# SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2025-2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved.
# SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0

"""Unit tests for ``dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator``.

These cover scheme / IP / hostname / path / redirect logic in isolation of
the media loaders, so they run quickly with no network and no vLLM imports.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import socket
from typing import Any
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, MagicMock, patch

import httpx
import pytest

from dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator import (
    UrlValidationError,
    UrlValidationPolicy,
    fetch_with_revalidation,
    is_blocked_ip,
    validate_local_path,
    validate_url,
)

pytestmark = [
    pytest.mark.unit,
    pytest.mark.pre_merge,
    pytest.mark.gpu_0,
]


STRICT_HTTPS = UrlValidationPolicy()

PERMISSIVE = UrlValidationPolicy(
    allow_http=True,
    allow_private_ips=True,
)


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# is_blocked_ip()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "ip",
    [
        "127.0.0.1",
        "10.0.0.1",
        "172.16.5.5",
        "192.168.1.1",
        "169.254.169.254",  # AWS metadata
        "100.64.0.1",  # CGNAT
        "0.0.0.0",
        "::1",
        "fe80::1",
        "fc00::1",
        "240.0.0.1",  # reserved
    ],
)
def test_is_blocked_ip_blocks_known_ranges(ip: str) -> None:
    assert is_blocked_ip(ip) is True


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "ip",
    [
        "8.8.8.8",
        "1.1.1.1",
        "93.184.216.34",  # example.com
        "2606:4700:4700::1111",  # Cloudflare
    ],
)
def test_is_blocked_ip_allows_public(ip: str) -> None:
    assert is_blocked_ip(ip) is False


def test_is_blocked_ip_non_ip_literal_returns_false() -> None:
    # A hostname, not an IP — is_blocked_ip only classifies literals.
    assert is_blocked_ip("example.com") is False


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_url() — scheme handling
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


async def test_validate_url_rejects_empty() -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="empty"):
        await validate_url("", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_rejects_http_by_default() -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="not allowed"):
        await validate_url("http://example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_rejects_file_scheme() -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="scheme 'file'"):
        await validate_url("file:///etc/passwd", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_rejects_ftp() -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="scheme 'ftp'"):
        await validate_url("ftp://example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_accepts_data_url_by_default() -> None:
    # data: URLs never touch the network — we allow them without further checks.
    await validate_url("", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_http_allowed_when_opted_in() -> None:
    policy = PERMISSIVE
    # With public hostname + allow_private_ips=True (keeps DNS out of the test)
    await validate_url("http://example.com/x.png", policy)


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_url() — IP literal handling
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "url",
    [
        "https://127.0.0.1/x.png",
        "https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
        "https://10.0.0.5/x.png",
        "https://192.168.1.1/x.png",
        "https://[::1]/x.png",
    ],
)
async def test_validate_url_rejects_private_ip_literal(url: str) -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="blocked range"):
        await validate_url(url, STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_allows_public_ip_literal() -> None:
    # Public IP literal and allow_private_ips=False — should pass the IP test
    # and skip DNS resolution (the IP path short-circuits).
    await validate_url("https://8.8.8.8/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_allows_private_ip_when_opted_in() -> None:
    await validate_url("https://127.0.0.1/x.png", PERMISSIVE)


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_url() — blocked hostnames
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


@pytest.mark.parametrize(
    "host",
    [
        "localhost",
        "metadata.google.internal",
        "metadata",
        "kubernetes.default.svc",
    ],
)
async def test_validate_url_rejects_blocked_hostname(host: str) -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="blocked"):
        await validate_url(f"https://{host}/path", STRICT_HTTPS)


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_url() — DNS resolution
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


def _fake_getaddrinfo(addrs: list[str]):
    def _impl(host: str, *_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any):
        return [
            (socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM, 6, "", (addr, 0)) for addr in addrs
        ]

    return _impl


async def test_validate_url_rejects_host_resolving_to_private_ip() -> None:
    with patch(
        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
        side_effect=_fake_getaddrinfo(["10.0.0.5"]),
    ):
        with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="blocked IP"):
            await validate_url("https://attacker.example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_rejects_host_if_any_ip_is_private() -> None:
    # Even if the host resolves to a public IP too, any blocked IP is fatal.
    with patch(
        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
        side_effect=_fake_getaddrinfo(["8.8.8.8", "169.254.169.254"]),
    ):
        with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="169.254.169.254"):
            await validate_url("https://mixed.example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_accepts_public_host() -> None:
    with patch(
        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
        side_effect=_fake_getaddrinfo(["93.184.216.34"]),
    ):
        await validate_url("https://example.com/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_resolution_failure_raises() -> None:
    with patch(
        "dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo",
        side_effect=socket.gaierror("nodename nor servname provided"),
    ):
        with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="Could not resolve"):
            await validate_url("https://does-not-exist.invalid/x.png", STRICT_HTTPS)


async def test_validate_url_skips_resolution_when_private_allowed() -> None:
    # In developer mode we short-circuit DNS to keep tests deterministic.
    with patch("dynamo.common.multimodal.url_validator.socket.getaddrinfo") as resolver:
        await validate_url("https://example.com/x.png", PERMISSIVE)
        resolver.assert_not_called()


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# validate_local_path()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


def test_validate_local_path_rejected_when_disabled() -> None:
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="not permitted"):
        validate_local_path("/etc/passwd", STRICT_HTTPS)


def test_validate_local_path_accepts_inside_prefix(tmp_path) -> None:
    media = tmp_path / "media"
    media.mkdir()
    target = media / "sample.png"
    target.write_bytes(b"\x89PNG\r\n")

    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(media))
    resolved = validate_local_path(str(target), policy)
    assert resolved == target.resolve()


def test_validate_local_path_rejects_outside_prefix(tmp_path) -> None:
    media = tmp_path / "media"
    media.mkdir()
    other = tmp_path / "secrets"
    other.mkdir()
    secret = other / "creds.txt"
    secret.write_text("hunter2")

    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(media))
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
        validate_local_path(str(secret), policy)


def test_validate_local_path_rejects_symlink_escape(tmp_path) -> None:
    media = tmp_path / "media"
    media.mkdir()
    outside = tmp_path / "outside.txt"
    outside.write_text("secret")
    link = media / "link.png"
    link.symlink_to(outside)

    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(media))
    # Path.resolve() follows the symlink; the target is outside the prefix.
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
        validate_local_path(str(link), policy)


def test_validate_local_path_missing_file(tmp_path) -> None:
    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path))
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="File not found"):
        validate_local_path(str(tmp_path / "nope.png"), policy)


def test_validate_local_path_missing_prefix(tmp_path) -> None:
    target = tmp_path / "sample.png"
    target.write_bytes(b"x")
    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allowed_local_path=str(tmp_path / "does-not-exist"))
    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="allowed_local_path does not exist"):
        validate_local_path(str(target), policy)


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


def test_policy_from_env_defaults(monkeypatch) -> None:
    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", raising=False)
    monkeypatch.delenv("DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH", raising=False)

    policy = UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
    assert policy.allow_http is False
    assert policy.allow_private_ips is False
    assert policy.allowed_local_path is None


def test_policy_from_env_allow_internal(monkeypatch) -> None:
    monkeypatch.setenv("DYN_MM_ALLOW_INTERNAL", "1")
    monkeypatch.setenv("DYN_MM_LOCAL_PATH", "/data/media")

    policy = UrlValidationPolicy.from_env()
    assert policy.allow_http is True
    assert policy.allow_private_ips is True
    assert policy.allowed_local_path == "/data/media"


# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# fetch_with_revalidation()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


def _mock_response(
    status_code: int = 200,
    location: str | None = None,
    *,
    request_url: str = "https://example.com/x.png",
) -> MagicMock:
    resp = MagicMock(spec=httpx.Response)
    resp.status_code = status_code
    resp.headers = {}
    resp.url = httpx.URL(request_url)
    resp.is_redirect = status_code in (301, 302, 303, 307, 308)
    if location is not None:
        resp.headers = {"location": location}
    resp.aclose = AsyncMock()
    return resp


def _mock_client(responses: list[MagicMock]) -> MagicMock:
    client = MagicMock(spec=httpx.AsyncClient)
    client.build_request = MagicMock(
        side_effect=lambda method, url, headers=None: MagicMock(spec=httpx.Request)
    )
    client.send = AsyncMock(side_effect=list(responses))
    return client


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_returns_first_response() -> None:
    policy = PERMISSIVE
    resp = _mock_response(status_code=200)
    client = _mock_client([resp])

    result = await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://example.com/x.png", policy)
    assert result is resp
    assert client.send.await_count == 1


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_follows_safe_redirect() -> None:
    policy = PERMISSIVE
    redirect = _mock_response(
        status_code=302,
        location="https://example.com/final.png",
        request_url="https://example.com/x.png",
    )
    final = _mock_response(status_code=200, request_url="https://example.com/final.png")
    client = _mock_client([redirect, final])

    result = await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://example.com/x.png", policy)
    assert result is final
    assert client.send.await_count == 2
    redirect.aclose.assert_awaited()


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_blocks_redirect_to_private_ip() -> None:
    # Strict policy — first hop is OK (public-IP literal), redirect target is blocked.
    strict = UrlValidationPolicy(allow_private_ips=False)

    redirect = _mock_response(
        status_code=302,
        location="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
        request_url="https://8.8.8.8/x.png",
    )
    client = _mock_client([redirect])

    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError):
        await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://8.8.8.8/x.png", strict)
    # Only one send — the redirect target is rejected before any further fetch.
    assert client.send.await_count == 1


@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_fetch_with_revalidation_enforces_redirect_limit() -> None:
    # _MAX_REDIRECTS is hardcoded at 3; we need 4 redirect responses to trip it.
    policy = UrlValidationPolicy(allow_private_ips=True)  # keep DNS out of this test

    def _hop(src: str, dst: str) -> MagicMock:
        return _mock_response(status_code=302, location=dst, request_url=src)

    client = _mock_client(
        [
            _hop("https://example.com/a", "https://example.com/b"),
            _hop("https://example.com/b", "https://example.com/c"),
            _hop("https://example.com/c", "https://example.com/d"),
            _hop("https://example.com/d", "https://example.com/e"),
        ]
    )

    with pytest.raises(UrlValidationError, match="Too many redirects"):
        await fetch_with_revalidation(client, "https://example.com/a", policy)
