They are bearers of aesthetic value or that in which aesthetic value resides. Thus, to say that an object has one of these properties is in part to say that the object is to some degree aesthetically good or bad.14 10 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 128\u2013129; Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, 48. For example, to describe a work as sublime, moving, or bold 11 See Griswold, \"Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues,\" 530\u2013531; Hinman, \"Philosophy and Style,\" 512\u2013514; Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts,\" 134; Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" 8; Magnus, \"Deconstruction Site,\" 216\u2013217. 12 Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 20; G\u00f6ran Hermer\u00e9n, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities, Studies in Aesthetics 1 (Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1988), 76, 144\u2013159. 13 I allow that evaluative properties might also be descriptive. See Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 25. 14 Hermer\u00e9n, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities, 149. 4 is normally to appraise it positively. To call it dreary, derivative, or boring is typically to assess it negatively.15 Second, some aesthetic properties are not evaluative, but are nonetheless relevant to aesthetic value. More specifically, they figure into our explanations of why an object warrants a positive or negative aesthetic value judgment. 16 I will focus on aesthetic properties that are themselves evaluative. I do not merely wish to show that a work's aesthetic properties bear upon its philosophical value but that its aesthetic value does so. For example, to describe the pace of a novel as fast is not necessarily to evaluate it. Yet, we might point to the fact that a novel is fast-paced to account for why we call it gripping, which typically would be an evaluative comment. 17 3. False Starts The following observation provides a tempting point of departure. When assessing philosophical texts, we often raise considerations that fall into a category that overlaps with aesthetics, namely stylistics. We praise or criticize works because they possess or lack properties such as clarity, succinctness, awkwardness, and eloquence.18 15 Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 20. We must take care here for several reasons. First, the contribution of almost any particular aesthetic value to a work's overall aesthetic merit can be overridden by the presence of other aesthetic values of the opposite valence. For example, a work might possess elegance. However, if it is also derivative, we might consider it an impoverished work of art all things considered. Thus, aesthetic values are pro tanto in nature. Second, whether an aesthetic value property has a positive or negative valence often depends on context. For instance, gracefulness is typically a good-making property. However, it might detract from artwork intent upon exhibiting the brutality of war. See Robert Stecker, Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 68. Third, whether an aesthetic property is evaluative at all may be context-dependent. Consider mournfulness. Kivy maintains that it has a positive valence in a lament, a negative valence in an epithalamion, but \"may very well be neutral if a feature of a violin sonata\" (\"What Makes 'Aesthetic' Terms Aesthetic?,\" 201.). We include \"well-written,\" or its opposite, in referee reports and in comments on student papers. The existence of such vocabulary in our critical practices suggests that stylistic considerations (and so perhaps aesthetic ones) may fall under the purview of philosophical val16 Goldman, Aesthetic Value, 20\u201321; Hermer\u00e9n, The Nature of Aesthetic Qualities, 76\u201379. 17 Merely showing that the aesthetic properties of a work bear upon its cognitive value will not establish my thesis that aesthetic value affects cognitive value. The reason is that we might have a common cause story on our hands. The aesthetic property in question might serve as the basis of both an aesthetic value and a cognitive value without the aesthetic value having any bearing on the cognitive value. 18 Brown, \"Philosophy, Rhetoric and Style,\" 425\u2013426; Griswold, \"Style and Philosophy: The Case of Plato's Dialogues,\" 529. 5 ue. After all, some scholars cite the appearance of cognitive vocabulary in art criticism as evidence that cognitive values influence aesthetic ones.19 We must tread carefully here. The fact that an evaluative judgment concerns a philosophical work does not necessarily make it a judgment about the philosophical value of that work. The reasons for the judgment matter. Why should not something of the reverse hold as well? 20 A second observation might afford better initial footing. We might defend the idea that aesthetic value can influence cognitive value by noting that we esteem some philosophical texts as highly as we do precisely because of their aesthetic merits. For instance, Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals and Quine's \"Two Dogmas of Empiricism\" probably would not occupy such lofty places in the canon were it not for their incomparable wit. Augustine's Confessions likely would attract fewer readers were it less moving. Finally, Austin's \"Truth\" might have received less attention had it not contained so many quotable passages. For example, if I extol William Irwin's The Simpsons and Philosophy because it has made a large sum of money, or if I laud Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged because of its influence on American culture, my evaluations are not philosophical in nature. In neither case am I concerned with the truth of the work's the content, the strength of its arguments, its relevance to perennial philosophical problems, etc. The same point might hold with regard to assessments based on stylistic considerations. Although frequently made of philosophical works, stylistic assessments might reveal nothing about their philosophical value. At least, we would need additional reasons before ruling out this possibility. Thus, we cannot conclude from the mere existence of stylistic vocabulary in criticisms of philosophical writing that stylistic value (and thus perhaps aesthetic value) bears upon philosophical value. 21 Conceding the accuracy of these conjectures, what follows? What do we learn from the fact that the philosophical community values texts partly for aesthetic rea- 19 See Rowe, \"Lamarque and Olsen on Literature and Truth.\" 20 See J. O. Urmson, \"What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?,\" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 31 (1957): 75-92. 21 The opening lines provide the most notable example: \"'What is truth?' said jesting Pilate, and would not stay for an answer. Pilate was in advance of his time. For 'truth' itself is an abstract noun, a camel, that is, of a logical construction, which cannot get past the eye even of a grammarian. We approach it cap and categories in hand: we ask ourselves whether Truth is a substance (the Truth, the Body of Knowledge), or a quality (something like the colour red, inhering in truths), or a relation ('correspondence'). But philosophers should take something more nearly their own size to strain at. What needs discussing rather is the use, or certain uses, of the word 'true'. In vino, possibly, 'veritas', but in a sober symposium 'verum',\" (\"Truth,\" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 24 (1950): 111. 6 sons? Not much. It indicates that the philosophical community cares about more than just philosophical matters. It also implies that some texts have aesthetic as well as philosophical value.22 4. Philosophical Content and Aesthetic Properties However, neither point entails that the possession of aesthetic value affects the possession of philosophical value. Where, then, to begin? Perhaps the proper place is with the notion that a text's aesthetic properties can implicitly express statements and claims. This idea is not novel, having been suggested by Martha Nussbaum,23 Peter Kivy,24 and others.25 First, note that works of literature typically prompt us to take up the point of view of the (presumed) narrator. For example, when reading Camus's The Stranger, we find ourselves looking at the world through the eyes of Mersault. The pages of Dickens's Copperfield draw us into the title character's perspective on life. Finally, the power of Nabokov's Lolita lies in its ability to make us empathize with Humbert Humbert. However, it lacks a robust defense. I will attempt one here. The same does not hold for philosophical texts. Reading them has a different phenomenology. We do not automatically enter into the (presumed) author's world. We do not extend him or her the same leeway regarding the facts. On the contrary, we interrogate each word and sentence. We demand justifications for every assertion made. In addition to extrinsic considerations such as genre, intrinsic ones such as style, structure, and tone facilitate this effect. Take Spinoza's Ethics. It proceeds in an abstract, impersonal, and dispassionate manner. These features keep us at arm's length from Spinoza, the man. They force us to concentrate on the ideas he puts forth. Moreover, the text's geometric feel encourages us to submit it to the same cold, logical analysis we would a mathematical proof.26 22 See also Lamarque, \"Cognitive Values in the Arts,\" 132. Alternatively, consider the dialogues of Plato, Berkeley, and Hume. The characters in them challenge and question each other's views. We find 23 Martha Nussbaum attributes the view to the ancient Greeks, but what she says also reflects her own position: \"Forms of writing were not seen as vessels into which different contents could be indifferently poured; form was itself a statement, a content\" (\"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" 15). 24 Kivy says, \"For the way in which the artist employs the medium is, in effect, part of the content, because it expresses something in the artist's point of view about the content\" (Philosophies of Arts, 117). 25 Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 147\u2013148; Danto, \"Philosophy as/and/of Literature,\" 7\u20138; Jenefer M. Robinson, \"Style and Personality in the Literary Work,\" The Philosophical Review 94, no. 2 (April 1, 1985): 227247; Hayden V. White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 1\u201325. 26 See Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature,\" 30\u201335. 7 ourselves caught up in the process. Transformed into judges of an imaginary debate, we scrutinize the merits of their arguments. These examples show how the formal properties of a philosophical text, such as its style, structure, or tone, can influence our approach to its content. However, the aesthetic properties of a philosophical text can perform a similar function. To see why, it helps to turn to works that do not invite dispassionate responses, such as Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. The Genealogy is a moving, provocative, and even disturbing book. Most conspicuous in this regard is the passage describing the journey of Mr. Rash and Curious into the workshop where Judeo-Christian ideals are made.27 The scene comes across as something out of a horror movie. The workshop is dark and foreboding. Soft muttering and whispering emanate from hidden nooks and crannies. Noxious air overcomes Mr. Rash and Curious; he struggles to contain his stomach. His unease and disgust are contagious; they wash over us.28 These feelings in turn shape how we perceive the workshop's secrets.29 The fact that the aesthetic properties of a text can influence us in this way underwrites their ability to imply claims. The reasoning here is roughly Gricean. When engaging with others, we tacitly assume that they will act cooperatively. They glue our attention to the unnerving aspects of Mr. Rash and Curious's discoveries. Thus, when he reports that Judeo-Christian values are the product of lies and deception, the message has a jarring effect. 30 In part this means that we expect them to encourage us only in appropriate ways. We presume that they will urge us to do only what they believe suits the circumstances. Thus, when an interlocutor prompts us to pursue a specific course of action, we take it that he or she considers the course of action appropriate. In other words, the conventional31 27 Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), sec. I.14. See Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 102\u2013105; Christopher Janaway, \"Responses to Commentators,\" European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2009): 145\u2013148; Stephen Mulhall, \"Nietzsche's Style of Address: A Response to Christopher Janaway's Beyond Selflessness,\" European Journal of Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2009): 121\u2013131. (but defeasi28 For more on emotional contagion, see Amy Coplan, \"Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the Ancients on Emotion and Virtue-Acquisition,\" Metaphilosophy 41, no. 1-2 (January 1, 2010): 132-151. 29 For discussions of how the emotions aroused by a text affect our understanding of it, see No\u00ebl Carroll, \"Art, Narrative, and Emotion,\" in Emotion and the Arts, ed. Mette Hjort and Sue Laver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 199\u2013203; Jenefer Robinson, Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and Its Role in Literature, Music, and Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 105\u201335, 154\u2013194. 30 H. Paul Grice, \"Logic and Conversation,\" in Syntax and Semantics 3: Speech Acts, ed. Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (New York: Academic Press, 1975), 45\u201348. 31 The implication is not a logical one. It does not deductively follow from encouragement that the encourager thinks the activity in question is appropriate. It is always possible that the person is trying to deceive us. 8 ble)32 The existence of such implications is uncontroversial when the encouragement occurs on the semantic level. Take political advertisements. They beg, plead, cajole, and threaten to get us to vote for a particular candidate, party, or proposition. The advertisements thereby imply that doing so is right or good. It is less obvious that similar implications arise when the encouragement operates on the level of formal and aesthetic properties. However, there is no prima facie reason to treat these cases differently. As the examples discussed above reveal, the formal and aesthetic properties of a text can lead us to perform specific actions. They can prompt us to approach a text in a particular way or adopt a certain attitude while reading it. It seems plausible to say that they thereby imply that undertaking these actions is appropriate. implication of a person's encouragement is that what he or she pushes us to do is somehow fitting. 5. The Effect of Aesthetic Properties on Philosophical Value This conclusion feeds into a larger argument about the relationship between aesthetic properties and philosophical values. To begin with, the claims implied by a text's aesthetic properties do not have to align with those that comprise the text's explicit semantic content. The former can say one thing, the latter something else. These two sets of claims can contradict each other.33 A thought experiment illustrates the idea. Imagine an alternative version of Nietzsche's Genealogy. It contains all the explicit philosophical content expressed by the original work. In particular, it includes the claim found in the third essay that our emotions play an essential role in knowledge acquisition. Such a contradiction would be a philosophical defect; it would compromise the consistency of the text. Thus we can see how possessing the wrong aesthetic properties can detract from a text's philosophical value. By the same token, possessing the right aesthetic properties can support the philosophical value of a text. If the implications of a text's aesthetic properties coincided with its explicit content, the consistency of the text would be upheld. 34 32 The implication would be defeated if, for example, we had good reasons for thinking that the author or speaker were jesting. However, the fictional text differs from Nietzsche's actual one in terms of its formal and aesthetic properties. It is not written in a bombastic style. It is neither moving, nor shocking, nor unsettling. Rather, it proceeds in a dispassionate and impersonal manner reminiscent of Spinoza's Ethics. 33 For other discussions of the sort of form-content contradiction described here, see Hinman, \"Philosophy and Style\"; Nussbaum, \"Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature.\" 34 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, sec. III.12. 9 Consequently, it only addresses its readers' intellects; it only arouses those aspects of their minds devoted to abstract reasoning.35 The reason for this contradiction, as well as for the loss of philosophical merit it engenders, deserves emphasis. The contradiction stems from the absence of the very properties that make Nietzsche's actual text aesthetically valuable, namely its ability to move, shock, and unsettle. Thus, the decrease in aesthetic value that occurs when moving from the real text to the fictional one results in a decrease in philosophical value. Conversely, the increase in aesthetic value that occurs when moving in the opposite direction brings about an increase in philosophical value. By way of the Gricean argument outlined above, it follows that the style of the imaginary text implies that a dispassionate approach to its content is fitting. In other words, we need not engage our emotions to grasp what it says. Such an implication, however, is inconsistent with the explicit content of the text. It contradicts the claim that knowledge acquisition requires activation of the emotions. 36 6. The Affect of Aesthetic Value on Philosophical Value We can now draw some general conclusions about the relationship between aesthetic and philosophical value. I have shown that the aesthetic value properties of a text can imply philosophical claims. These implicit claims can stand in various logical relationships with the explicit content of the text. For instance, they can entail the truth or falsehood of any part of it. Consequently, their presence can uphold (in the former case) or undermine (in the latter case) the coherence of the text. In both scenarios, the text's aesthetic value affects its philosophical value. Three cautionary notes are in order. First, the claims implied by a text's aesthetic value properties can also be logically irrelevant to its semantic content. It is possible for them to entail neither the truth nor the falsehood of anything the text explicitly says. In such cases-and they might be the majority-the aesthetic properties of the text might have no bearing on its philosophical value. Second, the properties that positively affect a text's philosophical value need not be aesthetically meritorious. Just as there is bad art and bad literature, so too are there 35 See Martha C. Nussbaum, \"Fictions of the Soul,\" in Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 245-260. 36 For other defenses of the philosophical importance of Nietzsche's literary style, see Janaway, Beyond Selflessness; Magnus, \"Deconstruction Site.\" For an opposing view, see Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 13\u201314. 10 negative aesthetic value properties.37 Third, aesthetic value has only limited impact on philosophical value. The latter consists in a plurality of things, from the truth of the claims made by a text, to the degree of support it provides for these claims, to the influence of its arguments on perennial philosophical problems, to its overall consistency. Aesthetic properties do not bear upon all of these considerations. For those it does affect, it is not the only relevant factor. Consistency, for example, is not simply a matter of the relationship between the claims implied by a text's aesthetic properties and those that comprise its explicit semantic content. The relationship that obtains strictly between the latter set of claims also matters. Moreover, if properties with a positive valence can contribute to philosophical value, as in the case of Nietzsche's Genealogy, so too can those with a negative valence. There may be cases where the literary equivalent of Socrates's ugly visage contributes to the coherence of the text. Consequently, even when aesthetic value does bear upon philosophical value, the correlation will not necessarily be direct. Even accounting for these three caveats, the following claims still hold. In some cases, the possession of aesthetic value positively affects a text's philosophical value. Conversely, the lack of aesthetic merit sometimes engenders philosophical defects. Therefore, we must attend to aesthetic considerations when creating and evaluating philosophical works. The intuitive view that aesthetic value does not bear upon philosophical value is mistaken. 37 See, for example, Stephen Davies, The Philosophy of Art, Foundations of the Philosophy of the Arts (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 54."], ["International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 40 The General Solution for a linear Second Order Homogenous Differential Equations with Variable Coefficients Rehab A .Shaaban Dep .of Mathematics .College of Education for girls. University of Kufa . Iraq Abstract : The main goal in this work to find the general solution for some kind of linear second order homogenous differential equations with variable coefficients which have the general form 0)()( \uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0a2 yxQyxPy , by using the substitution \uf0f2\uf03d dxxZ ey )( ,which transform form the above equation to Riccati equation . Keyword :Differential equations , Riccati equation , Bernoulli equation . 1. INTRODUCTION Many researchers in this field of differential equations , may face a difficult in solving the linear second order differential equations by using known methods . Therefore ,they are trying to solve these equations by using the power series or the Frobenius method [1] . Kathem [ 2 ] gave a method for solving the above equation ,this method depends to find a function )(xZ such that \uf0f2\uf03d dxxZ ey )( . Kathem [ 2] only gave examples which enable to find the general soluation by using this substitution . 2Bernoulli Equation [3] The general form that of Bernoulli equation has is written as 1)()( \uf0b9\uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2 nnyxqyxpy where p and q are functions of, x (or constants) 3Riccati Equation [4] The general form of Riccati equation is written as )1...(2)()()( yxhyxgxfy \uf02b\uf02b\uf03d\uf0a2 where gf , and h are given functions of x ( or constants) . We can solve it , if one or more particular solutions of )1( can be found by inspection or otherwise . The general solution of )1( is easy to be obtained by the following conditions iIf 1y is a known particular solution , then the general solution can be obtained by the assumption :- 1 yyU \uf02d\uf03d , then )1( transformed into Bernoulli equation 2) 1 2()( hUUhygxU \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b , so , the general solution of )1( is given by \uf05b \uf05d dxhyg exxdxxxhcyy ) 1 2( )(;)()()() 1 ( \uf0f2 \uf02b \uf03d\uf03d\uf0f2\uf02d\uf02d \uf063\uf063\uf063 International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 41 ii-If 1y and 2y are two known particular solutions , then the general solution of )1( can be found by the assumption 1 ) 2 ( yyyyU \uf02d\uf03d\uf02d , then the general solution is given by :dxyyxh\n\neyyCyy ) 21 ()( ) 2 ( 1 \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d\uf03d\uf02d , where C is an arbitrary constant . iiiIf 21 , yy and 3y ,are three known particular solutions, say then the general solution of equation )1( is given as : C yyyy yyyy \uf03d \uf02d\uf02d \uf02d\uf02d )()( )()( 113 231 , where C is an arbitrary constant 4How Find The General Solution for the Linear Second Order Differential Equations We can solve the equation )2...(0)()( \uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0a2 yxQyxPy by the following cases: iIf )(xP and )(xQ are constants say axP \uf03d)( and bxQ \uf03d)( then the equation )2( becomes )3...(0)()()( 2 \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 bxaZxZxZ , and the solution of )3( is given by :a ) \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02d\uf02b\uf02d \uf02d \uf03d x a bCx a bC x a ey 4 2 sin 24 2 cos 1 2 , if 4 2a b \uf0b9 ,where \uf061 and \uf062 are arbitrary constants b) \uf028 \uf029Cx x a eAy \uf02b \uf02d \uf03d 2 , if 4 2a b \uf03d ,where A and C are arbitrary constants . proof :- International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 42 a) Since 0)()(2)( \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 bxaZxZxZ , so \uf0f2 \uf02d\uf03d\uf02b\uf02d\uf03d \uf02b\uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02b \uf0de\uf03d\uf02b \uf02d\uf02b\uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02b 4 2 2; 2 2 2 0 4 22 2 a bdCx d a Z dZ dx a b a Z dZ fACandfACwherex a bCx a bC x a ey g eAdxf x a eAy gx a dxf e dxd ey dcf a dxfdZCx d aZ d sin 2 cos 1 ;) 4 2 sin 24 2 cos 1 (2 );cos(2 2 )cos(ln 2 a -dx)-(ftan ; 2 )tan( 2/1tan 1 \uf03d\uf03d\uf02d\uf02b\uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf03d\uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf02b\uf02d\uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf03d \uf03d\uf02d\uf02d\uf03d\uf0de\uf02b\uf02d\uf03d\uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02b\uf02d\uf0de \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 4.1.Example:For solving the differential equation 32,032 \uf02d\uf03d\uf03d\uf03d\uf02d\uf0a2\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0a2 bandayyy , since 4 2a b \uf0b9 Then , by using the above formula , we get the general solution which has the form ) 2 2 2 1(,) 2 2 2 1(, 3) 2 22 22 22 1 ( )2sin 2 2cos 1 ()13sin 2 13cos 1 ( i CC B i CC Awhere xBexAe i xexe C xexe Cxey ixCixCxeyxCxCxey \uf02d\uf03d\uf02b\uf03d \uf02b\uf02d\uf03d \uf02d\uf02d \uf02b \uf02b\uf02d\uf02d\uf03d \uf02b\uf02d\uf03d\uf0de\uf02d\uf02d\uf02b\uf02d\uf02d\uf02d\uf03d b) If 112 2 ; 1 2 2 1 0 2 4 CC Cx a ZxC a Z dx a Z dza b \uf02d\uf03d \uf02b \uf03d\uf02b\uf0de\uf02d\uf03d \uf02b \uf02d\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02b \uf0de\uf03d Since International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 43 \uf028 \uf029 2;2 22 ln 2 1 )( C eACx x a eAy Cx a Cx ey dx a Cx ey dxxZ ey \uf03d\uf02b \uf02d \uf03d \uf02b\uf02d\uf02b \uf03d\uf0de \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02b \uf03d\uf0de\uf0f2\uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6\uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 4.2.Example:-For solving the differential equation 4,4;044 \uf03d\uf03d\uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0a2 bayyy we will use the general form in the above formula and we get )(2,)(2 BAxxeyACBBAx x a ey \uf02b\uf02d\uf03d\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b \uf02d \uf03d ii-If 0)( \uf03dxQ , then the general solution is given by :- \uf0f2 \uf02b \uf0f2\uf02d\uf03d Bdx pdx eAy proof:Since 2020)()(2)( ZZPZZPZZQxZPxZxZ \uf02d\uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 , this is like Bernoulli equation , to solve it , let \uf0de\uf03d\uf02d tZ 1 1\uf03d\uf02d\uf0a2 Ptt .this equation is linear , and its integrating factor is given by:- \uf0f2 \uf03d\uf02b \uf0f2\uf02d\uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02b \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d\uf0de\uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d\uf03d\uf0f2 \uf02d \uf0de \uf0f2\uf02d\uf03d\uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d\uf0f2 \uf02d \uf0de\uf0f2 \uf02d \uf03d 1, )(1 )( ln )( )( )( )( )()( )()( )( )()( . C eABdx dxxp eA Cdx dxxp e ey dx dx dxxp e dxxp e ey dx dxxp e dxxp e Zdx dxxp et dxxp e dx dxxp edx dxxp exptdt dxxp e dxxp eFI 4.3.Example :For solving the differential equation 0 2 \uf03d\uf0a2\uf02d\uf0a2\uf0a2 y x y , we use the general form in the above formula and we get International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 44 \uf0f2 \uf02b \uf0f2\uf02d\uf03d Bdx dxxp eAy )( \uf0de \uf0f2 \uf02b \uf0f2 \uf03d Bdx dx xeAy 2 31 ;3 1 ln2 AABxAyBdxxeAy \uf03d\uf02b\uf03d\uf0de\uf02b\uf0f2\uf03d iii-If )(2)( xQxP \uf03d , then the equation )3( can be solved by the assumption )()( xQxZu \uf02b\uf03d , since \uf028 \uf029 0202202 \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 QZZQQZZQPZZZ , to solve this equation , let P Q uuu P Q u P Q u Q Q uZQZu \uf0a2 \uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b \uf0a2 \uf02d\uf0a2\uf0de \uf0a2 \uf02d\uf0a2\uf03d \uf0a2 \uf02d\uf0a2\uf03d\uf0a2\uf0de\uf02b\uf03d 202 2 , this is Riccati equation , with P Q xkandxgxf \uf0a2 \uf03d\uf03d\uf03d )(0)(,1)( Now , there are many cases 1-If 1u is a known solution to the last equation , then the general solution is given by \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d\uf0f2 \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 dx dxu e dxxQu eAy 1 2)( 1 proof:- The assumption 1uud \uf02d\uf03d transforms the equation to Bernoulli equation which has the form:\n\n20 1 22 dduddudd \uf02d\uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 , to solve it , we set 1 1 2221 \uf03d\uf02d\uf0a2\uf0de\uf0a2\uf02d\uf03d\uf0a2\uf02d\uf0de\uf0a2\uf03d\uf0a2\uf02d\uf02d\uf0de\uf03d\uf02d tuttddtddtd , this is linear equation , and its integrating factor is given by :- \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d dxu eFI 1 2 . ,so the general solution of the last equation is given by :- International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 45 ceAdx dxu e dxxQu eAy CdxxQudx dxu e ey dxxQu dx dxu e dxu e ey xQu dx dxu e dxu e Zu dx dxu e dxu e xQZ u dx dxu e dxu e u dx dxu e dxu e uu dx dxu e d dxu e dx dxu et dxu e \uf03d\uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d\uf0f2 \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02b\uf02d\uf02b\uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02d\uf02b \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d \uf02d\uf02b \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d\uf0de\uf02b \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d\uf02b \uf02b \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d\uf0de \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d\uf02d \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d\uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0de \uf0f2\uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2\uf02d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 ;1 2)( 1 )( 1 1 2 ln )( 1 1 2 1 2 )( 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 )( 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 21 2 1 2 1 2 . 2-If 1u and 2u are two known solutions , then the general solution of the last equation is given by :tconsC\n\ndxQ dxuu eC dxuu eCuu ey tan; 211 21 21 \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 proof:From Riccati equation we get \uf028 \uf029 C dxuu euuCuu ;21 21 \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d\uf03d\uf02d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 is any arbitrary constant so \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf0de \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7\uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7\uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 dxQ dxuu eC dxuu eCuu ey dxuu eC dxuu eCuu u 211 21 21 211 21 21 International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 46 3-if 21 ,uu and 3u are three known solutions , then the general solution of the last equation is given by :tconsC\n\nuu uu xJ dxxQ xCJ uxCJu ey tan; 23 13)(; )( )(1 2 )( 1 \uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02d\uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 proof:From Riccati equation we get : C uu uu C uu uu ; 23 13 2 1 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf02d \uf02d is any arbitrary constant \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02d\uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf02d \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf0de \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf0de\uf02d\uf03d\uf02d\uf0de \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf03d \uf02d \uf02d \uf0de \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 23 13)(; )( )(1 2 )( 1 )( )(1 2 )( 1 )(1 2 )( 1 2 )()( 1 23 13 )(;)( 2 1 uu uu xJ dxxQ xCJ uxCJu ey xQ xCJ uxCJu Z xCJ uxCJu uuxJCuxJCuu uu uu xJxJC uu uu Note:Some of these equations can be transformed into variable separable equations and don't need the above formula to find the general solution 4.5. Example :For solving the differential equation 2)(,2)(;022 xxQxxPyxyxy \uf03d\uf03d\uf03d\uf02b\uf0a2\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0a2 , by using the equation )3( we get \uf028 \uf029 002 222 \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 xZZxxZZZ , let \uf028 \uf029 \uf028 \uf029 xCxZ CxtCxtdx t dt tt tZtxZ \uf02d\uf02b\uf03d\uf0de \uf02b\uf03d\uf0de\uf02b\uf03d\uf0de\uf03d\uf02d \uf02d \uf0de\uf03d\uf02b\uf02d\uf0a2\uf0de \uf02d\uf0a2\uf03d\uf0a2\uf0de\uf03d\uf02b \uf02d tanh tanhtanh0 1 01 1 1 2 2 , since International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 47 \uf028 \uf029 CaeBCaeAxBxA x ey Cx ax ey axCx ey dxxCx ey dxxZ ey sinh,cosh;sinhcosh 2 2 1 )cosh( 2 2 12 2 1 coshln )tanh()( \uf03d\uf03d\uf02b \uf02d \uf03d \uf02b \uf02b\uf02d \uf03d\uf0de \uf02b\uf02d\uf02b \uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02d\uf02b \uf03d\uf0de\uf0f2\uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6\uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6\uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 iv) If )(xP and )(xQ are not any one of the above cases , then the equation 0)()(2 \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 xQZxPZZ is like Riccati equation . As a result then there are three cases : 1-If 1Z is a known solution to it, then the general solution of )1( is given by :aeAdx\n\ndxZP e dxZ eAy \uf03d\uf0f2 \uf0f2 \uf02b\uf02d\uf0f2 \uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 ;1 2 1 Proof :- The assumption uZZ \uf02b\uf03d 1 transforms the equation to Bernoulli equation which has the form:- \uf028 \uf029 02 21 \uf03d\uf02b\uf02b\uf02b\uf0a2 uuZPu , to solve it , we assume tu \uf03d\uf02d1 \uf028 \uf029 12 1 \uf03d\uf02b\uf02d\uf0a2\uf0de tZPt this is a linear equation , and its integrating factor (I.F) is given by :aeAdx\n\n)(tan; )(1 2 )( 1 ZZ ZZ xJandtconsC dx xJC ZxJCZ ey \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf03d \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 proof:From Riccati equation , we can write C ZZ ZZ C ZZ ZZ ; 23 13 2 1 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf02d \uf02d be any arbitrary constant \uf0f2 \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf0de \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d \uf02d\uf03d\uf02d\uf0de \uf02d \uf02d \uf03d\uf03d \uf02d \uf02d \uf0de \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 dx xJC ZxJCZ ey xJC ZxJCZ Z ZxJCZxJCZZ ZZ ZZ xJxJC ZZ ZZ )(1 2 )( 1 )(1 2 )( 1 2 )()( 1 23 13)(;)( 2 1 4.6..Example :For solving the differential equation 0 2 22 \uf03d\uf02d\uf0a2\uf02b\uf0a2\uf0a2 y x y x y , we use the general form in the above formula , which is aeAdx dxZP e dxZ eAy \uf03d\uf0f2 \uf0f2 \uf02b\uf02d\uf0f2 \uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 ;1 2 1 , International Journal of Engineering and Information Systems (IJEAIS) ISSN: 2000-000X Vol. 3 Issue 4, April \u2013 2019, Pages: 40-49 www.ijeais.org 49 now, let x Z 1 1 \uf03d ( which is a particular solution of Riccati equation ) 1 ;2 313 3 ln4ln 41 ACBBxx A C x AxdxxexeAy dx dx xe dx xeAy \uf03d\uf02b\uf02d\uf02d\uf03d \uf0f7 \uf0f7 \uf0f8 \uf0f6 \uf0e7 \uf0e7 \uf0e8 \uf0e6 \uf02b \uf02d\uf02d \uf03d\uf0f2 \uf02d\uf03d \uf0f2 \uf0f2\uf02d\uf0f2 \uf03d REFERENCE [1] Soloughter ,Dan [ 2000 ,Section 8.7] http : // math .furman .edu /~ des/book/Difference Equation to Differential Equations . [2] Kathem , Athera Nema ., \" Solving special Kinds of Second Order Differential Equations by using the substitution \uf0f2\uf03d dxxZ ey )( \" , Msc , thesies , University of Kufa , College of Eduction , Departmant of Mathematies , 2005 . [3] Braun , M. ,\" Differential Equation and Their Application \" , 4 th ed , New York : Spering \u2013 Verlag , [1993 ]. [4] Murphy . G . M . , \" Ordinary Differential Equation and their Solutions \" , D .Van Nastr and Company , Inc . , New York , [1960] ."], ["History of Science Society and University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Isis. http://www.jstor.org Review Author(s): Gary Hatfield Review by: Gary Hatfield Source: Isis, Vol. 81, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 340-341 Published by: on behalf of University of Chicago Press History of Science Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/233741 Accessed: 24-11-2015 14:24 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:24:20 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 340 BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 81: 2: 307 (1990) Three aspects of maritime concern can be identified: cosmographic theories about the globe and the oceans involved astronomy , cartography, and mathematics. The measurement of space and time depended on the development of instruments, and the story of ships and sail is that of technology. The social dimensions of a maritime society , and the trend toward \"scientific\" description , representation, explanation, and treatment of new environments and societies , are discussed in the context of the Casa de la Contratacion and the Consejo de Indias, unique centers of learning built on secular concerns. There are no footnotes, but a basic bibliography , an index, and a chronology make this well-written survey a useful reference as well. URSULA LAMB * Early Modern Period Marinus Dirk Stafleu. Theories at Work: On the Structure and Functioning of Theories in Science, in Particular during the Copernican Revolution. (Christian Studies Today .) 310 pp., bibl., index. Lanham, Md.! New York: University Press of America, 1987; Toronto: Institute for Christian Studies , 1987. $28.75 (cloth); $16.50 (paper). Theories at Work arose from classroom teaching and probably is intended for use in upper-level courses in the history and philosophy of science. It attempts to develop a theory of theories and to test that theory against the \"history of ideas,\" both philosophical and scientific, during the Copernican revolution. Two reasons are offered for this choice of historical test. First, it is claimed that the Copernican revolution brought about a fundamental change in the way the basic axioms of a theory were conceived : whereas the ancient ideal required that axioms be self-evident or intuitively obvious, Copernicus's willingness to flout common sense ushered in the modern penchant for treating theoretical axioms as contingent and as initially unknown. Second , the Copernican revolution has been a central test case for the \"new\" philosophy of science of Karl Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn. The second reason plays the larger role in structuring the book, which effectively contains two parts: an examination of the role of theories in early modern astronomy and physics (Chs. 2-6), and a discussion of the norms and values that should guide the development of theories (Chs. 7-12). In the first part the author argues that theorists should aim for causal explanation, rather than mere prediction; that during the Copernican revolution there was a change in the principles of scientific explanation, and in particular that motion changed from being something that required explanation to being a principle of explanation; and that the aim of modern science is to discover laws, not merely to solve problems. In the chapters on value he argues that the norms of theory making should include the attempt to be clear, the attempt to avoid giving offense, the duty to publish, and the search for simple and harmonious laws. In the final chapter the author contends that realism in science always is a matter of belief , for which no proof is possible. He commends a \"reformationist view\" of the laws of nature, attributed to John Calvin, according to which laws are the free and arbitrary creation of a god who remains faithful to the laws so decreed, thereby ensuring a stable natural order that is subject to scientific investigation. The author describes this view not as a metaphysical tenet but as an article of faith. The book's theism will seem a benefit to some and a drawback to others. Let us place it to one side and examine the book on its historical and philosophical merits. The description of the \"article of faith\" just mentioned as essentially \"reformational\" may be questioned, for Descartes adopted a voluntarist position virtually identical with the one attributed to Calvin. More generally, although the book cites primary sources frequently, the interpretation of these sources draws heavily upon such authors as E. A. Burtt, E. J. Dijksterhuis, the early A. R. Hall, and Alexandre Koyre. The historiography is thus quite dated and echoes the familiar but dubious position that Archimedes, Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes were all \"Platonists.\" In accordance with Pierre Duhem, all technical astronomy prior to Copernicus is incorrectly described as \"instrumentalist\" (Sec. 2.1). Some of the historical discussions are interesting , including the analysis of Christiaan Huygens as a \"normal scientist\" (Sec. 4.2), the claim that \"crises\" follow the introduction of new theories, rather than preceding them (Sec. 4.5), and the discussion of the This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:24:20 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 81: 2: 307 (1990) 341 relations among the theories of Newton, Galileo, Kepler, and Descartes (Sec. 5.1). In general the work is strongest when dealing with the relation of Newton to his predecessors and successors. However, numerous factual and interpretive errors undercut its usefulness as a textbook, as when it is claimed that according to Descartes planetary rotation is the cause of vortical motion, or that Descartes's treatment of rest and rectilinear motion as \"states\" was fully equivalent to Newton's law of inertia (Sec. 3.4; according to Descartes, a change in the direction of straight-line motion does not require force). Moreover, the chief historical argument of the book, pertaining to the rejection of the Aristotelian ideal of self-evident axioms, is weakened by a failure to discuss the Aristotelian distinction between the order of knowledge and the order of nature (in the former order, axioms are not originally evident). Philosophically, the attempt to observe \"theories at work\" is commendable and indicates the author's alliance with Popper, Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan, who are frequently cited, sometimes with approval, sometimes in disagreement. The more particular philosophical claims of the author, such as that human experience can be analyzed into four irreducible modes (number, space, motion, and physical interaction ), are of interest but are not developed sufficiently to permit evaluation. GARY HATFIELD Juan A. Frago Gracia; Jose Garcia-Diego. Un autor aragone's para \"Los veintiun libros de los ingenios y de las maquinas.\" (Coleccion Estudios y Monografias, 7.) 148 pp., illus. Zaragoza: Diputacion General de Aragon, 1988. The Veintiun libros is among the most substantial technological manuscripts of the sixteenth century. Running to over nine hundred pages, now bound in five volumes, the twenty-one books describe every technology that makes use of water, with information on such matters as the chemical processes used in refining, the material used in the construction of bridges, harbors , conduits, and much else. In all, the work is almost as comprehensive as Georgius Agricola's De re metallica or Vannoccio Biringuccio's Pirotechnia, which may have been its model. Until 1976 the manuscript was assumed to be by a celebrated maker of clocks, planetaria, and automatic puppets, Juanelo Turriano of Cremona: he was also known as a hydraulic engineer and had designed a novel if cumbersome waterworks for Toledo and its palace, the Alcazar. In that year, however, J. A. Garcia-Diego showed how implausible this attribution was. Simply , there is hardly any congruence between Turriano's career as known to us and the areas of expertise of the author of the Veintiu'n libros-no mention of any of the inventions of Turriano or of the places where he worked (the places that are mentioned are in Aragon, where Turriano apparently never went). At first Garcia-Diego thought something at least of the manuscript was contributed by Giovanni Francesco Sitoni, an Italian engineer who did work in Aragon. GarciaDiego has since found a manuscript on irrigation by Sitoni, which he hopes to publish . But it is now clear that Sitoni cannot be the author of the Veintiuin libros. Garcia -Diego had already concluded that the author must be a native speaker of Spanish. He has now collaborated with the philologist Juan Frago Gracia to produce what must be a definitive study of the language of the Veintiuin libros. Frago Gracia's thorough investigation reveals a wealth of words used only in certain parts of Aragon, with local spellings and syntax. Clearly the author's mother tongue was Aragonese Spanish. Indeed, although a number of the place names mentioned are in the southern highlands of Aragon, the vocabulary strongly suggests an origin further north, in the Alto Aragon between the Ebro basin and the Pyrenees (roughly, the modern province of Huesca). More tentatively , Frago Gracia proposes the central part of the province. Other inquiries by Garcia-Diego, to experts in design, tell us that the costume and architectural details of the four hundred-plus drawings that illustrate the Veintiiun libros are probably of the last decade of the sixteenth century. The language seems to bear this date out, broadly speaking. So we now have a time and a place-approximately. Have we an author? N. Garcia Tapia has argued for the one man he believes fits the bill, Pedro Juan de Lastanosa (most recently and most fully in \"Pedro Juan de Lastanosa y Pseudo-Juanelo Turriano,\" Llull, 1987, 10:51-74). He has claimed that Lastanosa is the only engiThis content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 14:24:20 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions"]]