fix: harden Rust MediaFetcher agains redirect bypass and DNS rebinding (#8569)

Signed-off-by: zhongdaor <zhongdaor@nvidia.com>

Cargo.lock

@@ -2431,6 +2431,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "image",
  "indicatif 0.18.4",
  "insta",
+ "ipnet",
  "json-five",
  "lazy_static",
  "memfile",

Cargo.toml

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ modelexpress-common = { version = "0.3.0" }
 
 humantime = { version = "2.2.0" }
 indexmap = { version = "2" }
+ipnet = { version = "2" }
 libc = { version = "0.2" }
 oneshot = { version = "0.1.13", features = ["std", "async"] }
 ordered-float = "4"

lib/bindings/kvbm/Cargo.lock

@@ -1563,6 +1563,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "galil-seiferas",
  "hf-hub",
  "image",
+ "ipnet",
  "json-five",
  "minijinja",
  "minijinja-contrib",

lib/bindings/python/Cargo.lock

@@ -1576,6 +1576,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "galil-seiferas",
  "hf-hub",
  "image",
+ "ipnet",
  "json-five",
  "memfile",
  "minijinja",

lib/bindings/python/rust/llm/preprocessor.rs

@@ -49,8 +49,11 @@ pub struct MediaFetcher {
 impl MediaFetcher {
     #[new]
     fn new() -> Self {
+        // Use from_env so DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL is honored by the
+        // Rust-side frontend-decode fetch path, matching the Python
+        // UrlValidationPolicy.from_env() behavior on the backend.
         Self {
-            inner: RsMediaFetcher::default(),
+            inner: RsMediaFetcher::from_env(),
         }
     }
     fn user_agent(&mut self, user_agent: String) {
@@ -65,6 +68,10 @@ impl MediaFetcher {
         self.inner.allow_direct_port = allow;
     }
 
+    fn allow_private_ips(&mut self, allow: bool) {
+        self.inner.allow_private_ips = allow;
+    }
+
     fn allowed_media_domains(&mut self, domains: Vec<String>) {
         self.inner.allowed_media_domains = Some(domains.into_iter().collect());
     }

lib/llm/Cargo.toml

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ either = { workspace = true }
 futures = { workspace = true }
 futures-util = { workspace = true }
 hf-hub = { workspace = true }
+ipnet = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
 oneshot = { workspace = true }
 parking_lot = { workspace = true }

lib/llm/src/preprocessor/media/loader.rs

@@ -2,9 +2,14 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
 
 use std::collections::HashSet;
+use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
+use std::sync::{Arc, LazyLock};
 use std::time::Duration;
 
 use anyhow::Result;
+use ipnet::IpNet;
+use reqwest::dns::{Addrs, Name, Resolve, Resolving};
+use reqwest::redirect::Policy;
 
 use dynamo_memory::nixl::NixlAgent;
 use dynamo_protocols::types::ChatCompletionRequestUserMessageContentPart;
@@ -15,12 +20,90 @@ use super::rdma::{RdmaMediaDataDescriptor, get_nixl_agent};
 
 const DEFAULT_HTTP_USER_AGENT: &str = "dynamo-ai/dynamo";
 const DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 3;
+
+// IP ranges that must never be reachable from a user-controlled URL.
+// Source: RFC1918 (private), RFC6598 (CGNAT), RFC5735 (loopback, link-local,
+// 0.0.0.0/8), RFC4193 (ULA), RFC4291 (IPv6 loopback / link-local), RFC6890
+// (reserved). Link-local 169.254/16 covers the AWS / OpenStack metadata IP.
+//
+// Keep this list in sync with the Python counterpart
+// (components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/url_validator.py::_BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS).
+static BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS: LazyLock<Vec<IpNet>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    [
+        "0.0.0.0/8",
+        "10.0.0.0/8",
+        "100.64.0.0/10",
+        "127.0.0.0/8",
+        "169.254.0.0/16",
+        "172.16.0.0/12",
+        "192.0.0.0/24",
+        "192.0.2.0/24",
+        "192.168.0.0/16",
+        "198.18.0.0/15",
+        "198.51.100.0/24",
+        "203.0.113.0/24",
+        "224.0.0.0/4",
+        "240.0.0.0/4",
+        "255.255.255.255/32",
+        "::/128",
+        "::1/128",
+        "::ffff:0:0/96",
+        "fc00::/7",
+        "fe80::/10",
+        "ff00::/8",
+    ]
+    .iter()
+    .map(|s| s.parse().expect("invalid CIDR in BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS"))
+    .collect()
+});
+
+// Hostnames we reject by literal match without any DNS lookup. Defends
+// against /etc/hosts tricks or malicious resolvers that alias metadata /
+// internal-service names to attacker IPs. Match is case-insensitive.
+//
+// Keep this list in sync with the Python counterpart
+// (components/src/dynamo/common/multimodal/url_validator.py::_BLOCKED_HOSTS).
+static BLOCKED_HOSTS: LazyLock<HashSet<&'static str>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    [
+        "localhost",
+        "localhost.localdomain",
+        "ip6-localhost",
+        "ip6-loopback",
+        "metadata",
+        "metadata.google.internal",
+        "metadata.goog",
+        "kubernetes.default",
+        "kubernetes.default.svc",
+    ]
+    .iter()
+    .copied()
+    .collect()
+});
+
+/// Return `true` if `ip` falls inside any of the blocked ranges.
+pub fn is_blocked_ip(ip: &IpAddr) -> bool {
+    BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS.iter().any(|net| net.contains(ip))
+}
 
 #[derive(Clone, Debug, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
 pub struct MediaFetcher {
     pub user_agent: String,
     pub allow_direct_ip: bool,
     pub allow_direct_port: bool,
+    /// When `false` (default), reject URLs that target blocked locations:
+    /// an IP literal in the RFC-range blocklist (`BLOCKED_IP_NETWORKS`),
+    /// a hostname in the literal blocklist (`BLOCKED_HOSTS`, e.g.
+    /// `localhost` / `metadata.google.internal`), or — in
+    /// `check_if_url_allowed_with_dns` — a hostname that DNS-resolves
+    /// to a blocked IP. The name reads "IP" but semantically this is a
+    /// single "allow internal / on-prem targets" switch that covers
+    /// both IP and hostname blocklists together: real on-prem
+    /// deployments need both at once (private CIDRs *and* internal
+    /// service names), and splitting them would give no useful config
+    /// while doubling the footgun surface. **Never** set on anything
+    /// public-facing.
+    pub allow_private_ips: bool,
     pub allowed_media_domains: Option<HashSet<String>>,
     pub timeout: Option<Duration>,
 }
@@ -31,12 +114,34 @@ impl Default for MediaFetcher {
             user_agent: DEFAULT_HTTP_USER_AGENT.to_string(),
             allow_direct_ip: false,
             allow_direct_port: false,
+            allow_private_ips: false,
             allowed_media_domains: None,
             timeout: Some(DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT),
         }
     }
 }
 
+impl MediaFetcher {
+    /// Build a `MediaFetcher` whose defaults respect the shared
+    /// `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL` environment variable. Mirrors the Python
+    /// `UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()` behavior so both fetch paths
+    /// (frontend decode in Rust, backend decode in Python) honor the
+    /// same on-prem opt-in flag.
+    ///
+    /// `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL=1` flips `allow_direct_ip`,
+    /// `allow_direct_port`, and `allow_private_ips` all to `true` at
+    /// once.
+    pub fn from_env() -> Self {
+        let allow_internal = std::env::var("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL").ok().as_deref() == Some("1");
+        Self {
+            allow_direct_ip: allow_internal,
+            allow_direct_port: allow_internal,
+            allow_private_ips: allow_internal,
+            ..Self::default()
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl MediaFetcher {
     pub fn check_if_url_allowed(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<()> {
         if !matches!(url.scheme(), "http" | "https" | "data") {
@@ -47,21 +152,107 @@ impl MediaFetcher {
             return Ok(());
         }
 
-        if !self.allow_direct_ip && !matches!(url.host(), Some(url::Host::Domain(_))) {
+        let host = url
+            .host()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("URL has no host component"))?;
+
+        if !self.allow_direct_ip && !matches!(host, url::Host::Domain(_)) {
             anyhow::bail!("Direct IP access is not allowed");
         }
         if !self.allow_direct_port && url.port().is_some() {
             anyhow::bail!("Direct port access is not allowed");
         }
+
+        // Host-level checks: blocked hostnames and IP literals in blocked
+        // ranges. DNS-resolved IPs are checked in `check_if_url_allowed_with_dns`.
+        if !self.allow_private_ips {
+            let ip_literal = match host {
+                url::Host::Domain(domain) => {
+                    let lowered = domain.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();
+                    if BLOCKED_HOSTS.contains(lowered.as_str()) {
+                        anyhow::bail!("Host '{domain}' is blocked (resolves to internal service)");
+                    }
+                    None
+                }
+                url::Host::Ipv4(ip) => Some(IpAddr::V4(ip)),
+                url::Host::Ipv6(ip) => Some(IpAddr::V6(ip)),
+            };
+            if let Some(ip) = ip_literal
+                && is_blocked_ip(&ip)
+            {
+                anyhow::bail!("IP literal '{ip}' is in a blocked range");
+            }
+        }
+
         if let Some(allowed_domains) = &self.allowed_media_domains
-            && let Some(host) = url.host_str()
-            && !allowed_domains.contains(host)
+            && let Some(host_str) = url.host_str()
+            && !allowed_domains.contains(host_str)
         {
-            anyhow::bail!("Domain '{host}' is not in allowed list");
+            anyhow::bail!("Host '{host_str}' is not in the allowed_media_domains list");
         }
 
         Ok(())
     }
+
+    /// Full policy check: runs `check_if_url_allowed` and, for hostname
+    /// URLs, resolves DNS and checks each resulting IP against the blocked ranges.
+    pub async fn check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Result<()> {
+        self.check_if_url_allowed(url)?;
+
+        // Only hostnames need DNS resolution; IP-literal hosts were already
+        // checked against the blocklist above.
+        if self.allow_private_ips || url.scheme() == "data" {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let Some(url::Host::Domain(host)) = url.host() else {
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+
+        let port = url.port_or_known_default().unwrap_or(0);
+        let iter = tokio::net::lookup_host((host, port))
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Could not resolve host '{host}': {e}"))?;
+        for sock_addr in iter {
+            let ip = sock_addr.ip();
+            if is_blocked_ip(&ip) {
+                anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' resolves to blocked IP '{ip}'");
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+/// DNS resolver that filters out blocked IP ranges before reqwest sees them.
+///
+/// Attached to the shared `reqwest::Client` via `ClientBuilder::dns_resolver`.
+/// reqwest calls this for every hostname it needs to resolve — including
+/// redirect targets — so DNS rebinding can't slip a blocked IP past us:
+/// reqwest literally never learns about the blocked addresses.
+struct BlocklistResolver {
+    allow_private_ips: bool,
+}
+
+impl Resolve for BlocklistResolver {
+    fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
+        let host = name.as_str().to_string();
+        let allow_private = self.allow_private_ips;
+        Box::pin(async move {
+            let iter = tokio::net::lookup_host((host.as_str(), 0_u16)).await?;
+            let addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = if allow_private {
+                iter.collect()
+            } else {
+                iter.filter(|sa| !is_blocked_ip(&sa.ip())).collect()
+            };
+            if addrs.is_empty() {
+                return Err(Box::new(std::io::Error::new(
+                    std::io::ErrorKind::AddrNotAvailable,
+                    format!("no non-blocked addresses for host '{host}'"),
+                ))
+                    as Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>);
+            }
+            Ok(Box::new(addrs.into_iter()) as Addrs)
+        })
+    }
 }
 
 pub struct MediaLoader {
@@ -76,9 +267,31 @@ pub struct MediaLoader {
 
 impl MediaLoader {
     pub fn new(media_decoder: MediaDecoder, media_fetcher: Option<MediaFetcher>) -> Result<Self> {
-        let media_fetcher = media_fetcher.unwrap_or_default();
-        let mut http_client_builder: reqwest::ClientBuilder =
-            reqwest::Client::builder().user_agent(&media_fetcher.user_agent);
+        // Fall back to env-aware defaults so `DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL=1` is
+        // honored even when the caller doesn't pass an explicit fetcher.
+        let media_fetcher = media_fetcher.unwrap_or_else(MediaFetcher::from_env);
+
+        // Redirect policy: revalidate the policy-visible part of the URL
+        // (scheme, IP literals, hostname blocklist, direct-IP / direct-port
+        // rules) on every hop. DNS-based attacks on redirect targets are
+        // handled by the custom resolver below.
+        let fetcher_for_redirects = media_fetcher.clone();
+        let redirect_policy = Policy::custom(move |attempt| {
+            if attempt.previous().len() >= MAX_REDIRECTS {
+                return attempt.error(anyhow::anyhow!("too many redirects (max={MAX_REDIRECTS})"));
+            }
+            match fetcher_for_redirects.check_if_url_allowed(attempt.url()) {
+                Ok(()) => attempt.follow(),
+                Err(e) => attempt.error(e),
+            }
+        });
+
+        let mut http_client_builder = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .user_agent(&media_fetcher.user_agent)
+            .redirect(redirect_policy)
+            .dns_resolver(Arc::new(BlocklistResolver {
+                allow_private_ips: media_fetcher.allow_private_ips,
+            }));
 
         if let Some(timeout) = media_fetcher.timeout {
             http_client_builder = http_client_builder.timeout(timeout);
@@ -111,7 +324,9 @@ impl MediaLoader {
                     .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Model does not support image inputs"))?;
 
                 let url = &image_part.image_url.url;
-                self.media_fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(url)?;
+                self.media_fetcher
+                    .check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(url)
+                    .await?;
                 let data = EncodedMediaData::from_url(url, &self.http_client).await?;
 
                 // Use runtime decoder if provided, with MDC limits enforced
@@ -132,7 +347,9 @@ impl MediaLoader {
                         })?;
 
                     let url = &video_part.video_url.url;
-                    self.media_fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(url)?;
+                    self.media_fetcher
+                        .check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(url)
+                        .await?;
                     let data = EncodedMediaData::from_url(url, &self.http_client).await?;
 
                     // Use runtime decoder if provided, with MDC limits enforced
@@ -181,6 +398,8 @@ mod tests {
         let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
             allow_direct_ip: true,
             allow_direct_port: true,
+            // mockito serves on 127.0.0.1 which is in the loopback blocklist.
+            allow_private_ips: true,
             ..Default::default()
         };
 
@@ -307,7 +526,153 @@ mod tests_non_nixl {
             result
                 .unwrap_err()
                 .to_string()
-                .contains("not in allowed list")
+                .contains("allowed_media_domains")
         );
     }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_is_blocked_ip_ranges() {
+        for ip in [
+            "127.0.0.1",
+            "10.0.0.1",
+            "172.16.5.5",
+            "192.168.1.1",
+            "169.254.169.254", // AWS metadata
+            "100.64.0.1",      // CGNAT
+            "::1",
+            "fe80::1",
+            "fc00::1",
+        ] {
+            let addr: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
+            assert!(is_blocked_ip(&addr), "{ip} should be blocked");
+        }
+
+        // Public IPs should pass.
+        for ip in ["8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1", "2606:4700:4700::1111"] {
+            let addr: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
+            assert!(!is_blocked_ip(&addr), "{ip} should not be blocked");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_blocked_ip_literal_rejected_even_when_direct_ip_allowed() {
+        // allow_direct_ip=true lets IP-literal URLs through the early check,
+        // but the RFC-range blocklist must still reject cloud-metadata IPs.
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
+            allow_direct_ip: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+
+        let url = url::Url::parse("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/").unwrap();
+        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+        assert!(
+            result
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string()
+                .contains("is in a blocked range")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_blocked_hostname_rejected() {
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
+        for host in [
+            "localhost",
+            "metadata.google.internal",
+            "kubernetes.default.svc",
+        ] {
+            let url = url::Url::parse(&format!("https://{host}/x")).unwrap();
+            let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
+            assert!(result.is_err(), "{host} should be blocked");
+            assert!(
+                result.unwrap_err().to_string().contains("blocked"),
+                "{host} error should mention 'blocked'"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_allow_private_ips_bypasses_blocklist() {
+        // allow_private_ips=true is the escape hatch for on-prem / dev envs.
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
+            allow_direct_ip: true,
+            allow_private_ips: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+
+        // Both an IP literal in a blocked range and a blocked hostname
+        // should pass when the opt-in flag is set.
+        assert!(
+            fetcher
+                .check_if_url_allowed(&url::Url::parse("http://10.0.0.5/x").unwrap())
+                .is_ok()
+        );
+        assert!(
+            fetcher
+                .check_if_url_allowed(&url::Url::parse("https://localhost/x").unwrap())
+                .is_ok()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_hostname_blocklist_case_insensitive() {
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
+        let url = url::Url::parse("https://Metadata.Google.Internal/x").unwrap();
+        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_from_env_default() {
+        // Saving/restoring env vars in tests is racy with parallel tests,
+        // so we only assert the "unset" case here (parallel-safe).
+        // SAFETY: single-threaded mutation acceptable for this restore.
+        unsafe {
+            std::env::remove_var("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL");
+        }
+        let f = MediaFetcher::from_env();
+        assert!(!f.allow_private_ips);
+        assert!(!f.allow_direct_ip);
+        assert!(!f.allow_direct_port);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_hostname_blocklist_strips_trailing_dot() {
+        // FQDN form with a trailing dot must still match the blocklist;
+        // `metadata.google.internal.` resolves to the same host as
+        // `metadata.google.internal` at the DNS layer.
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
+        let url = url::Url::parse("https://metadata.google.internal./x").unwrap();
+        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed(&url);
+        assert!(result.is_err(), "FQDN with trailing dot should be rejected");
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_check_with_dns_data_url_skips_resolution() {
+        // data: URLs never touch the network, so the async path must early-return.
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
+        let url = url::Url::parse("").unwrap();
+        fetcher.check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&url).await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_check_with_dns_public_ip_literal_passes() {
+        // IP literals were already checked by the sync pass; async path is a no-op.
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher {
+            allow_direct_ip: true,
+            ..Default::default()
+        };
+        let url = url::Url::parse("https://8.8.8.8/x").unwrap();
+        fetcher.check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&url).await.unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_check_with_dns_blocked_hostname_fails_before_resolution() {
+        // The sync hostname-blocklist check fires before we attempt any DNS.
+        let fetcher = MediaFetcher::default();
+        let url = url::Url::parse("https://localhost/x").unwrap();
+        let result = fetcher.check_if_url_allowed_with_dns(&url).await;
+        assert!(result.is_err());
+    }
 }