fix: Validate multimodal media URLs and load paths (#8282)

Signed-off-by: zhongdaor <zhongdaor@nvidia.com>

components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/audio_loader.py

@@ -3,13 +3,18 @@
 
 import asyncio
 import logging
-from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Awaitable, Dict, Final, List
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 import numpy as np
 
 import dynamo.nixl_connect as nixl_connect
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.http_client import get_http_client
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import (
+    UrlValidationPolicy,
+    fetch_with_revalidation,
+    validate_media_url,
+)
 from dynamo.common.utils import nvtx_utils as _nvtx
 from dynamo.common.utils.media_nixl import read_decoded_media_via_nixl
 from dynamo.common.utils.runtime import run_async
@@ -57,37 +62,28 @@ class AudioLoader:
         self,
         http_timeout: float = 30.0,
         enable_frontend_decoding: bool = False,
+        url_policy: UrlValidationPolicy | None = None,
     ) -> None:
         if http_timeout <= 0:
             raise ValueError(f"http_timeout must be positive, got {http_timeout}")
         self._http_timeout = http_timeout
         self._enable_frontend_decoding = enable_frontend_decoding
+        self._url_policy = url_policy or UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
         self._nixl_connector = None
         self._vllm_media_connector = None
         if self._enable_frontend_decoding:
             self._nixl_connector = nixl_connect.Connector()
             run_async(self._nixl_connector.initialize)
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _normalize_audio_url(audio_url: str) -> str:
-        """Convert bare filesystem paths to file:// URIs.
-
-        HTTP(S) and data: URLs are returned unchanged.
-        """
-        parsed_url = urlparse(audio_url)
-        if parsed_url.scheme or not audio_url:
-            return audio_url
-
-        file_path = Path(audio_url).expanduser()
-        if not file_path.exists():
-            raise FileNotFoundError(f"Error reading file: {file_path}")
-
-        return file_path.resolve().as_uri()
-
     def _get_vllm_media_connector(self) -> Any:
         if self._vllm_media_connector is None:
             MediaConnector, _ = _require_vllm_audio_media()
-            self._vllm_media_connector = MediaConnector(allowed_local_media_path="/")
+            # Confine vLLM's own local-path access to the same prefix we enforce.
+            # Empty string matches vLLM's secure default (no local access).
+            allowed = self._url_policy.allowed_local_path or ""
+            self._vllm_media_connector = MediaConnector(
+                allowed_local_media_path=allowed
+            )
 
         return self._vllm_media_connector
 
@@ -97,14 +93,23 @@ class AudioLoader:
 
     @_nvtx.annotate("mm:audio:load_with_vllm", color="cyan")
     async def _load_audio_with_vllm(self, audio_url: str) -> tuple[np.ndarray, float]:
+        normalized_url = await validate_media_url(audio_url, self._url_policy)
+        media_io = self._create_vllm_audio_io()
+
+        # HTTP(S) goes through our SSRF-safe fetcher so each redirect hop is
+        # revalidated; vLLM's own fetcher honors redirects without re-checking.
+        # data: and file:// never touch the network, so vLLM can handle them.
+        if urlparse(normalized_url).scheme in ("http", "https"):
+            http_client = get_http_client(self._http_timeout)
+            response = await fetch_with_revalidation(
+                http_client, normalized_url, self._url_policy
+            )
+            response.raise_for_status()
+            return await asyncio.to_thread(media_io.load_bytes, response.content)
+
         connector = self._get_vllm_media_connector()
-        normalized_url = self._normalize_audio_url(audio_url)
-        # TODO: Add caching for repeated remote `audio_url` downloads to avoid
-        # refetching the same asset across requests.
         return await connector.load_from_url_async(
-            normalized_url,
-            self._create_vllm_audio_io(),
-            fetch_timeout=self._http_timeout,
+            normalized_url, media_io, fetch_timeout=self._http_timeout
         )
 
     @_nvtx.annotate("mm:audio:load_audio", color="cyan")

components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/http_client.py

@@ -6,12 +6,6 @@
 # You may obtain a copy of the License at
 #
 # http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-#
-# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-# limitations under the License.
 
 import logging
 from typing import Optional
@@ -20,28 +14,32 @@ import httpx
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
-# Global HTTP client instance
+# The shared client has ``follow_redirects=False`` to prevent redirect-based
+# SSRF filter bypass. Callers must follow redirects manually via
+# :func:`dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.fetch_with_revalidation` so
+# that each hop is re-validated against the SSRF policy.
 _global_http_client: Optional[httpx.AsyncClient] = None
 
 
 def get_http_client(timeout: float = 60.0) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
-    """
-    Get or create a shared HTTP client instance.
+    """Return a shared async HTTP client for media fetches.
 
-    Args:
-        timeout: Timeout for HTTP requests
-
-    Returns:
-        Shared HTTP client instance
+    The client intentionally disables automatic redirect following. Callers
+    that need to follow redirects must route the request through
+    :func:`fetch_with_revalidation`, which revalidates every redirect hop
+    against the SSRF policy.
     """
     global _global_http_client
 
     if _global_http_client is None or _global_http_client.is_closed:
         _global_http_client = httpx.AsyncClient(
             timeout=timeout,
-            follow_redirects=True,
+            follow_redirects=False,
             limits=httpx.Limits(max_keepalive_connections=20, max_connections=100),
         )
-        logger.info(f"Shared HTTP client initialized with timeout={timeout}s")
+        logger.info(
+            "Shared HTTP client initialized (timeout=%ss, follow_redirects=False)",
+            timeout,
+        )
 
     return _global_http_client

components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/image_loader.py

@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ from dynamo.common.utils.media_nixl import read_decoded_media_via_nixl
 from dynamo.common.utils.runtime import run_async
 
 from .http_client import get_http_client
+from .url_validator import (
+    UrlValidationPolicy,
+    fetch_with_revalidation,
+    validate_media_url,
+)
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -36,6 +41,7 @@ class ImageLoader:
         cache_size: int = CACHE_SIZE_MAXIMUM,
         http_timeout: float = 30.0,
         enable_frontend_decoding: bool = False,
+        url_policy: UrlValidationPolicy | None = None,
     ):
         """
         Initialize the ImageLoader with caching, HTTP settings, and optional NIXL config for
@@ -49,12 +55,14 @@ class ImageLoader:
             enable_frontend_decoding: If True, enables NIXL RDMA for transferring
                 decoded images directly from frontend memory, bypassing standard
                 network transport. Defaults to False.
+            url_policy: Policy for validating URLs. Defaults to UrlValidationPolicy.from_env().
         """
         self._http_timeout = http_timeout
         self._cache_size = cache_size
         self._image_cache: OrderedDict[str, Image.Image] = OrderedDict()
         self._inflight: dict[str, asyncio.Task[Image.Image]] = {}
         self._enable_frontend_decoding = enable_frontend_decoding
+        self._url_policy = url_policy or UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
         # Lazy-init NIXL connector only when frontend decoding is enabled
         self._nixl_connector = None
         if self._enable_frontend_decoding:
@@ -94,7 +102,9 @@ class ImageLoader:
         try:
             with _nvtx.annotate("mm:img:http_fetch", color="lime"):
                 http_client = get_http_client(self._http_timeout)
-                response = await http_client.get(image_url)
+                response = await fetch_with_revalidation(
+                    http_client, image_url, self._url_policy
+                )
                 response.raise_for_status()
                 if not response.content:
                     raise ValueError("Empty response content from image URL")
@@ -134,26 +144,25 @@ class ImageLoader:
             raise ValueError(
                 "Invalid image source scheme: local file access is not allowed"
             )
+        normalized_url = await validate_media_url(image_url, self._url_policy)
+        parsed_url = urlparse(normalized_url)
 
         if parsed_url.scheme in ("http", "https"):
-            key = image_url.lower()
+            key = normalized_url.lower()
 
-            # Check cache (sync — no await, no interleaving possible)
             if key in self._image_cache:
                 logger.debug(f"Image found in cache for URL: {image_url}")
                 self._image_cache.move_to_end(key)
                 return self._image_cache[key]
 
-            # Join existing in-flight task, or start a new one
             if key not in self._inflight:
-                task = asyncio.create_task(self._fetch_and_cache(key, image_url))
+                task = asyncio.create_task(self._fetch_and_cache(key, normalized_url))
                 # Suppress "exception was never retrieved" if all waiters cancel
                 task.add_done_callback(
                     lambda t: t.exception() if not t.cancelled() else None
                 )
                 self._inflight[key] = task
 
-            # shield so cancelling THIS caller doesn't cancel the shared task
             return await asyncio.shield(self._inflight[key])
 
         if parsed_url.scheme == "data":

components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/url_validator.py

+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+"""URL / path validation and SSRF-safe HTTP fetching for multimodal loaders.
+
+By default (``UrlValidationPolicy()``), only ``https://`` and ``data:`` URLs
+are allowed; private / internal IPs and local filesystem access are both
+blocked. Individual loaders can add stricter rules on top — ``ImageLoader``,
+for example, refuses every local input regardless of policy.
+
+To loosen the defaults, either build a ``UrlValidationPolicy(...)`` directly
+or call ``UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()`` to pick up the ``DYN_MM_*`` vars
+below.
+
+"""
+
+import asyncio
+import ipaddress
+import os
+import socket
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from pathlib import Path
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+import httpx
+
+
+class UrlValidationError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a URL or filesystem path fails the configured policy."""
+
+
+# IP ranges that must never be reachable from a user-controlled URL.
+# Source: RFC1918 (private), RFC6598 (CGNAT), RFC5735 (loopback, link-local,
+# 0.0.0.0/8), RFC4193 (ULA), RFC4291 (IPv6 loopback / link-local), RFC6890
+# (reserved). Link-local 169.254/16 covers the AWS / OpenStack metadata IP.
+_BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS: tuple[ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network, ...] = (
+    ipaddress.ip_network("0.0.0.0/8"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("10.0.0.0/8"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("127.0.0.0/8"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("169.254.0.0/16"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("172.16.0.0/12"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.0.0/24"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("192.0.2.0/24"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("192.168.0.0/16"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("198.18.0.0/15"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("198.51.100.0/24"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("203.0.113.0/24"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("224.0.0.0/4"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("240.0.0.0/4"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("255.255.255.255/32"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("::/128"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("::1/128"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("::ffff:0:0/96"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("fc00::/7"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("fe80::/10"),
+    ipaddress.ip_network("ff00::/8"),
+)
+
+# Hostnames that resolve to cloud metadata / internal services regardless of
+# DNS records. Matched case-insensitively.
+_BLOCKED_HOSTS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
+    {
+        "localhost",
+        "localhost.localdomain",
+        "ip6-localhost",
+        "ip6-loopback",
+        "metadata",
+        "metadata.google.internal",
+        "metadata.goog",
+        "kubernetes.default",
+        "kubernetes.default.svc",
+    }
+)
+
+
+def is_blocked_ip(ip_text: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if ``ip_text`` parses as an IP inside one of the blocked ranges."""
+    try:
+        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_text)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return any(ip in net for net in _BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class UrlValidationPolicy:
+    """Frozen policy describing which media URLs and local paths are allowed."""
+
+    allow_http: bool = False
+    allow_private_ips: bool = False
+    allowed_local_path: str | None = None
+
+    @classmethod
+    def from_env(cls) -> "UrlValidationPolicy":
+        """Build a policy by reading the ``DYN_MM_*`` environment variables."""
+        allow_internal = os.getenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", "0") == "1"
+        return cls(
+            allow_http=allow_internal,
+            allow_private_ips=allow_internal,
+            allowed_local_path=os.getenv("DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH", "").strip() or None,
+        )
+
+
+async def validate_url(url: str, policy: UrlValidationPolicy) -> str:
+    """Check ``url`` against ``policy`` and return it unchanged if it passes.
+
+    ``https://`` and ``data:`` always pass. ``http://`` needs
+    ``allow_http=True``. Anything else is rejected outright.
+
+    For URLs with a hostname, we resolve it here (off the event loop via
+    ``loop.getaddrinfo``) and check the resulting IPs against the blocked
+    ranges. This catches obvious DNS rebinding but not an attacker who
+    changes their answer between this lookup and httpx's actual connect.
+
+    Raises ``UrlValidationError`` on any policy violation.
+    """
+    if not url:
+        raise UrlValidationError("URL is empty")
+
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
+
+    if scheme == "data":
+        return url
+
+    if scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+        raise UrlValidationError(f"URL scheme '{scheme}' not allowed")
+
+    if scheme == "http" and not policy.allow_http:
+        raise UrlValidationError(
+            "http:// URLs are not allowed; set DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL=1 to enable"
+        )
+
+    host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
+    if not host:
+        raise UrlValidationError(f"URL has no host component: {url!r}")
+
+    if not policy.allow_private_ips and host in _BLOCKED_HOSTS:
+        raise UrlValidationError(
+            f"Host '{host}' is blocked (resolves to internal service)"
+        )
+
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    else:
+        if not policy.allow_private_ips and is_blocked_ip(host):
+            raise UrlValidationError(f"IP literal '{host}' is in a blocked range")
+        return url
+
+    if policy.allow_private_ips:
+        return url
+
+    loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
+    try:
+        infos = await loop.getaddrinfo(host, None)
+    except socket.gaierror as exc:
+        raise UrlValidationError(f"Could not resolve host '{host}': {exc}") from exc
+    for info in infos:
+        addr = info[4][0]
+        if is_blocked_ip(addr):
+            raise UrlValidationError(f"Host '{host}' resolves to blocked IP '{addr}'")
+    return url
+
+
+def validate_local_path(path: str, policy: UrlValidationPolicy) -> Path:
+    """Resolve ``path`` and confirm it sits inside ``allowed_local_path``.
+
+    We call ``Path.resolve()`` first, so symlinks that point outside the
+    allowed prefix are caught. Local access is refused outright when
+    ``allowed_local_path`` is unset (the default).
+
+    Raises ``UrlValidationError`` if the feature is off or the resolved
+    path escapes the prefix.
+    """
+    if not policy.allowed_local_path:
+        raise UrlValidationError(
+            "Local media paths are not permitted; set " "DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH to enable"
+        )
+
+    try:
+        resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve(strict=True)
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        raise UrlValidationError(f"File not found: {path}") from exc
+    except OSError as exc:
+        raise UrlValidationError(f"Could not resolve path '{path}': {exc}") from exc
+
+    try:
+        allowed = Path(policy.allowed_local_path).expanduser().resolve(strict=True)
+    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
+        raise UrlValidationError(
+            f"Configured allowed_local_path does not exist: {policy.allowed_local_path}"
+        ) from exc
+
+    try:
+        resolved.relative_to(allowed)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise UrlValidationError(
+            f"Path '{path}' is outside the allowed directory '{policy.allowed_local_path}'"
+        ) from exc
+
+    return resolved
+
+
+async def validate_media_url(url: str, policy: UrlValidationPolicy) -> str:
+    """Validate any media input and return a canonical URL string.
+
+    Bare filesystem paths and ``file://`` URIs go through
+    ``validate_local_path`` and come back as a resolved ``file://`` URI.
+    Everything else goes through ``validate_url`` and is returned
+    unchanged. Callers can still reject the result afterwards —
+    ``ImageLoader``, for example, refuses local files regardless.
+
+    Raises ``UrlValidationError`` on any policy violation.
+    """
+    if not url:
+        raise UrlValidationError("URL is empty")
+
+    parsed = urlparse(url)
+    scheme = parsed.scheme.lower()
+
+    if scheme in ("", "file"):
+        raw_path = parsed.path if scheme == "file" else url
+        resolved = validate_local_path(raw_path, policy)
+        return resolved.as_uri()
+
+    return await validate_url(url, policy)
+
+
+_MAX_REDIRECTS = 3
+
+
+async def fetch_with_revalidation(
+    client: httpx.AsyncClient,
+    url: str,
+    policy: UrlValidationPolicy,
+) -> httpx.Response:
+    """Safely fetch a URL while checking security policy at every redirect.
+
+    Only ``_MAX_REDIRECTS`` hops allowed. ``client`` must have
+    ``follow_redirects=False`` (the default from ``get_http_client``).
+    We follow redirects ourselves and validate each ``Location`` header
+    against the policy first.
+
+    Only plain ``GET`` with no custom headers is supported. httpx normally
+    strips credentials on cross-origin redirects only when
+    ``follow_redirects=True``.
+
+    Raises ``UrlValidationError`` on any policy violation or when the
+    redirect chain exceeds ``_MAX_REDIRECTS``.
+    """
+    current_url = url
+    hops_remaining = _MAX_REDIRECTS
+    visited: list[str] = []
+
+    while True:
+        await validate_url(current_url, policy)
+        visited.append(current_url)
+
+        request = client.build_request("GET", current_url)
+        response = await client.send(request, follow_redirects=False)
+
+        if not response.is_redirect:
+            return response
+
+        location = response.headers.get("location")
+        if not location:
+            return response
+
+        if hops_remaining <= 0:
+            await response.aclose()
+            raise UrlValidationError(
+                f"Too many redirects (max={_MAX_REDIRECTS}); chain={visited}"
+            )
+        hops_remaining -= 1
+
+        next_url = str(response.url.join(location))
+        await response.aclose()
+        current_url = next_url

components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/video_loader.py

@@ -16,13 +16,18 @@
 import asyncio
 import logging
 import os
-from pathlib import Path
 from typing import Any, Awaitable, Dict, Final, List
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 import numpy as np
 
 import dynamo.nixl_connect as nixl_connect
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.http_client import get_http_client
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import (
+    UrlValidationPolicy,
+    fetch_with_revalidation,
+    validate_media_url,
+)
 from dynamo.common.utils.media_nixl import read_decoded_media_via_nixl
 from dynamo.common.utils.runtime import run_async
 
@@ -53,33 +58,27 @@ class VideoLoader:
         http_timeout: float = 60.0,
         num_frames: int = NUM_FRAMES_DEFAULT,
         enable_frontend_decoding: bool = False,
+        url_policy: UrlValidationPolicy | None = None,
     ) -> None:
         self._http_timeout = int(http_timeout)
         self._num_frames = num_frames
         self._enable_frontend_decoding = enable_frontend_decoding
+        self._url_policy = url_policy or UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
         self._nixl_connector = None
         self._vllm_media_connector = None
         if self._enable_frontend_decoding:
             self._nixl_connector = nixl_connect.Connector()
             run_async(self._nixl_connector.initialize)
 
-    @staticmethod
-    def _normalize_video_url(video_url: str) -> str:
-        parsed_url = urlparse(video_url)
-        if parsed_url.scheme or not video_url:
-            return video_url
-
-        file_path = Path(video_url).expanduser()
-        if not file_path.exists():
-            raise FileNotFoundError(f"Error reading file: {file_path}")
-
-        return file_path.resolve().as_uri()
-
     def _get_vllm_media_connector(self) -> Any:
         if self._vllm_media_connector is None:
             MediaConnector, _, _ = _require_vllm_video_media()
-            # Match the previous backend behavior and allow direct local file paths.
-            self._vllm_media_connector = MediaConnector(allowed_local_media_path="/")
+            # Confine vLLM's own local-path access to the same prefix we enforce.
+            # Empty string matches vLLM's secure default (no local access).
+            allowed = self._url_policy.allowed_local_path or ""
+            self._vllm_media_connector = MediaConnector(
+                allowed_local_media_path=allowed
+            )
 
         return self._vllm_media_connector
 
@@ -93,14 +92,23 @@ class VideoLoader:
     async def _load_video_with_vllm(
         self, video_url: str
     ) -> tuple[np.ndarray, Dict[str, Any]]:
+        normalized_url = await validate_media_url(video_url, self._url_policy)
+        media_io = self._create_vllm_video_io()
+
+        # HTTP(S) goes through our SSRF-safe fetcher so each redirect hop is
+        # revalidated; vLLM's own fetcher honors redirects without re-checking.
+        # data: and file:// never touch the network, so vLLM can handle them.
+        if urlparse(normalized_url).scheme in ("http", "https"):
+            http_client = get_http_client(self._http_timeout)
+            response = await fetch_with_revalidation(
+                http_client, normalized_url, self._url_policy
+            )
+            response.raise_for_status()
+            return await asyncio.to_thread(media_io.load_bytes, response.content)
+
         connector = self._get_vllm_media_connector()
-        normalized_url = self._normalize_video_url(video_url)
-        # TODO: Add caching for repeated remote `video_url` downloads to avoid
-        # refetching the same asset across requests.
         return await connector.load_from_url_async(
-            normalized_url,
-            self._create_vllm_video_io(),
-            fetch_timeout=self._http_timeout,
+            normalized_url, media_io, fetch_timeout=self._http_timeout
         )
 
     async def load_video(self, video_url: str) -> tuple[np.ndarray, Dict[str, Any]]:

components/src/dynamo/common/tests/multimodal/test_audio_loader.py

 # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
-from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
 
+import httpx
 import numpy as np
 import pytest
 
 import dynamo.common.multimodal.audio_loader as audio_loader_module
 from dynamo.common.multimodal.audio_loader import AudioLoader
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import (
+    UrlValidationError,
+    UrlValidationPolicy,
+    validate_media_url,
+)
 
 pytestmark = [
     pytest.mark.unit,
@@ -16,34 +22,116 @@ pytestmark = [
 ]
 
 
-def test_normalize_audio_url_converts_local_paths(tmp_path):
+def _permissive_http_policy() -> UrlValidationPolicy:
+    """Policy that lets existing tests keep using https://example.com/... URLs.
+
+    Private/loopback IPs and DNS checks are bypassed so tests don't depend on
+    real DNS resolution of example.com.
+    """
+    return UrlValidationPolicy(
+        allow_http=True,
+        allow_private_ips=True,
+    )
+
+
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_converts_local_paths(tmp_path):
     audio_path = tmp_path / "sample.wav"
     audio_path.write_bytes(b"RIFF")
 
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path))
+
     assert (
-        AudioLoader._normalize_audio_url(str(audio_path))
+        await validate_media_url(str(audio_path), policy)
         == audio_path.resolve().as_uri()
     )
 
 
-def test_normalize_audio_url_preserves_data_urls():
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_preserves_data_urls():
     data_url = "data:audio/wav;base64,UklGRg=="
-    assert AudioLoader._normalize_audio_url(data_url) == data_url
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
+    assert await validate_media_url(data_url, policy) == data_url
 
 
-def test_normalize_audio_url_preserves_http_urls():
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_preserves_http_urls():
     url = "https://example.com/audio.wav"
-    assert AudioLoader._normalize_audio_url(url) == url
+    policy = _permissive_http_policy()
+    assert await validate_media_url(url, policy) == url
+
+
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_rejects_bare_path_by_default(tmp_path):
+    audio_path = tmp_path / "sample.wav"
+    audio_path.write_bytes(b"RIFF")
+
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="Local media paths are not permitted"):
+        await validate_media_url(str(audio_path), policy)
+
+
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_rejects_private_ip():
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError):
+        await validate_media_url("https://169.254.169.254/audio.wav", policy)
 
 
-def test_normalize_audio_url_raises_on_missing_file():
-    with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError, match="Error reading file"):
-        AudioLoader._normalize_audio_url("/nonexistent/audio.wav")
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_accepts_file_uri_inside_prefix(tmp_path):
+    audio_path = tmp_path / "sample.wav"
+    audio_path.write_bytes(b"RIFF")
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path))
+
+    file_uri = audio_path.resolve().as_uri()
+    assert await validate_media_url(file_uri, policy) == file_uri
+
+
+async def test_normalize_audio_url_rejects_file_uri_outside_prefix(tmp_path):
+    allowed = tmp_path / "media"
+    allowed.mkdir()
+    other = tmp_path / "secret.wav"
+    other.write_bytes(b"RIFF")
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(allowed))
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
+        await validate_media_url(other.resolve().as_uri(), policy)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_load_audio_rejects_http_by_default():
+    loader = AudioLoader(url_policy=UrlValidationPolicy())
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not allowed"):
+        await loader.load_audio("http://example.com/x.wav")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_load_audio_blocks_redirect_to_private_ip():
+    """A 302 to a blocked IP must be rejected per-hop, not only the initial URL."""
+    loader = AudioLoader(url_policy=UrlValidationPolicy())
+    loader._create_vllm_audio_io = MagicMock(return_value=MagicMock())  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+    redirect = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    redirect.status_code = 302
+    redirect.is_redirect = True
+    redirect.headers = {"location": "https://169.254.169.254/evil"}
+    redirect.url = httpx.URL("https://8.8.8.8/a.wav")
+    redirect.aclose = AsyncMock()
+
+    client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+    client.build_request = MagicMock(return_value=MagicMock(spec=httpx.Request))
+    client.send = AsyncMock(return_value=redirect)
+
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.audio_loader.get_http_client",
+        return_value=client,
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="blocked range"):
+            await loader.load_audio("https://8.8.8.8/a.wav")
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_load_audio_uses_vllm_media_connector():
     loader = AudioLoader()
+    loader._url_policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
     waveform = np.random.randn(16000).astype(np.float32)
     sr = 44100.0
     loader._load_audio_with_vllm = AsyncMock(  # type: ignore[method-assign]
@@ -60,7 +148,7 @@ async def test_load_audio_uses_vllm_media_connector():
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_load_audio_rejects_empty_waveform():
-    loader = AudioLoader()
+    loader = AudioLoader(url_policy=_permissive_http_policy())
     loader._load_audio_with_vllm = AsyncMock(  # type: ignore[method-assign]
         return_value=(np.array([], dtype=np.float32), 16000.0)
     )

components/src/dynamo/common/tests/multimodal/test_image_loader.py

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import pytest
 from PIL import Image
 
 from dynamo.common.multimodal.image_loader import ImageLoader
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import UrlValidationPolicy
 
 pytestmark = [
     pytest.mark.asyncio,
@@ -45,29 +46,42 @@ def _make_png_bytes() -> bytes:
 PNG_BYTES = _make_png_bytes()
 
 
+def _permissive_policy(
+    allowed_local_path: str | None = None,
+) -> UrlValidationPolicy:
+    """Return a policy that permits the schemes used by tests without DNS hits."""
+    return UrlValidationPolicy(
+        allow_http=True,
+        allow_private_ips=True,
+        allowed_local_path=allowed_local_path,
+    )
+
+
 def _mock_http_client(
     content: bytes = PNG_BYTES,
     status_code: int = 200,
     delay: float = 0.0,
     side_effect: Exception | None = None,
 ) -> AsyncMock:
-    """Return a mock httpx.AsyncClient whose .get() returns a fake response.
+    """Return a mock httpx.AsyncClient compatible with fetch_with_revalidation.
+
+    ``fetch_with_revalidation`` uses ``client.build_request(...)`` then
+    ``client.send(request, follow_redirects=False)``. We stub both and also
+    keep ``client.get`` behaviour for any legacy callers.
 
     Args:
         content: Raw bytes returned as the HTTP response body.
         status_code: HTTP status code; >=400 triggers raise_for_status().
         delay: Seconds to sleep before responding (simulates network latency).
-        side_effect: If set, .get() raises this exception instead of returning.
+        side_effect: If set, .send()/.get() raises this exception instead.
     """
 
-    async def _get(url: str) -> Any:
-        if delay > 0:
-            await asyncio.sleep(delay)
-        if side_effect is not None:
-            raise side_effect
+    def _build_response() -> Any:
         resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
         resp.status_code = status_code
         resp.content = content
+        resp.is_redirect = False
+        resp.headers = {}
         resp.raise_for_status = MagicMock()
         if status_code >= 400:
             resp.raise_for_status.side_effect = httpx.HTTPStatusError(
@@ -75,14 +89,27 @@ def _mock_http_client(
             )
         return resp
 
+    async def _respond(*_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+        if delay > 0:
+            await asyncio.sleep(delay)
+        if side_effect is not None:
+            raise side_effect
+        return _build_response()
+
     client = AsyncMock()
-    client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_get)
+    client.get = AsyncMock(side_effect=_respond)
+    client.build_request = MagicMock(return_value=MagicMock(spec=httpx.Request))
+    client.send = AsyncMock(side_effect=_respond)
     return client
 
 
 @pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
 def loader() -> ImageLoader:
-    return ImageLoader(cache_size=4, http_timeout=30.0)
+    return ImageLoader(
+        cache_size=4,
+        http_timeout=30.0,
+        url_policy=_permissive_policy(),
+    )
 
 
 # --- Concurrent same-URL dedup ---
@@ -103,7 +130,7 @@ async def test_concurrent_same_url_deduplicates(loader: ImageLoader) -> None:
     assert len(results) == 2
     assert results[0].size == results[1].size
     # Only one HTTP GET should have been issued
-    assert mock_client.get.call_count == 1
+    assert mock_client.send.call_count == 1
 
 
 async def test_concurrent_different_urls_fetch_independently(
@@ -120,7 +147,7 @@ async def test_concurrent_different_urls_fetch_independently(
             loader.load_image("https://example.com/b.png"),
         )
 
-    assert mock_client.get.call_count == 2
+    assert mock_client.send.call_count == 2
 
 
 # --- Waiter cancellation isolation ---
@@ -206,6 +233,46 @@ async def test_data_url_non_image_rejected(loader: ImageLoader) -> None:
         await loader.load_image("data:text/plain;base64,aGVsbG8=")
 
 
+# --- SSRF / scheme rejection ---
+
+
+async def test_http_scheme_rejected_by_default(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    """With default env policy, http:// URLs must be rejected before any fetch."""
+    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH", raising=False)
+
+    default_loader = ImageLoader(cache_size=4, http_timeout=30.0)
+
+    mock_client = _mock_http_client()
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.image_loader.get_http_client",
+        return_value=mock_client,
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="scheme|not allowed"):
+            await default_loader.load_image("http://example.com/x.png")
+
+    # The shared HTTP client must not be touched when the URL is rejected.
+    assert mock_client.send.call_count == 0
+    assert mock_client.get.call_count == 0
+
+
+async def test_blocked_private_ip_rejected(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    """Cloud metadata / private IPs must be rejected even over https."""
+    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", raising=False)
+
+    strict_loader = ImageLoader(
+        cache_size=4,
+        http_timeout=30.0,
+        url_policy=UrlValidationPolicy(
+            allow_http=True,
+            allow_private_ips=False,
+        ),
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="blocked range"):
+        await strict_loader.load_image("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
+
+
 # --- HTTP error contract ---
 
 

components/src/dynamo/common/tests/multimodal/test_url_validator.py

+# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
+
+"""Unit tests for ``dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator``.
+
+These cover scheme / IP / hostname / path / redirect logic in isolation of
+the media loaders, so they run quickly with no network and no vLLM imports.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import socket
+from typing import Any
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import (
+    UrlValidationError,
+    UrlValidationPolicy,
+    fetch_with_revalidation,
+    is_blocked_ip,
+    validate_local_path,
+    validate_url,
+)
+
+pytestmark = [
+    pytest.mark.unit,
+    pytest.mark.pre_merge,
+    pytest.mark.gpu_0,
+]
+
+
+STRICT_HTTPS = UrlValidationPolicy()
+
+PERMISSIVE = UrlValidationPolicy(
+    allow_http=True,
+    allow_private_ips=True,
+)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# is_blocked_ip()
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "ip",
+    [
+        "127.0.0.1",
+        "10.0.0.1",
+        "172.16.5.5",
+        "192.168.1.1",
+        "169.254.169.254",  # AWS metadata
+        "100.64.0.1",  # CGNAT
+        "0.0.0.0",
+        "::1",
+        "fe80::1",
+        "fc00::1",
+        "240.0.0.1",  # reserved
+    ],
+)
+def test_is_blocked_ip_blocks_known_ranges(ip: str) -> None:
+    assert is_blocked_ip(ip) is True
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "ip",
+    [
+        "8.8.8.8",
+        "1.1.1.1",
+        "93.184.216.34",  # example.com
+        "2606:4700:4700::1111",  # Cloudflare
+    ],
+)
+def test_is_blocked_ip_allows_public(ip: str) -> None:
+    assert is_blocked_ip(ip) is False
+
+
+def test_is_blocked_ip_non_ip_literal_returns_false() -> None:
+    # A hostname, not an IP — is_blocked_ip only classifies literals.
+    assert is_blocked_ip("example.com") is False
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_url() — scheme handling
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_empty() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="empty"):
+        await validate_url("", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_http_by_default() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="not allowed"):
+        await validate_url("http://example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_file_scheme() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="scheme 'file'"):
+        await validate_url("file:///etc/passwd", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_ftp() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="scheme 'ftp'"):
+        await validate_url("ftp://example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_accepts_data_url_by_default() -> None:
+    # data: URLs never touch the network — we allow them without further checks.
+    await validate_url("", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_http_allowed_when_opted_in() -> None:
+    policy = PERMISSIVE
+    # With public hostname + allow_private_ips=True (keeps DNS out of the test)
+    await validate_url("http://example.com/x.png", policy)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_url() — IP literal handling
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "url",
+    [
+        "https://127.0.0.1/x.png",
+        "https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+        "https://10.0.0.5/x.png",
+        "https://192.168.1.1/x.png",
+        "https://[::1]/x.png",
+    ],
+)
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_private_ip_literal(url: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="blocked range"):
+        await validate_url(url, STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_allows_public_ip_literal() -> None:
+    # Public IP literal and allow_private_ips=False — should pass the IP test
+    # and skip DNS resolution (the IP path short-circuits).
+    await validate_url("https://8.8.8.8/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_allows_private_ip_when_opted_in() -> None:
+    await validate_url("https://127.0.0.1/x.png", PERMISSIVE)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_url() — blocked hostnames
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "host",
+    [
+        "localhost",
+        "metadata.google.internal",
+        "metadata",
+        "kubernetes.default.svc",
+    ],
+)
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_blocked_hostname(host: str) -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="blocked"):
+        await validate_url(f"https://{host}/path", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_url() — DNS resolution
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _fake_getaddrinfo(addrs: list[str]):
+    def _impl(host: str, *_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any):
+        return [
+            (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", (addr, 0)) for addr in addrs
+        ]
+
+    return _impl
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_host_resolving_to_private_ip() -> None:
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
+        side_effect=_fake_getaddrinfo(["10.0.0.5"]),
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="blocked IP"):
+            await validate_url("https://attacker.example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_rejects_host_if_any_ip_is_private() -> None:
+    # Even if the host resolves to a public IP too, any blocked IP is fatal.
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
+        side_effect=_fake_getaddrinfo(["8.8.8.8", "169.254.169.254"]),
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="169.254.169.254"):
+            await validate_url("https://mixed.example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_accepts_public_host() -> None:
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
+        side_effect=_fake_getaddrinfo(["93.184.216.34"]),
+    ):
+        await validate_url("https://example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_resolution_failure_raises() -> None:
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
+        side_effect=socket.gaierror("nodename nor servname provided"),
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="Could not resolve"):
+            await validate_url("https://does-not-exist.invalid/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+async def test_validate_url_skips_resolution_when_private_allowed() -> None:
+    # In developer mode we short-circuit DNS to keep tests deterministic.
+    with patch("dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo") as resolver:
+        await validate_url("https://example.com/x.png", PERMISSIVE)
+        resolver.assert_not_called()
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# validate_local_path()
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_validate_local_path_rejected_when_disabled() -> None:
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="not permitted"):
+        validate_local_path("/etc/passwd", STRICT_HTTPS)
+
+
+def test_validate_local_path_accepts_inside_prefix(tmp_path) -> None:
+    media = tmp_path / "media"
+    media.mkdir()
+    target = media / "sample.png"
+    target.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n")
+
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(media))
+    resolved = validate_local_path(str(target), policy)
+    assert resolved == target.resolve()
+
+
+def test_validate_local_path_rejects_outside_prefix(tmp_path) -> None:
+    media = tmp_path / "media"
+    media.mkdir()
+    other = tmp_path / "secrets"
+    other.mkdir()
+    secret = other / "creds.txt"
+    secret.write_text("hunter2")
+
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(media))
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
+        validate_local_path(str(secret), policy)
+
+
+def test_validate_local_path_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path) -> None:
+    media = tmp_path / "media"
+    media.mkdir()
+    outside = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
+    outside.write_text("secret")
+    link = media / "link.png"
+    link.symlink_to(outside)
+
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(media))
+    # Path.resolve() follows the symlink; the target is outside the prefix.
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
+        validate_local_path(str(link), policy)
+
+
+def test_validate_local_path_missing_file(tmp_path) -> None:
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path))
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="File not found"):
+        validate_local_path(str(tmp_path / "nope.png"), policy)
+
+
+def test_validate_local_path_missing_prefix(tmp_path) -> None:
+    target = tmp_path / "sample.png"
+    target.write_bytes(b"x")
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path / "does-not-exist"))
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="allowed_local_path does not exist"):
+        validate_local_path(str(target), policy)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def test_policy_from_env_defaults(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH", raising=False)
+
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
+    assert policy.allow_http is False
+    assert policy.allow_private_ips is False
+    assert policy.allowed_local_path is None
+
+
+def test_policy_from_env_allow_internal(monkeypatch) -> None:
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", "1")
+    monkeypatch.setenv("DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH", "/data/media")
+
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
+    assert policy.allow_http is True
+    assert policy.allow_private_ips is True
+    assert policy.allowed_local_path == "/data/media"
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# fetch_with_revalidation()
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _mock_response(
+    status_code: int = 200,
+    location: str | None = None,
+    *,
+    request_url: str = "https://example.com/x.png",
+) -> MagicMock:
+    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    resp.status_code = status_code
+    resp.headers = {}
+    resp.url = httpx.URL(request_url)
+    resp.is_redirect = status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308)
+    if location is not None:
+        resp.headers = {"location": location}
+    resp.aclose = AsyncMock()
+    return resp
+
+
+def _mock_client(responses: list[MagicMock]) -> MagicMock:
+    client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+    client.build_request = MagicMock(
+        side_effect=lambda method, url, headers=None: MagicMock(spec=httpx.Request)
+    )
+    client.send = AsyncMock(side_effect=list(responses))
+    return client
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_returns_first_response() -> None:
+    policy = PERMISSIVE
+    resp = _mock_response(status_code=200)
+    client = _mock_client([resp])
+
+    result = await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://example.com/x.png", policy)
+    assert result is resp
+    assert client.send.await_count == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_follows_safe_redirect() -> None:
+    policy = PERMISSIVE
+    redirect = _mock_response(
+        status_code=302,
+        location="https://example.com/final.png",
+        request_url="https://example.com/x.png",
+    )
+    final = _mock_response(status_code=200, request_url="https://example.com/final.png")
+    client = _mock_client([redirect, final])
+
+    result = await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://example.com/x.png", policy)
+    assert result is final
+    assert client.send.await_count == 2
+    redirect.aclose.assert_awaited()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_blocks_redirect_to_private_ip() -> None:
+    # Strict policy — first hop is OK (public-IP literal), redirect target is blocked.
+    strict = UrlValidationPolicy(allow_private_ips=False)
+
+    redirect = _mock_response(
+        status_code=302,
+        location="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
+        request_url="https://8.8.8.8/x.png",
+    )
+    client = _mock_client([redirect])
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError):
+        await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://8.8.8.8/x.png", strict)
+    # Only one send — the redirect target is rejected before any further fetch.
+    assert client.send.await_count == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_enforces_redirect_limit() -> None:
+    # _MAX_REDIRECTS is hardcoded at 3; we need 4 redirect responses to trip it.
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allow_private_ips=True)  # keep DNS out of this test
+
+    def _hop(src: str, dst: str) -> MagicMock:
+        return _mock_response(status_code=302, location=dst, request_url=src)
+
+    client = _mock_client(
+        [
+            _hop("https://example.com/a", "https://example.com/b"),
+            _hop("https://example.com/b", "https://example.com/c"),
+            _hop("https://example.com/c", "https://example.com/d"),
+            _hop("https://example.com/d", "https://example.com/e"),
+        ]
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="Too many redirects"):
+        await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://example.com/a", policy)

components/src/dynamo/common/tests/multimodal/test_video_loader.py

 # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
-from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
+from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch
 
+import httpx
 import numpy as np
 import pytest
 
 import dynamo.common.multimodal.video_loader as video_loader_module
+from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import (
+    UrlValidationError,
+    UrlValidationPolicy,
+    validate_media_url,
+)
 from dynamo.common.multimodal.video_loader import VideoLoader
 
 pytestmark = [
@@ -16,25 +22,103 @@ pytestmark = [
 ]
 
 
-def test_normalize_video_url_converts_local_paths(tmp_path):
+async def test_normalize_video_url_converts_local_paths(tmp_path):
     video_path = tmp_path / "sample.webm"
     video_path.write_bytes(b"video")
 
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path))
+
     assert (
-        VideoLoader._normalize_video_url(str(video_path))
+        await validate_media_url(str(video_path), policy)
         == video_path.resolve().as_uri()
     )
 
 
-def test_normalize_video_url_preserves_data_urls():
+async def test_normalize_video_url_preserves_data_urls():
     data_url = "data:video/webm;base64,Zm9v"
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
+
+    assert await validate_media_url(data_url, policy) == data_url
+
+
+async def test_normalize_video_url_rejects_bare_path_by_default(tmp_path):
+    video_path = tmp_path / "sample.webm"
+    video_path.write_bytes(b"video")
+
+    # Default policy has no allowed_local_path -> local paths rejected.
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
 
-    assert VideoLoader._normalize_video_url(data_url) == data_url
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="Local media paths are not permitted"):
+        await validate_media_url(str(video_path), policy)
+
+
+async def test_normalize_video_url_rejects_private_ip():
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError):
+        await validate_media_url("https://169.254.169.254/video.mp4", policy)
+
+
+async def test_normalize_video_url_accepts_file_uri_inside_prefix(tmp_path):
+    video_path = tmp_path / "sample.webm"
+    video_path.write_bytes(b"video")
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path))
+
+    file_uri = video_path.resolve().as_uri()
+    assert await validate_media_url(file_uri, policy) == file_uri
+
+
+async def test_normalize_video_url_rejects_file_uri_outside_prefix(tmp_path):
+    allowed = tmp_path / "media"
+    allowed.mkdir()
+    other = tmp_path / "secret.webm"
+    other.write_bytes(b"video")
+    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(allowed))
+
+    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
+        await validate_media_url(other.resolve().as_uri(), policy)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_load_video_rejects_http_by_default():
+    # Default env policy: http is disabled, so validation should reject this
+    # before any fetch is attempted.
+    loader = VideoLoader(url_policy=UrlValidationPolicy())
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not allowed"):
+        await loader.load_video("http://example.com/x.mp4")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_load_video_blocks_redirect_to_private_ip():
+    """A 302 to a blocked IP must be rejected per-hop, not only the initial URL."""
+    loader = VideoLoader(url_policy=UrlValidationPolicy())
+    loader._create_vllm_video_io = MagicMock(return_value=MagicMock())  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+    redirect = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
+    redirect.status_code = 302
+    redirect.is_redirect = True
+    redirect.headers = {"location": "https://169.254.169.254/evil"}
+    redirect.url = httpx.URL("https://8.8.8.8/v.mp4")
+    redirect.aclose = AsyncMock()
+
+    client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
+    client.build_request = MagicMock(return_value=MagicMock(spec=httpx.Request))
+    client.send = AsyncMock(return_value=redirect)
+
+    with patch(
+        "dynamo.common.multimodal.video_loader.get_http_client",
+        return_value=client,
+    ):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="blocked range"):
+            await loader.load_video("https://8.8.8.8/v.mp4")
 
 
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_load_video_uses_vllm_media_connector():
     loader = VideoLoader()
+    # data: scheme is in the default allowlist regardless of env flags.
+    loader._url_policy = UrlValidationPolicy()
     frames = np.arange(24, dtype=np.uint8).reshape(1, 2, 4, 3)[:, :, ::-1, :]
     metadata = {"fps": 4.0, "frames_indices": [0], "total_num_frames": 1}
     loader._load_video_with_vllm = AsyncMock(  # type: ignore[method-assign]

docs/features/multimodal/README.md

@@ -48,6 +48,25 @@ Dynamo provides support for improving latency and throughput for vision-and-lang
 
 **Status:** ✅ Supported | 🧪 Experimental | ❌ Not supported
 
+## Security: URL Validation
+
+All multimodal loaders route remote fetches through a shared URL policy
+(`dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator`). Only
+`https://` and `data:` URLs are allowed by default, private / internal IPs are blocked,
+and local file access is disabled. Every HTTP redirect hop is re-validated
+against the policy.
+
+Two environment variables loosen the defaults for non-public deployments:
+
+| Variable | Default | Effect |
+|----------|---------|--------|
+| `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL` | `0` | Set to `1` to allow `http://` and private / internal IP targets. Intended for on-prem or local-dev setups where media lives on an internal network. |
+| `DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH` | *(empty)* | Absolute directory prefix. When set, `file://` URIs and bare paths are allowed if they resolve inside this prefix. |
+
+<Warning>
+**Never set `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL=1` on public-facing deployments.** It opens SSRF paths to cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDS, GCE, Azure) and other internal services.
+</Warning>
+
 ## Example Workflows
 
 Reference implementations for deploying multimodal models:

tests/mm_router/test_vllm_mm_router_e2e.py

@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ def _make_process_env(log_level: str = "debug", **extra) -> dict[str, str]:
     env["DYN_LOG"] = log_level
     env["DYN_NAMESPACE"] = NAMESPACE
     env["DYN_REQUEST_PLANE"] = "tcp"
+    env["DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL"] = "1"
     env.update(extra)
     return env
 

tests/utils/multimodal.py

@@ -179,6 +179,11 @@ def make_multimodal_configs(
         marks.extend(profile.marks)
 
         key = f"mm_{topology}_{profile.short_name}"
+        worker_env = {
+            "DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL": "1",
+            "DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH": str(WORKSPACE_DIR),
+            **topo_cfg.env,
+        }
         configs[key] = config_cls(
             name=key,
             directory=topo_cfg.directory or directory,
@@ -188,6 +193,6 @@ def make_multimodal_configs(
             marks=marks,
             delayed_start=topo_cfg.delayed_start,
             request_payloads=profile.request_payloads,
-            env=topo_cfg.env,
+            env=worker_env,
         )
     return configs